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Introduction

This thesis deals with the Uability of automobile and motorcycle manufacturers,
as well as their suppliers, in situations
Specifically,
to those

it

compares the product

where a defective product causes a harmfiil event.

liability

laws of the Federal Republic of Germany'

of the United States of America.^

Before entering into the details of legal doctrine, the introductory note provides

background information on the social and economic aspects of automobile use

two

countries. Next, Chapter

I

describes the liability regime governing claims against

German motor

vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers. Chapter

comparable law

in the

similar, in part

German

even

identical,

and only

legislature should introduce

differ in a

American product

further pleads against federalization

2 [hereinafter

United States or U.S.].

aspects.

liability law,

focuses on the

It

recommends

it

its

product

that the
liability

argues for the adoption of a

by the United States Supreme Court.

of United States product

part of tort law, traditionally belongs to the states.

Germany].

few

capped punitive damages to

clearer determination of the preemption doctrine

[hereinafter

II

United States and contains the conclusion that both laws are very

law, and, with regard to

'

in those

liability

It

law which, as a

2

Social aspects demonstrating the practical relevance of the

-

TOPIC
Motor vehicle
and Germany.

making
time.

It

travel

the primary

is

means of transportation

in the

United States^

provides a high degree of personal mobility for each individual,

possible to establish social and business contacts and organize one's leisure

it

Due

to the geographical

dimensions and underdeveloped public transportation

systems, most importantly in the United States, the automobile has
necessity of everyday

This observation

life.

is

become a

practical

reflected in statistics pertaining to the

degree of motorization in the two countries. In 1996 the population in the United States

was approximately 265.28

million,'* in

registered vehicles in the United States
that the degree

it

to drive automobiles.

million^, in

1

in

8 in

mind

is

76 %, whereas

that children

Germany*

when measuring

The number of

Germany 49
in

million'', so

Germany

it is

under the age of 16 in

are generally not legally entitled

Moreover, elderly people will often not be able

to their physical condition. Thus,

because these groups of people

may

to drive cars

due

not be taken into

the degree of motorization, the factual degree of motorization

even higher than the one mentioned above. In addition, the number of new

registrations for

^

was 201.63

must be kept

the United States and under the age of

is

82.01 million^ people.

of motorization in the United States

only about 57 %. However,

account

Germany

motor vehicles, especially

U.S. Department of Transportation, National

Safety Facts 1996, Introduction, p.
^ U.S.

1,

for passenger cars, increases every year. In

Highway

Traffic Safety Administration,

Overview

Traffic

<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gOv/people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.

Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety

Facts 1996, Chapter 5, States, Table 103, <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/TSF96Contents.html>.
^

Statistisches

Bundesamt Deutschland (Federal

Statistical Office

of Germany) [hereinafter Statistisches

Bundesamt], <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/e/be02_t02.htm>.
^
"^

*

See supra, note
Statistisches

See,

§

7

4.

Bundesamt, Verkehr
sec.

I,

Nr.

3

(Traffic), <http://v^^ww.statistik-bund.de/basis/d^dl9.htm>.

Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung

Bekanntmachung vom 28.09.1988, Bundesgesetzblatt,
StVZO].

Teil

I

(StVZO) in der Fassung der
BGBi. I], S. 1793 [hereinafter

[hereinafter

3

1996 about 4.8 million motor vehicles were newly registered

compared

to 3.8 million in

1995'^ while

Germany

in

the

in the

United States,^

number of

registrations for

passenger cars amounted to almost 3.5 million" in 1996 compared to 3.2 million in
1995.^2 Thus, the degree of motorization increases continuously in both nations.

Although motorization brings numerous advantages,
that the use

of motor vehicles can lead to accidents

are killed every year. In 1996, there

crashes, in

in

its

which a

biggest disadvantage
large

number of people

were an estimated 6,842,000 police-reported

which 41,907 people were

killed

is

and 3,51 1,000 people were

traffic

injured.'^ Thus,

an average of 115 persons died each day in motor vehicle crashes, one every 13
minutes. •'* In the same year 8,758 people were killed in motor vehicle accidents in

Germany, an average of 24 people per day, one every hour
accidents alcohol and

small

/

or speeding

number of accidents,

was

at least

.'^

In the majority of these

a contributing factor. '^ However, in a

the malfunction of a part of the

motor

vehicle,

its

design or

Which comes to the average of 3,55 million new registrations of motor vehicles since 1988, see: U.S.
Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Overview Traffic Safety

^

Facts 1996,
'^ In

Summary, Table

1994, the total

<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.

2, p. 3,

number of registered

vehicles

was 188.43

million. In 1995, this

number increased to
number

192.21 million, thus an increase of about 3.8 million compared to 1994 can be noticed. This

increased again in 1996, where 197.1 million vehicles were registered, thus a total of approximately 4.8

new registrations compared to 1995 can be noticed, see,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Overview Traffic
million

2, p. 3, <http://www.nhtsa.dot. gov./

"

'^

Statistisches

U.S. Department of Transportation,
Safety Facts 1996,

Summary, Table

people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.

Bundesamt, Verkehr

(Traffic), <http://www.statistik-bund.de/bsis/d/bdl9_t01.htm>.

U.S. Department of Transportation, National

Traffic Safety Facts 1996, Introduction, p.

Highway

Traffic Safety Administration,

Overview

1,

<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.

'^ Statistisches

Bundesamt Verkehr

(Traffic), <http://www.statitik-bund.de/basis/d^dl9_t03.htm>.

'^ In

1996, 17,126 fatalities were alcohol-related (40.9

lives

were

lost in

% of total traffic fatalities for the year) and
was a contributing factor in 30 % of

speeding-related crashes (speeding

crashes), see, U.S. Department of Transportation, National

Overview

Traffic Safety Facts 1996,

Summary,

12,998

all

Highway

p. 4-5,

<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa/overvu96.html #Motorcy>.

fatal

Traffic Safety Administration,

4
the lack of necessary information will have played a role in the occurrence of the
accident.

'"^

-

Economic aspect showing the practical importance of the topic

The mentioned

statistical

data already gives a hint to the economic importance

of the motor vehicle industry the United States and Germany. In
industries in the respective national economies, providing

it is

one of the top

many jobs and

constituting a

Germany,

for example,

significant percentage of the gross national product. In 1996,

was

fact,

the third largest producer and the second largest exporter of motorcars in the

world. '^ Thus,

it

not surprising that one often hears the term "automobile-lobby"

is

which might, from case
economic and

-

to case,

be connected with the exertion of influence on

political,

legal decisions.

Effects of product liability on automobile and motorcycle

manufacturers (and their suppliers)
Product

laws can affect the business and business-related decisions of

liability

motor vehicle manufacturers and
products often

is

one factor which

their

is

suppliers.

First,

the

for

liability

defective

taken into consideration before determining the

location of a production center,i^ because the strictness of product liability laws

vary from country to country and in the United States from state to

'^ E.g., see,

BGHZ

motorcycle;

in

this

99,167

ff. -

Honda: Here, a steering gear cover

case, the defect consisted of the

accessories (steering gear cover) that could be used for
^^ International

^9

Henry

J.

can refer to

Steiner et

al.,

of the driver of a

manufacturer's (Honda's) failure to observe
products (motorcycles).

Transnational Legal Problems 50

BMW of North America,
its

Inc. v.

Zekoll,

Umkehr

Schadensersatzprozess,

im

(4'^ ed.

1994); as an example one

Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996): The Alabama Supreme Court

decision to allow an action against the

as long-arm-jurisdiction did not exist because of a lack

1997,198(201).

However,

Facts and Statistics for 1996, p. 3, <http://mightymall.com/sevenseas/facts.html>.

held that the Trial Court erred in

Joachim

its

led to the death

state.

may

German manufacturer (BMW)

of contacts to the forum

U.S.-amerikanischen

in the

Produkthaftpflichtrecht

United States; see,

und

internationaler

Praxis des Intemationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts [hereinafter IPRax]

5

economic

factors like the market, wages, social security contributions, taxes, antitrust

and labor

will

legislation,^^

often

be more important and even decisive

the

for

determination in question. For example, the production center of the Mercedes-Benz

Tuscaloosa,

despite

Secondly, the involvement of a manufacturer or supplier in a product

liability

Alabama's

suit

ML-320)

Alabama,^'

cross-country

(M-Class,

vehicle

strict

product

in

is

liability laws.

and the related potential risk of economic loss can have severe consequences for

Due

business.

punitive

to higher

damages

in the

medical costs, the existence of a jury, and the availability of

United States, which

even higher for U.S. manufacturers, or those

compared

to others

recent case in

who

its

is

unknown

who can be

to

German

law, this risk

is

sued in the United States,

are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This can be illustrated

by a

which a South Carolina jury returned a $ 262.5 million verdict against

Chrysler in a product liability suit brought by a family whose 6-year-old child was
killed in

an automobile accident. The award consisted of $ 12.5 million

and $ 250 million
Thirdly,

in punitive

in

in

compensatory

damages. ^2

addition

to

the

potential

monetary

liability

a

motor vehicle

manufacturer has to face, the loss of reputation caused by the involvement in a product
liability action

who

has to

can lead to a sales

start

The same

crisis.

a recall campaign for a product that

has to remedy the defect which

may

997, Mercedes-Benz recalled

20
2'

its

true for a manufacturer or supplier

is

cost a lot of

Germany, Mercedes Benz recently had
1

is

defective. Here, the manufacturer

money and damage

to face this situation.

image. In

Beginning in October

A-Class, the so-called "Baby-Benz," because

it

tended

m
Deutsche Autos

in

den

USA

begehrt (German cars desired in the U.S.), Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger,

Wirtschaft, October 6, 1997, <http://ksta.de/text/wirtschaft/wirtschaft01.html>.
22

its

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October

9,

1997, at section

G

1.

6

extreme driving situations simulated

to roll over in

of

this type

were

in

road

tests. ^3

was delayed

affected. Delivery to customers

About 100,000

for 12 weeks,^'*

cars

and the

2,600 cars which had already been delivered were recalled. ^^ j\iq whole A-Class-series
got a

new

chassis-tuning with different stabilizers, broader

and was equipped with an Electronic

Stability

computerized stabilization of the car in a

split

added without additional charge

substitute car

a lowered body-work

Program (ESP) guaranteeing

and those customers who had already
1998 received a

delivery date prior to February

from Mercedes-Benz.^^

It is

a

second. All these improvements were

to the customer,

ordered an A-Class model for a

tires,

estimated that the profit of the

the years 1997 and 1998 will be diminished by 300 million Deutsche

Mark

company

in

[hereinafter

DM], and combine boss Juergen Schrempp admitted

that the prestige

of the combine,

known

been

Other examples

of

as a

recall

model

in traffic safety until that date, has

scratched.^''

campaigns carried out by automobile manufacturers can be gathered from the

table in the appendix.^*

Rapidly developing technology contributes to the manufacturer's increased
exposure to product

liability suits or

car consisted of only a

being forced to recall products. In former times a

few mechanical

parts.

Today

it

consists of thousands of

mechanical and electronic elements some of which are highly sophisticated, like driver

and passenger airbags, side-bags, Anti-Slip-Regulation (ASR), Anti-lock Braking

System (ABS), brake

assistant, Electronic Stability

Although most of these innovations contribute

23

Autobild, Nr. 44,

October 30, 1997,
2'*

10/97, October 30,

to safety

and comfort, they

1997, <http://www.autobild.de.>;

Koeber

may

etc.

also

Stadt-Anzeiger,

at 29.

Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, November

26 Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger,
2"^

Program (ESP), power windows

October 30, 1997,

Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, November

^^ See infra, at 186.

12, 1997, at 33.

at

29; Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger,

12, 1997, at 33.

November

12, 1997, at 33.

7

way

malfunction in a

could be held

On

that

can cause an accident for which the manufacturer or supplier

liable. ^^

the subject of liability,

we now have

defective products in both countries.

The

to consider the liability situation for

Germany has

potential defendant in

to

be

aware of the increasing shaping of the idea of consumer protection,^^ which

is

noticeable not only in legislation and jurisprudence but also in the attitude of the

consumers who become more and more demanding. In the
Directive^'

on product

and Germany,
1

in

liability

performing

must

first

be mentioned.

It

field

of

legislation, the

was enacted on July

1

,

1

990 the national

statute

law

The most important innovation

the introduction of strict liability for

is

all

that has

which

been brought by

liability

claim can either be based on traditional

requiring fault, or

on

tort

law (§§ 823

-

have been killed

in the

1990 a

853 BGB)33

Unites States by airbags inflating

1993 to September 1994

power windows; 9

it

is

estimated that 499 persons have been injured

% of them

in

in

low

From October

severity crashes, see, Airbag Statistics, <http://www.hwysafety.org/airbags/airstat.htm>.

connection with motor

(43 persons) were injured as a result of a "faulty"

power window,

Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Research Note,

see, U.S.

May

this

strict liability.

2^ For example, since 1990, 89 people

vehicle

is

three kinds of product liability claims

(manufacturing, design, and instructions or warnings-defects). Thus, since

product

art.

concerning

the liability for defective products (Produkthaftungsgesetz, ProdHaftG)^^
all states.

25, 1985,

duty to transform this directive in accordance with

its

89 of the European Treaty, enacted on January

obligatory for

EC-

1997,

Injuries

associated

with

Hazards

involving

Motor

Vehicle

Power

Windows,

<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa>.
30

Graf von Westphalen-Littbarski, Produkthaftungshandbuch, Band 1,
und deliktische Haftung, Strafrecht und Produkthaftpflichtversicherung § 48, Rn. 1
[hereinafter von Westphalen-editor, Band 1]; Littbarski is talking about a "[T]riumphal march of the idea
of consumer protection...".
Friedrich

Vertragliche

3J

EG-Richtlinie 85/374

32 Gesetz ueber die

BGBl.

I

S.

2198

33 Buergerliches

EWG,

Abl.

L 210/29-33

v.

07.08.1985.

Haftung fuer fehlerhafte Produkte (Produkthaftungsgesetz, ProdHaftG)

v.

15.12.1989

[hereinafter Product Liability Act, Produkthaftungsgesetz or ProdHaftG].

Gesetzbuch (Civil Code)

entered into force 01.01.1900.

v.

18.08.1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter RGBl.j S. 195,

8

Another law which has recently been enacted on the basis of an EC-Directive^"*
is

the statute concerning the regulation of safety requirements for products and the

of CE-labeling

protection

enacted on August

(Produktsicherheitsgesetz,

ProdSG)^^.

1997 and requires manufacturers

1,

This

statute

to put safe products

was

on the

market. In case of violation of this requirement, administrative agencies, like the
Federal Office for Motor Traffic (Kraftfahrtbundesamt,) have the power either to forbid
the marketing of the product or to issue orders to the manufacturer requiring

provide a warning about the product or recall

warnings or recalls themselves; and,
to

DM

50.000,

disobeying

the

to

finally,

it.

first

they can impose an administrative fine up

manufacturer.

With

this

law,

power of

the

1,

New cars wall

1998 on, whereas

before 1998, on October

With regard

1,

to the

so called "Fowl pest

is in

have to meet the requirements of this directive from October

becomes mandatory

it

was

time.

In addition, an EC-Directive establishing a higher standard for crash tests
preparation.

to

Secondly, these agencies can issue

administrative agencies to intervene in situations involving defective products

expressly established for the

it

for all cars, including those introduced

2003.36

German

courts,

it

can be said that since the leading case, the

decided by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany, a

case,"^''

continuous tightening of the defendant's duties under product

liability

law can be

noticed.38

^'^

EG-Richtlinie 92/59

sicherheitsrichtlinie",
^^

Gesetz

EWG

ABIEG

des Rates

v.

L 228

v.

Nr.

29.06.1992 ueber die allgemeine Produktsicherheit "Produkt1

1.08.1992, S. 24.

Regelung der Sicherheitsanforderungen

zur

Kennzeichung, Produktsicherheitsgesetz, ProdSG

v.

an

Produkte

30.04.1997 BGBl.

I

und zum Schutz der CES. 934 [hereinafter Product

Safety Act, Produktsicherheitsgesetz, or ProdSG].
36

See <http://www.fia.com/tourisme/safety/coagnstd.htm>.

37

BGHZ 51,91

-

Huehnerpest (Fowl

38 See, in particular:
II

BGHZ

(Benomyl) (Apple scab

bottle

I);

BGHZ

1

16,60

-

80,186

II);

-

pest).

Kindertee

I

Apfelschorf
1); BGHZ 80,199
BGHZ 104,323 Mehrwegflasche (Returnable
BGHZ 16,104 - Salmonellen (Salmonellae).

Apfelschorf I (Derosal) (Apple scab

BGHZ

99,167

-

(Child tea

Honda;
I);

-

1

I

9
In the United States, however, product liability

more complex. Of course,

protection are
contrast to

federal law

Germany, a

this is to a

on products

law and the role of consumer

high extent due to the fact

As

liability is non-existent.^^

areas of substantive law (e.g. criminal law, family law)

product

,

that, in

in

law

liability

most
not

is

subject to federal but to state regulation, either with regard to legislation or with respect

common

to

As

law.''^

a

result

of

this

of competence one can notice

division

fragmentation and a lack of clarity in the field of product

made

attempts have been

law on products

liability,

each has

In 1996, the latest legislative initiative'*^ to enact such a federal law, through

failed.'*'

which

to introduce a federal

Although several

liability.

restrictions

of

liability

would have been introduced,

failed.

The

law passed

draft

both the House of Representatives and the Senate and was the most successfiil initiative

been introduced. However, President Clinton considered

that has ever

it

to be too

detrimental to the consumer and vetoed the proposal.''^ Thus, the liability for defective

products

is still

subject to a different treatment in each of the 50 states. In the majority

of these

states,

however, efforts for reform of product

liability

law have taken place

^^ Tort law, including product liability law, belongs to the historic province of the states and

estimated that 95

A

Talarico,

%

of

tort litigation is

decided by state courts, see,

Profile of Tori Litigation in Georgia

and Reflections on

Thomas A. Eaton

&

is

it

Susette

M.

Tort Reform, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 627,632

and note 9 (1996).

no federal common

'*0

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,

'*'

Robert A. Goodman, Proposed Federal Standards for Product Liability, 30 Harv.

304 U.S. 64,78 (1938): "[TJhere

is

law...".
J.

on Legis. 296,299

Lies,

The Manufacturer of this Product may have engaged in Cover-Ups,
and Concealment: Making the Case for limitless Punitive Awards in Product Liability Lawsuits, 73

Ind.

L.J.

(1993); Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning

Punitive
^^

187,251 (1997); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice through National

Damage, 46 Am. U.

The 1996

state

!

L. Rev.

legislation focused

1573,1613-1614 (1997).

on capping punitive damage awards and intended

laws regarding punitive damages, see.

The

Common

to establish

uniform

Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of

1996, H.R. 956,104* Cong. § 102 (a) (1) (1996), see, Mabry, supra note 41, at 251. For criticism on this
Talarico, supra note 39, at 685,686 (arguing that the proposed 1996 legislation did
bill, see, Eaton

&

address secondary issues

(e.g.

punitive damages, joint and several liability) instead of imposing a uniform

standard to determine design or warning defects).
^^ President Clinton vetoed because he feared that limits

"[pjrevent

Damages

many
in

persons from receiving

fiill

compensation for

on punitive remedies
their injury.", see,

Amy

in

tort

law would

A. Kirby, Punitive

Contract Actions: The Tensions between the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the

International Sale of Goods

and

U.S.

Law, 16

J.L.

& Com. 215, note 83

and accompanying

text (1997).

10
since the
against

1

980s, pursuing the
'^

enterprises.'*''

common

jn

number of claims brought

goal of reducing the

particular,

"quiet

this

revolution"'*^

comprises

the

introduction of caps on damages,'*'^ the modification or abolition of the collateral source
joint

rule,'*^

^'*

and several

James A. Henderson,

and a change

liability,'*^

Jr.

&

awarding punitive damages^o.^i

in

Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution

Products Liability:

in

An

Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 479 (1990); Pace, supra note 41, at 1613 (stating
that the recently proposed national tort reform legislation intends to protect manufacturers from excessive

damage awards; see

punitive

% of

increased from 2
'*^

In

see,

also, S.

Rep. No. 104-69,

at 1-1

% in

federal cases in 1975 to 5.74

Product

(1995));

1989, see,

liability actions

Goodman, supra note

1986 and 1987 laws concerning the restrictions of damage claims entered into force

See,

207 (1990); see

L. Rev.

have

41, at 307.
in

41 states,

& Craig Joyce, "Off the Races":

Joseph Sanders

27 Hou.
'*^

all

James A. Henderson,

also,

Jr.

&

The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process,
WILLIAM LLOYD Prosser ET AL., TORTS 808 (5™ ed. 1994).

Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution

in

Products Liability:

An

&

Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 479,480 (1990); James A. Henderson, Jr.
Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev.

1332,1342 (1991); Theodore Eisenberg
Products

Liability,

&

James A. Henderson,

Jr.,

Inside the Quiet Revolution in

39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 731 (1992).

& Susette M. Talarico, Testing two Assumptions about Federalism and Tort Reform,
on Reg. 371,389 (1996) (stating that 35 states have enacted legislation placing caps on
compensatory damages and providing statistical data on damage-cap legislation).

'*^

Thomas A. Eaton

14 Yale

'*^

J.

According

damage claim against the defendant remains entirely although
same harmflil event against a third party - typically an
even if the plaintiff has abeady received the payment of damages

to the collateral source rule a

the plaintiff has other claims resulting out of the

insurance

company

from the

third party. Usually, these claims or

same

is

true

payments had to be disregarded in a products liability
most of the jurisdictions either the jury or the judge can decide whether they have
be subtracted from the amount of damages that is going to be awarded to the plaintiff, see, Kathleen E.

action;
to

the

-;

meanwhile,

in

Pyne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 Det. CiL. Mich

70 (1995)
Missouri,

New

^^

the

Under

Jersey,

applicable in

One

common

law rule of joint and several

German

restriction

tort

&

liability

each of several defendants

Talarico, supra note 39, at 682-683. This rule

concerning the granting of punitive damages

higher than the double of the actual

Another kind of

restriction

is

damage
-

will flow towards the state; e.g.,

capped punitive damages

An Economic

is

the introduction of an upper limit

amount of punitive damages may not be

CONN. GEN. Stat. Ann. § 52-240B (West 1991).
of the amount of
which can be up to 75 %, see, Ga. CODE ANN., § 51-12in Oregon the plaintiff gets 40 % of the awarded amount of

is

(a).

Some of

the reasons for the introduction of

that they increase predictability

avoid the effect of over-deterrence, see, Amelia
Motive:

responsible for

claim, see,

punitive damages, see, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1)
statutory

is

comparable to the rules

that the plaintiff can only recover a certain percentage

granted punitive damages; the other part
-

is

law (§§ 840, 421 ff, 426 BGB).

("caps") for punitive damages. In Connecticut, for example, the

5.1(e)(2)

U. L. Rev. 1207, note

North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon).

the entire loss, see, Eaton

^^

St.

(stating that the only states retaining the collateral source rule are Colorado, Florida, Iowa,

Perspective, 40

Emory

J.

of punitive damage awards and

Toy, Statutory Punitive

L.J.

Damage Caps and the

Profit

303,323-328 (1991). In addition, the requirement

concerning the provision of evidence for circumstances justifying the granting of punitive damages
higher than the one for other

facts:

Whereas usually

facts

is

have to be proven by the "preponderance of

11

Furthermore, an important source of tort law in the United States to which courts
often refer to as an authority, the Restatement, has been subject to change and high
criticism. In reflecting current

1965 established

From 1965
Today's

in its §

until today,

402A

common

law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts from

a strict liability standard for

all

kinds of product defects.

however, courts have interpreted § 402

common law

upholds

majority

a

strict

liability

A

in various ways.

standard

solely

for

manufacturing defects. For design and instruction or warning defects, on the other hand,
a "kind of negligence" standard
availability

rules

set

is

applied under which the plaintiff has to prove the

of an alternative design or information. ^^ xhese changes are reflected

forth

the

in

Third

Restatement.

Restatement incorrectly restates the

However,

common law

and that

consumer, too manufacturer-friendly. ^^ This controversy

and complexity of U.S. product

critics

it is,

fiirther

argue

that

the

to the detriment

law

in this field in

area.

of the

liability law.

linking of social,

economic, and legal issues and demonstrate the practical importance of product

motor vehicle

new

enhances the difficulty

The above mentioned aspects give an impression of the close

in the

in the

The purpose of

Germany and

this thesis is to present the

the United States

product

liability

liability

by taking a comparative view,

to

discover and debate the legal issues, and to attempt to provide solutions for them.

evidence", facts supporting the award of punitive damages have to be proven with "clear and convincing
evidence", see. Pace, supra note 41, at 1589-1590 and note 65.
5'

Prosser, supra note 45,

52 See,

at

808.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

P.F.D.], April

Liability, Proposed Final Draft [hereinafter

1997, §2.

1,

^^ See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B): The
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407,1424 (1994); David G. Owen, RiskUtility Balancing in Design Defct Cases, 30. U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 239 (1997); Frank J. Vandali,

Constructing a

Roof Before

Liability Section

2

(b)

the Foundation

is

prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
J. L. Ref. 261,277-279 (1997).

Design Defect, 30 U. Mich.

Chapter I
Product liability in the motor vehicle area in Germany

A. Sources of

1.

law and system of product liability law

Three statutory sources based on tort law - generally
excluding contract law

In
first

German law

source

is

the

which contains

three statutory sources of product liability law are found.

German

in its §§

Civil

823

-

853

The

Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB)^'* from 1900,

BGB the traditional tort law.

The second source

is

the

Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz)^^ from 1990. The third and most recent
source, the Product Safety Act (Produktsicherheitsgesetz),^^

was enacted on August

1^',

1997.

As we can
reason for this

see, contract

is that,

law does not appear as a source of product

liability.

with regard to an action brought against the manufacturer or

supplier of a defective product, a contract does generally not exist because the

usually buys a product
directly

{e.g.

car)

from a

from the manufacturer. Due

consumer and the

The

latter,

dealer, trader, or marketing

to the

consumer

company, not

lack of contractual links between the

the consumer's claim can, according to the

German Supreme

Civil Court [Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen], generally not arise out of contract law

^^

See supra, note 33.

^^

See supra, note 32.

^^

See supra, note 35.

12

13

but can only be based on tort law.^^

58

Even

in exceptional cases, contractual relations

if,

between the consumer and the manufacturer

exist, a contract-based

caused by a defective product would be subject to more, or
potential defenses than a products liability claim based

on

action for breach of warranty of a sales contract (§§ 433,

459

liable

without

such a claim

fault,^^

the item has been handed over (§

at

more

least

tort law.

BGB)

ff.

claim for harm
severe,

Although

an

in

the defendant

is

barred by the statute of limitations six months after

is

477

sec.

I

BGB.) The same

statute

of limitations

is

applicable to an action for breach of a sales contract [positive Vertragsverletzimg,

compound

p.V.V.],60 where, to

matters, the defendant

is

only liable for culpable

behavior for which the plaintiff bears the burden of proofs* Moreover, a contractual

claim could be contracted away either by individual agreement between the parties^^ or

by

of

use

the

Geschaeftsbedingungen],^3

and

terms

general

limited only

conditions

by the

BGB, ^5

the plaintiff cannot get

" BGHZ 51,91(93

From

Buick Motor Co.,

1 1 1

59

Hans Putzo,

^0

Helmut Heinrichs,

62

Id. at

Vorbem

Hans Putzo,

for pain

the plaintiffs point of

253

fact that, according to §

and suffering under contract law,

pest).

can be drawn to United States product

infra,

Chapter

II,

at

liability law:

Since MacPherson

v.

96-97.

Palandt BuergerlicHES Gesetzbuch
in

v § 249
in

of

N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) the privity requirement for actions against a manufacturer

has been abolished, see
in

enhanced by the

damages

Huehnerpest (Fowl

ff.) -

^^ In this context, a parallel

61

fiirther

[Allgemeine

trade

statute concerning the regulation

general terms and conditions of trade (AGB-Gesetz)^.

view, these disadvantages are

of

§

459 BGB, Rn. 4 (57*

Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch

BGB,

§ 276

BGB,

Rn.

ed. 1998).
1

10 (57* ed. 1998).

Rn. 162.

Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch Vorbem

v § 459

BGB,

Rn.

1

;

§ 463

BGB,

Rn. 3(57*ed. 1998).
63

Helmut Heinrichs,

in

Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch

§

276 BGB, Rn. 62: § 9

AGBG,

Rn.

36ff. (57*ed. 1998).
6^

Gesetz zur Regelung

des

Rechts

der Allgemeinen

Geschaeftsbedingungen

(AGB-Gesetz),

v.

09.12.1976(BGB1. IS. 3317).
65 §

253

BGB

be requested

in

provides: "For

damage which

cases determined by the law."

is

not pecuniary damage, compensation

in

money can

only

.

14

because a provision allowing him to recover for
this area

kind of damage does not exist in

this

of law.

A claim

based on

tort law,

on the other hand,

is

subject to a three-year limitation

period that begins from the time the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have

discovered the act or omission of the tortfeasor (§ 852 sec.
(§ 12 sec.

ProdhaftG). The

I

liability

I

BGB

-

traditional tort law)

of the defendant for defective products under

tort

law can generally be contracted away neither through individual agreement nor through
the use of general terms

and conditions of

trade.^^ Furthermore, the plaintiff is not

excluded from recovery for pain and suffering as the result of a provision allowing him
to recover for this kind

fundamental

2.

of product

pillar

BGB.

of damage § 847

Thus,

tort

law has been and

still is

the

liability law.

The role of judicial decisions: Updating of the law of product
liability

Although the
with

tort law,

it

legislature of the Civil

Code from 1900 included

a section dealing

did not specifically take care of the manufacturer's liability for defective

products.^^ Thus,

was

it

the task of the courts to interpret traditional tort law under this

aspect of liability so that product liability was, in fact, not subject to statutory but to
judicial regulation.^*

other

fields

of law,

Heinz Thomas,

reason for that
that

this

kind of

regulated in special statutes

liability is partly

Produkthaftungsgesetz and Produktsicherheitsgesetz). However, compared to

(e.g.,

66

Today,

in

contrast

law the

play

liability (for defective

contracts

to

Schuldverhaeltnisse],

still

a

very

important

Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch

in

in tort

courts

law

tort

which
consists

create

§ 823

role

in

interpretation,

BGB, Rn. 218 (57*

ed. 1998); the

products) can generally not be "contracted"
obligations

of obligations

based

which

are

on

agreements

created

by

law

away

is

[vertragliche

[gesetzliche

Schuldverhaeltnisse]
67

ReINHART MERTENS,

BGB,

Rn. 269

6* See, e.g.,

(3^" ed.

BGHZ

in

MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH,

§ 823 sec.

I

1997).

51,91

ff.

-

Huehnerpest (Fowl

pest): In this

landmark decision the Supreme Court

introduced the shift of burden of proof to the defendant with regard to breach of duty and

fault.

15
determination, and updating of this law,^^ as legislators are not able to regulate every

One may conclude

single issue that might arise.^o

same importance

decisions almost have the

3.

as

that in this area

common law

in the

German

judicial

United States.

Differences between the three sources and the impact on
criminal law

Liability for a claim

under traditional

torts (§§

In order for a plaintiffs claim to be successful, he

823

-

853

BGB)

is

must generally prove

based on

fault.

that the act or

omission of the defendant was negligent or intentional.^' From the plaintiffs point of

view this

a relatively high standard compared to the statute concerning the

is

liability for

defective products (Produkthaftungsgesetz), but the traditional tort law does generally

not place any limitations on the plaintiffs potential recovery. "^^

On

the other hand, the statute concerning the liability for defective products

(Produkthaftungsgesetz) does establish a

can be held

liable for

Thus, the plaintiff

who

strict liability

damages caused by

standard so that the defendant

his defective product regardless

of

fault.''^

bases his claim on this statute does not have to prove any form

of culpable behavior on the part of the defendant.^"* However, the Produkthaftungsgesetz
provides several limitations with respect to the damages that the plaintiff can recover.

Most

importantly,

it

does not contain a provision according to which the plaintiff could

recover for pain and suffering. This kind of recovery

69

Mertens, supra note

"^^

See, e.g.,

BGHZ

67, § 823

104,323 ff

-

BGB, Rn.

this

duty

is

Mehrwegflasche

1

Thomas, supra note

72

m

at

§823 BGB, Rn.

" Id

at

Vorbem v

74

See, §

1

sec.

§

1

I):

The Supreme Court introduced

have a specific risk of danger; consequence

the presumption that a (manufacturing) defect ab^eady existed before the

66, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 54

159.

ProdHaftG, Rn.

IV ProdHaftG.

(Returnable bottle

products that

product has been marketed.
71

exclusively reserved to

271.

the manufacturer's duty to secure the status of

of a violation of

is

5.

-

57.

16

law (§ 847 BGB). In case of property damage, the

traditional tort

deductible of 1.125,-

money

DM (§

ProdHaftG), and

1 1

the plaintiff can recover

in case

plaintiff has to

pay a

of personal harm the amount of

limited to 160 million

DM

law we have a

standard based on negligence

is

(§ 10 sec.

I

ProdHaftG)

(capped damages).^^
Thus, under traditional

tort

liability

without any limitations, whereas under the statute concerning the
products, the liability standard

is strict liability

liability for defective

with several limitations. Therefore,

can be concluded that a disadvantage for the plaintiff in the burden of proof

it

is

compensated by allowing him non-limited recovery and vice versa.
contrast

In

to

traditional

tort

law,

which

basically^^

attempts to

provide

compensation for harm that has already occurred, and the Produkthaftungsgesetz, which
fullyP'^

follows the same purpose, the statute concerning the regulation of safety

requirements

products

for

By empowering

approach.

(Produktsicherheitsgesetz,

Federal

the

Office

for

ProdSG)

Motor

takes

a

different

of Germany

Traffic

[Kraftfahrtbundesamt] to prohibit a product from being put on the market (§ 7 ProdSG),
to

warn of dangerous products

^5 Further important limitations
-

In case

which are foreseen

to other things, see §

In case of property

fact

ProdSG) and

in the

/

or to recall unsafe products (§ 9

Produkthaftungsgesetz

are:

of property damage the plaintiff cannot recover for the defective product

damage caused
-

(§ 8

damage

1

sec.

1, cl.

but only for

itself

2 ProdHaftG;

the plaintiff can only recover if the other thing

used by the plaintiff for private purposes (in contrast to commercial

was meant

and was

to be

in

I, cl.

2

which the plaintiffs claim

is

activities),

see §

I

sec.

ProdhaftG;
-

The Produktafhaftungsgesetz contains a provision of repose according

to

excluded ten years after the defective product that caused the harm has been put on the market by the
manufacturer, see § 13 sec.
^^

The term

"^

basically''' is

I

ProdHaftG.

used because of the following reason: Although traditional

the majority of cases compensation only,

harm

in the area

of products

defective products

is

it

tort

law provides

in

also comprises the aspect of preventing the occurrence of

liability since the

manufacturer's post-salt duties to warn, instruct and recall

recognized under § 823 sec.

I

BGB,

see,

THOMAS, supra note

66, § 823

BGB,

Rn.

208-209.
^^

The term

'''fully'''

is

used because the Produkthaftungsgestz exclusively serves the purpose of providing

compensation but does not comprise any aspect of prevention of harm.

17

ProdSG), the legislature's purpose

is

not to compensate for harmful events but to

prevent their occurrence (prevention instead of compensation)^^ Moreover, by vesting a

governmental agency with power concerning the regulation of private business matters,
it

belongs to the field of public

on private law
belong

of

area

in particular administrative law, with influence

whereas traditional

(tort law),

the

to

law,''^

private

law

tort

law and the Produkthaftungsgesetz

only.

This

means

under

that

the

Produktsicherheitsgesetz the manufacturer, trader or a third person^^ can be subject to
administrative regulation (e.g. administrative fines, substitute performance). However, a
violation

of

traditional

tort

law,

the

Produkthaftungsgesetz

Produktsicherheitsgesetz by a car manufacturer or

its

even

or

the

supplier might also be sanctioned

by the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB)^^^^ One might,

for example,

think of a case in which personal injury occurred as a result of the negligent, or even
intentional behavior, of an automobile manufacturer
that the gas tanks

under

warm

who knew

or could have

of a certain car he produces are likely to explode when

weather conditions. ^^ Then, the manufacturer or

its

known

filling the

tank

responsible organs

(e.g.

^* <http://www.ra-clr-d-wendel.de/parts/downloacl/wrpsg.txt>.
^^

German law makes the general difference between three
among others, tort law and in particular products

comprises,
Public

Law and

Criminal

Law (which

is

in fact

different fields
liability

law

-,

of law: Private

Law

-

which

involving private parties only,

only a special area of public law), both generally

involving a governmental party on the one hand and a private party on the other hand; this distinction
reflected in the existence of three general jurisdictions and has effect

For private law matters. Civil Courts (Zivilgerichte) have jurisdiction, for Public
administrative Courts or the Constitutional Courts of the Laender (states) or the

and for Criminal

Law

80 See,
§ 7 sec. Ill
81

is

on the distribution of competences:

Law

either the

Bund have competence

only Criminal Courts can be called on.

ProdSG.

Strafgesetzbuch (StGB),

v.

15.05.1871 RGBl. S. 127 [hereinafter StGB].

BGH NJW 1990,2560 (Lederspray-Leatherspray); Christoph Kremer, Traeger der haftungsrecthlichen
Produktverantwortung im KfZ-Bereich, Deutsches Autorecht [hereinafter DAR] 4 / 96,134,139 (1996).
82

8^ In fact, several accidents

the filler pipes of

OPEL

had

fire and explosions occurred in 1995 due to gases escaping out of
models when refueled; because of that the German car manufacturer
worldwide 2.3 million affected cars of this model, see, Report: Rueckrufe am

caused by

OPEL ASTRA

to recall

laufenden Band, Autobild Nr. 49

v.

05.12.1997,

at 76.

18
board)^"* or

employees

{e.g.

product designer, product manager)^^ will not only be

subject to a product liability action brought by the plaintiff, but he will also be subject to

criminal prosecution, which could be based on § 230

§ 222

StGB

(negligent homicide), § 223

(negligent physical injury),

(intentional physical injury), §

which negligently caused death) or § 303 StGB

(intentional physical injury

damage

StGB

StGB

to property). In such a situation, the responsible organs or persons

226 StGB

(intentional

who

acted or

omitted necessary measures could be convicted to pay a criminal fine, or they could

even be imprisoned.
Thus, although German product
law),

it

liability

law has

roots in private law (tort

its

also affects administrative law as part of the public law and can even raise issues

under criminal law. As a resulting consequence, the motor vehicle manufacturer or

its

supplier will be well advised to examine product liability issues not only under the

aspects of tort law but also with regard to effects on the other

Therefore he should

B.

make use of lawyers who

fields

of law.

are specialized in these areas.

Product liability under traditional tort law (§§ 823 - 853 bgb)

1.

Structure and most important sections of traditional tort law

Before entering in detail into the exposition of product
traditional tort law,

it is

important provisions.

necessary to explain briefly

German

traditional tort

law

is

its

Kremer, supra note 82

and

structure

under

liability issues

to present its

regulated in the last

section of the second of five^^ books of the Civil

^'^

two

title

Code from 1900,

most

of the

last

the law of

at 139.

85 /J.

*^

The German

Part (§§
4*^

1

-

Civil

240); 2""

Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) comprises
book,

Law

book, Family law (§§ 1297

-

of obligations (§§ 241

1921);

5"^

book,

Law

-

853);

3^"^

book.

five books: T'

Law

of succession (§§ 1922

-

book, General

of things (§§ 854
2385).

-

1296);

19
obligations.

comprises §§ 823

It

modem

the

-

853

BGB

concerning

statute

which are not only

the

(Produkthaftungsgesetz) from 1990, but which

This

law.

liability

is

due

Produktsicherheitsgesetz from

the

to

1

provide the foundation for product

still

and

Produkthaftungsgesetz

the

that

fact

products

defective

for

liability

applicable^'' beside

still

997 are disadvantageous

for the plaintiff

and

the

or leave

/

gaps in the regulation of issues such as the duty to warn or to recall defective products
or accessories. Thus a recourse to traditional tort law
sustain the plaintiffs claim in

its

is

often necessary in order to

entire extent.

Although under the heading of "Tortious acts" the Civil Code only
853

BGB,

traditional tort

law comprises

in fact

more

system of the Civil Code which contains general rules

long as they do not modify the general rules. Like

once instead of being cited
the Civil

Code

which

is

in

due to the

only had to be cited

this, the latter

Part" and provides with

its

§§

of limitation

in

§§ 194

-

225

BGB
-

231

importance. The second book, the law of obligations, contains in

249

BGB

book of

BGB

general

With respect

BGB
its

are of particular

§§241

-

432

,

§ 254

which

BGB

which contains the

rule

are designed for situations in

See, § 15 sec.

88

§§ 249

-

253

89

§§ 412

.

426

II

which more than one debtor or

ProdHaftG.

BGB are modified or specified by
BGB are specified or modified by

§§ 842

-

plaintiff

on contributory negligence and §§ 421

exists (joint-debtors, joint-creditors). ^^

8''

BGB

Of high importance

253 BGB^^ which regulate the kind and the extent of damages the

-

can recover

240

first

and the provisions of

general rules most of which can be applied to traditional tort law.
are §§

-

1

are in principle applicable to each of the four following books.

grounds of justification for an unlawful behavior in §§ 226

432

-

beginning of the Code, or

at the

every section to which they also apply. The

named "General

to tort law, the regulation

-

is

§§ 823

beginning of its books, that are usually applicable to the sections which follow, as

at the

rules

provisions. This

lists

845, 847

§ 840 sec.

I -

III

BGB.

BGB.

creditor

20
Traditional tort law itself provides the

with § 823 sec.

liability

I

BGB^o and

basis of the claim, containing

its

main provisions

§ 823 sec.

BGB^'. These sections represent the

II

who

of the principal for a vicarious agent

who

not the vicarious agent but the principal
person, if he

is

damages

prerequisites and the compensation for

legal consequence. Still less important is § 831
liability

of product

in the area

sec.

BGB^^ which

I

establishes the

causes harm. In such a situation

will

as

it

is

have to pay damages to the third

unable to provide exculpatory evidence.

Concerning the determination of the kind and extent of damages for which the
plaintiff

can recover under §§ 823 sec.

rules of

§§ 249

BOB

253

§ 823 sec.

I,

are completed

by §§ 842

damage can only be requested

determination

is

contained in § 847 sec.

get compensation for pain and suffering

and § 831
-

in cases

sec.

BGB

845

253 BGB,^^ which

particular importance in this context is §

non-material

II

I

BOB,

the general

and § 847 BOB. Of

states that

compensation for

determined by the law. Such a

BGB,^"* which establishes that a plaintiff can

I

when harm

has occurred to his body, his health,

or his personal liberty .^^

90 § 823 sec.
life,

damage

resulting
9^ §

BGB

I

provides:

"A

person who, intentionally or negligently, causes unlawfully harm to

body, health, freedom, property, or other rights of another person

823

sec.

II

BGB

provides: "Subject to the

intends to provide protection for another person.
fauh, the duty to provide compensation for
9^ § 83

1

sec.

I

BGB

states:

same
If,

obligation

is

the one

according to this law,

damages only

exists in case

"The one who nominates another person

The duty

to provide

its

who

violates a law

violation

is

which

possible without

of fault."

to

compensation for the damage which the other person causes unlawfully
the performing.

obliged to compensate the

is

to this person."

performing
to a third

compensation for damages does not

is

obliged to provide

person

in

execution of

exist if the principal followed

the necessary standard of care in trade and business with regard to the choice... and the supervision of the

nominated person or

if

the

damage had

also occurred

would

the principal have followed this standard of

care."
9^

See supra, note 65.

^^ §

847

sec.

I

BGB

provides: "In case of injury to

body or health

freedom, the injured person can also get a just compensation

in

as well as in case of deprivation of

money

for

damage

that

is

not pecuniary

damage."

The assessment of the amount of money which the plaintiff can recover as pain and suffering lies
287 ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure), Zivilprozessordnung
[hereinafter
ZPO].
30.01.1877 (RGBl. S. 83),

9^

in

the discretion of the court (judge(s)), see, §

v.

21

BGB

§ 840
to §

840

§ 852

sec.

BGB

contains a rule on the liability of joint tortfeasors that are, according

BGB,

1

§§421

generally liable as joint-debtors under

-

426 BGB.

completes the general regulations of limitation of §§ 194

establishing a period of limitation of three years for a claim based

on

-

225

Finally,

BGB

in

traditional tort

law, beginning from the time in which the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the tortious
act or omission of the tortfeasor.

2.

Liability under § 823 sec.

A)

requirements must be met. The defendant must have

823

sec.

I

which

(ii.)

BGB. The

occurred to the

must have caused a

latter violation

must have acted with

and

I

the following seven

violated a duty of care

(iv.)

by an

act

unlawful, and the defendant

and a

finally (vii.) a causal connection

harm must

(vi.)

harm must have

between the violation of

exist.^''

Violation of a duty of care by an act or omission

For a violation of a duty of care in the area of product
is

BGB,

violation of a right protected under §

must have been

the protected right and the occurrence of the

(I.)

(iii.)

(i.)

(v.) fault (negligent or intentional),

plaintiff,

BGB

Link and constituent facts

In order to bring a successfiji claim under § 823 sec.

or omission^^

I

not whether a product

is

liability, the

decisive fact

defective, but rather whether the manufacturer or supplier

observed the necessary standard of care in trade and business (reasonable manufacturer
standard) with respect to the manufacture and design of his product, and whether he

furnished appropriate warnings and instructions for the product.^^

96 See,

Thomas, supra note

66, § 823

BGB,

97

M

98

Hein KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, Rn. 106

at §

823

BGB,

Rn.

Rn.

2.

1.

ff.,

445 (6*

ed. 1994).

22
(II.)

Causal connection between violation of duty of care and
VIOLATION OF RIGHT

This violation must have led to a violation of a right that

823

sec.

BGB. Such

I

when

a causal connection exists

is

protected under §

three elements are completed.

First,

according to the theory of equivalence,^^ also called the "but for"

treats

every circumstance equal, '°' a causal link exists

when

test,'^^

which

a circumstance cannot be

disregarded without the success (harm) being dropped. In other words,

if

one can give a

negative answer to the question, "if one disregards the circumstance would the harm

then

still

have occurred?", then a causal connection

exists.

necessary factor in determining whether a causal link exists,
all

Although
it

extends

this theory is a

liability

beyond

bounds, because almost every fact would have to be considered as causal. '^^

Therefore, the so-called theory of adequate causation has to be considered as second

element.

Its

goal

is to

eliminate completely unlikely causal developments by raising the

question of whether these developments can
third

still

be attributed to the tortfeasor. '^^ The

element that must be checked with regard to the issue of causal connection

whether

it is

is

the purpose of the violated statute or section to protect from the kind of

harm which occurred. 'O"*

(III.)

Violation of a right protected under § 823 sec.

If a causal connection

right that is protected under §

99

101

102

823

sec.

I

BGB

BGB,

104

if

a

has been violated. This section expressly

Rn. 57.

M
Id.

Heinrichs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 58; even the fact that the parents gave birth to
would be a causal factor because without his birth the harm would not have occurred.

the tortfeasor
103

BGB

can be established as mentioned above, one must see

Heinrjchs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249

'00

I

Heinrichs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 58.
Id. at

Vorbem v

§

249 BGB, Rn.

62.

23

enumerates
sec.

is

I

BGB

life,

body, health and personal liberty as protected

speaks of "...other

rights..." that are subject to its protection.

the undisputed right of possession of something, '^-^

where damage occurred

Moreover, § 823

rights.

to property only,

which comes

and where the plaintiff

is

This other right

into play in cases

not the

owner of the

vehicle. 1^^ Then, he cannot assert a violation of his property right, but he can base his

claim on violation of his right of possession of the automobile.
able to get compensation, if he

is

sec.

I

BGB

still

be

unable to use the vehicle involved in the accident.

In any case, however, in order to

under § 823

Thus, he will

file

a product liability

suit,

a right protected

must have been violated by putting a defective product on the

market. 10^ The situations in which a product

is

considered as "defective" will be

discussed in connection with the different categories of product defects. ^"^^

(IV.)

The
justified

BGB)

Unjustified violation

violation of a right protected under § 823 sec.

by a ground of justification which can

I

BGB

must not be

either be written (§§

-

231, 904

or unwritten (approval or consent). '^^ However, in the area of product liability

neither written nor unwritten grounds of justification will

be pertinent, because,

obviously, a manufacturer will not have acted in self-defense (§ 227
(§

227

legally

229 BGB), nor

will the

105

Thomas, supra note

106

One might

for

consumer have consented

66, § 823

BGB,

example think of a

Rn.

Mertens, supra note

^^^

situation in

See

109

THOMAS, supra note

67, § 823 sec.

I

which the

BGB,

Rn. 276.

infra, at 43.

66, § 823

BGB, Rn.

of the

or self-help

right.

13.

car under reservation of title.
lO'^

to the violation

BGB)

36-44.

plaintiff leased a car or in

which he bought a

24
(V.)

Moreover, the defendant

is

Fault

only liable

if

he acted with intent or

negligence with regard to the violation of the right protected under § 823 sec.
Intent

products

liability,

is

BGB."^

a manufacturer or supplier will most often have acted negligently

a product defect occurred.

initiate

On the

other hand, with respect to design and warnings
is

conceivable, because here a

a cost-benefit-analysis in cases where the

financial

for additional warnings or recalls

awarded

company

expenditure of

additional safety features might affect the practical use of the product"^ or

that could be

is

necessary in trade. "^ Regarding the field of

or instructions defects, intentional behavior

might

I

thereby defined as knowledge and will to violate the right,'" and negligence

is

defined as disregard of the diligence that

when

with

at least

where costs

of the product might exceed the amount of damages

to the plaintiff in a potential

law

suit."''

Harm and its causal connection to the violation of

(VI. / VII.)

PROTECTED RIGHT
Through the
sec.

I

BOB

a

suffers to his

as

well

as

intentional or negligent violation of a right protected under § 823

harm must have occurred. Harm
goods

naturally defined as every loss that one

like life, health, property, honor, etc.

non-material

"0 Thomas, supra

is

damage. "^

note 66, § 823

BGB, Rn.

For

our

topic

and comprises pecuniary
relevant

especially

54, 55-57; Heinrichs, supra note 60, §

loss

are

the

276 BGB, Rn.

10-

12.
' '
'

"2

Heinrichs, supra note 60,§ 276
/^. at §

276 BGB, Rn.

BGB, Rn.

12.

"^ An automobile manufacturer could
however,
""*

this

Andreas

would

10.

for

example produce a car
of the vehicle due

affect the practical usefulness

Birkmann,

Produktbeobachtungspflicht

bei

that

to

its

is

designed as safe as a tank;

weight, size, use of fuel

Kraftfahrzeugen

-

etc.

Entwicklung

und

Weiterentwicklung der Produktbeobachtungspflicht durch die Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs,

DAR 4/90,

124 (127) (1990); see also. Wolf Wegener, Produktbeobachtungspflicht
DAR4/90, 130 (131) (1990).
"5 Heinrichs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 7.

bei Kraftfahrzeugen,

25

compensation for medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earnings,

inability to use

the product (vehicle) and property damage.
If

each of the above mentioned requirements

right to get

compensation under § 823

b)

sec.

I

BGB

the plaintiff has the

is fulfilled,

he suffered.

for the loss

Potential plaintiffs and potential defendants

After having presented the general prerequisites of § 823 sec.
turn to the question of who can sue and

(I.)

§ 823 sec.
right protected
liability

by

I

can be sued under

BGB, we now

this section.

Potential plaintiffs

BGB^'^ provides

this section

who

I

that

everyone

who

is

subject to a violation of a

has a right to request compensation. Thus, in a product

case not only the consumer of the product (buyer, lessee, user), but also any

third person that suffers injury because

of the defectiveness of the product (automobile

or motorcycle) has a claim against the liable person or company.

(II.)

The wording of
determining
"[t]he

who

one

who... causes

however, only those
its

sec.

I

unlawfully

who

cases where the

production or

823

BGB

also

provides the

can be a potential defendant in a product

Accordingly, "everybody"
liable. 1 '8 In

§

Potential defendants

is

who were

to

partially

in fact involved or

'^

See supra, note 90.

'

'^

See supra, note 90.

'

'^

See, Kremer, supra note 82, at 136.

harm can be held

caused by a defective product,

who seemed

to

placement on the market could be held responsible,

'

for

compensate... ".^'^

responsible for the occurrence of the

harm has been

point

liability action. It states that

obliged

harm... is

starting

be involved in
if

its

they had violated

26
a legal duty to maintain safety."^ Thus, in a product liability action the circle of
potential defendants can be reduced to three basic categories: (a) the manufacturer
its

supplier, (b) the quasi-manufacturer

(a)

and

and

(c) others.

Motor vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers as potential
defendants

When

discussing product manufacturers,

types of manufacturers. First, there
entirely in his

own

is

the manufacturer

are

•

20

entirely

between three

who produces
we have

finally, there is the

by himself together with the supplied ones so

created ("assembler").

motorcycles

differentiate

enterprise ("entire manufacturer.") Next,

of individual supply parts ("supplier,") and
the parts produced

we must

the product

the manufacturer

manufacturer

who

puts

that the final product is

motor vehicle industry, however, neither cars nor

in the

produced by one manufacturer.

Rather,

motor vehicle

companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW), Audi, Porsche,
etc.

work together with

suppliers that furnish electronic parts, brakes or tires. Therefore,

they have to be considered as assemblers.

With regard

to liability, the supplier is first

of

all

generally responsible for the

defectiveness of the individual supply parts. ^^^ In addition, he

is

also liable for defects

of the final product that are the result of a violation of his duty to instruct the assembler
with respect to the use and assimilation of the supply parts. 122 Moreover, the supplier
has a duty to notify the assembler
defective in the

'

19

way

Mertens, supra note

'20Mat§823BGB,
121

BGH

he recognizes that the construction of a spare part

when he has

intended by the assembler, and

67, § 823

BGB,

NJW]

BGH NJW

is

a reason to assume

Rn. 276.

Rn. 278.

BGH

Versicherungsrecht [hereinafter VersR] 1959,104 (105);

[hereinafter
122

it is

if

1968,247 (248); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823

1996,2224 (2225); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823

Neue

BGB,

BGB,

Juristische Wochenschrift

Rn. 278 and note 724.

Rn. 278 and note 726.

27
danger has not been recognized by the

that the

be held

supplier will

the

liable

latter. '23

In case of violation of this duty

harm occurs because of

if

the

omission of the

notification.

The assembler, on

the other hand,

responsible for defects resulting out of the

is

assembly of the motor vehicle. '^4 Furthermore, he can also be held
supply parts, although in the majority of cases the supplier
this responsibility.

One could

for

example think of a case

liable for defective

itself will

in

have

to

assume

which the defect finds

its

origin in the defective design-plan or design-instruction of the assembler according to

which the supplier has produced the
liable.

own

The same

part.'^s

Then, the assembler will be held solely

where he violated his

responsibility hits the assembler in situations

duties, like his duty to carefully

choose and observe the supplier, '^6 his duty to

carry out quality checks '^^ concerning the supply parts, and his duty to observe their
faultless working'28.

Another important area
subject to liability

held

in

its

is

in

which car and motorcycle manufacturers might be

the one of motor- vehicle accessories. In 1986, the

famous "Honda-decision"'29

that

a worldwide

Supreme Court

operating

motorcycle-

manufacturer has the duty to observe the world-market of accessories that are
compatible to
the

its

own

combination of

products in order to discover and prevent dangers resulting fi-om
its

motorcycle, here,

a

"Honda

GL

accessories, here, a cover for the steering gear. Facts, issues,

'23

BGH NJW

(515);

1996,2224 (2225 f);

Mertens, supra note

67, § 823

BGH

1000 Goldwing", with

and the potential impact of

Zeitschrift ftier Wirtschaftsrecht [hereinafter ZIP]

BGB,

1990,514

Rn. 278.

BGH VersR 1956,259 (259); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278.
'25 BGHZ 67,359 (362); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278.
'26 BGH VersR 1972,559 (560); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278;
'24

at 137.

BGH NJW 1968,247 (248); MERTENS, supra note 67,
'28 BGHZ 104,323 (327); BGHZ 67,359 (362).
'29 BGHZ 99,167 ff
'27

§ 823

BGB, Rn.

278.

Kremer, supra note 82

28
this case

on the motor vehicle manufacturing world

will be discussed in connection with

the duty to observe products once they have been put

(III.)

on the market. '^o

The quasi-manufacturer as potential defendant under § 823
SEC.

I

BGB

Another category of potential defendants

is

the so called quasi-manufacturers. In

contrast to the real manufacturer, they are not involved in the production process of the

product but label someone else's product either with their names or trademarks. '3' Such
a quasi-manufacturer

is

subject to liability

when two

through the mentioned behavior he must have

at least

personal duty to check the product safety so that

prerequisites are fulfilled. First,

impliedly indicated that he took a

it

appears as if he were the real

manufacturer. 132 Second, in contrast to § 4 ProdHaftG,i33 the consumer must have

evinced a special confidence to the quasi-manufacturer with the result that the

first-

mentioned omitted precautionary measures which he otherwise would have taken. '^4
This requirement

is

based on the finding of the Supreme Court that consumers generally

evince their confidence to the professionalism of the real manufacturer, while only

130

See

'31

One

infra, at 54.

could, for example, think of a car manufacturer which receives engine filters

another manufacturer specialized
single part of the car

integrating

them

in the

manufacture of these

was produced by

filters.

In order ot

•32

into the engine. If a harmful event occurs

BGH NJW
See

due to a defect

infra, at 83,

BGH NJW

(e'^ed. 1994).

NJW-RR] 1995,342
823 BGB, Rn. 279.

Rechtsprechungs-Report [hereinafter

quasi-manufacturer
134

seem

that

from
each

in

these products, the car
filters

himself but put

on them.

observe products); Mertens, supra note 67, §
133

it

the car-manufacturer he puts his label on the filters before

manufacturer will be liable as quasi-manufacturer since he did not manufacture the
his label

(oil, air-filter)

make

(343) (concerning the duty to

and note 362; under § 4 ProdHaftG the only requirement to establish liability for a
that he sells a product under his name, trademark or other distinctive sign.

is

1980,1219 (1219);

BGH

VersR 1977,839

(839);

Hein KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 468

29
under particular circumstances '^^ do they give their confidence to the one that provided
the name. '^6

Although

in recent cases dealing

Supreme Court has established

with defective food products for babies'^'' the

duty for the quasi-manufacturer to observe

a

its

"products," in the motor vehicle area, however, the existence of quasi-manufacturers as
potential defendants

is

by taking a look

at

not as likely as
the

it

might be

in other fields.

occurrences within the

This can be concluded

of distribution from the

chain

manufacturer of the supply parts (supplier), to the manufacturer of the motor vehicle
(assembler), to the retailer (dealer), and finally to the consumer.
individual parts from the supplier will integrate

them

name

produces. With respect to the appearance of his

The assembler who

into the car or

"BMW"),

(e.g.

gets

motorcycle he

the assembler will

only be interested in selling the motor vehicle as a whole under his name; he will not

have an

interest in labeling

any single part of

it,

because

it

would make

additional

negotiations with the supplier necessary dealing with the permission of changing
or trademarks in order not to get in conflict with law. Secondly,

Thirdly,

it

would lead

its

name

free

of charge.

it

would not necessarily

profit or reputation. Thus, concerning the relationship

between

the supplier and the assembler, the latter will almost never be a quasi-manufacturer.

same

name on

assembler. Although he might put his business

'^^ Particular

BUERGERLICHEN Gesetzbuch,

BGH NJW

823

BGB,

137

BGHZ

[hereinafter

1980,1219 (1219);

BGH

Erman]

/ fame of
SCHIEMANN,

§ 823

VersR 1977,839

BGB,

the

motor vehicle from the

the quasi-manufacturer or unusual
in

Erman Handkommentar ZUM

Rn. 123

(839); see also,

(9*^ ed.

1994).

SCHIEMANN, supra note

Rn. 123.
1

16,60

-

Kindertee

1

(Child tea

1);

BGH NJW

1995,1286

The

the frame of the license plates

circumstances can be: Unusual knowledge

influence of the latter on the real manufacturer, see, G.

'36

who buys

true for the retailer (authorized dealer)

is

the

an increase of the assembler's production costs, as he would

to

have to build up a special department for the labeling. Finally,
cause an increase of

would increase

it

purchase price of the supply part as the supplier will not "sell" his

names

-

Kindertee

III

(Child tea

III).

135, §

30
of the cars he

name

his

advertisement purposes, he will not label these automobiles with

sells for

or trademark

(IV.)

-

The
vehicles

Other potential defendants

company and importer

Liability of marketing

of the marketing company and that of the importer of motor

liability

basically identical, because the importer

is

is

the marketing

company of

a

foreign manufacturer. ^^^ Thus, both groups of potential defendants can be discussed
together.

As

neither the marketing

manufacturer, neither

is

company nor

the importer of

motor vehicles

generally liable under traditional tort law for

is

a

harm caused by

defective products. '39 Nevertheless, either can, under particular circumstances, have a

duty to examine, instruct or observe the products

under § 823

sec.

I

BGB

in case

sells,

it

and

can be established

liability

of its violation. For example, both the marketer and the

importer are obliged to examine the products purchased from the assembler,

knowledge of the occurrence of harmful events
or if other circumstances

/

make such an examination

or the importer's legal duty

they had

which these products were involved,
necessary. •''^ If then no measures to

coming from the product were taken, a

avert the danger

company's and

in

if

would

violation of the marketing

exist

and

liability

could be

established.

Although the standard of

liability for

same, one could think about imposing

'38

Mertens, supra note

'39

BGHZ

99,167

ff. -

67, § 823

Honda;

BGB, Rn.

BGH NJW

both potential defendants

stricter duties

is

basically the

on the importer of motor vehicles

280.

1994,517(517

f.);

THOMAS, supra note

66, § 823

BGB,

Rn.

216.
''O

BGHZ

823BGB,

99,167 (170
Rn. 216.

f.);

MERTENS, supra note

67, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 280; THOMAS, supra note 66, §
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than on domestic marketing companies. This consideration could at least be justified in
situations

one

in

where a manufacturer abroad has

Germany and

/

or where a suit and

would be considerably

goods from the

six original

lower safety standards than the

enforcement against a foreign manufacturer

However, the Supreme Court held

aggravated.''*'

the introduction of stricter duties

its

to follow

was not necessary

for those

who

European Union Countries. '"^^ Behind

in 1980'''2 that

import technical

this decision

was

the

reasoning that these countries have basically the same safety standards for products.

Furthermore,

it

the European

emphasized

Union

is

that the

sufficiently guaranteed

Communities concerning the
and commercial

in civil

enforcement of judgments among member-states of

competence and enforcement of judicial decisions

judicial

affairs."''*'*

Due

Europeanwide unification of product
might generally be extended

to all

by the "Agreement of the European

to EC-Directives''*^ leading to a progressive

liability

member

laws and safety standards,

states

this

holding

of the European Union. Regarding the

duties of importers of U.S. or Japanese automobiles and motorcycles, one can hazard

the assumption that the

Supreme Court would decide

in a similar

way, because safety

standards for motor vehicles in the United States and Japan are at least as high as in the

member

states

of the European Union. Thus, the one

who

imports motor vehicles out of

the mentioned countries will generally not be subject to stricter duties than a domestic

marketing company.

'"*'

Mertens, supra note

''*2

BGH NJW

''*'

The

1980,1219 (1219

six original

18, 1951, are:

67, § 823

member

^^ Uebereinkommen

f.) -

states

Germany, France,

BGB,

Rn. 280.

Fahrradgabel (Bicycle-handle-bars).

of the European Coal and Steel Community, founded

Italy,

in Paris

April

Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg.

der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften ueber die gerichtliche Zustaendigkeit und die

Vollstreckung gerichtlicher Entscheidungen

in Zivil-

und Handelssachen

v.

27.09.1968, BGBl. 72

11

774,

entered into force on 01.02.1973 between the six original member-states.
''*^

See, EC-Directives leading to the enactment of product liability laws, product safety laws zmd crash-

test-standards, see. Introduction, supra at 7-8.
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-

Liability of the combine (group)

Motor vehicle manufacturers
structured, in the

are often structured, or could at least often be

form of a combine, which means

that there

is

a controlling

company,

mostly a corporation and several subsidiaries, frequently private limited companies. In
order to escape product
is

the

most

liability, the

likely to cause severe

combine could

harm

(e.g.

transfer the production of goods that

airbags, brakes, tires, gas tanks) to a

combine-subsidiary. •'•^ The most important reason for such an extemalization of
liability is that the controlling

company of the combine, which

strongest defendant, could through this behavior evacuate
access. 1'*'^

As

successfully

number of defendants

a result, the

would be decreased, and

defendant would be

fatal for his

its

its

is

usually the financially

assets fi-om the plaintiffs

the plaintiff could potentially sue

restriction to

claim in cases where the

the combine-subsidiary as

latter is insolvent or

where the

barred by the statute of limitation (§ 852 BGB).''*^ In consideration of these

claim

is

facts,

one has to raise the question of whether the combine's controlling company can

and should get off without being held

liable

when

a harmful event has been caused by a

defective product manufactured by the combine-subsidiary. i"*^ Legal scholars'^o agree
that a

company executing

•'^
147
148

company has

Kremer, supra note 82,

m
m

its

above mentioned

legally responsible in the

controlling

control over

dependent subsidiary should also be held
situations.

They persuasively argue

the legal duty resulting out of § 823 sec.

I

BGB

that a

to intervene

at 138.

at 135.

'49 This question has

been raised

Hommelhoff and Westermann

in

in the

1969 by Ekkehard Rehbinder and has been taken up again by Oehler,
beginning of the 1990s, see, id at 138 and notes 41, 43.

150 M. Theisen, Der Konzern - Betriebswirtschaftliche und rechtliche Grundlagen der
KONZERNUNTERNEHMUNG 443 (1992); T. Westermann, Umwelthafiung im Konzern, Zeitschrift flier das
W. Oehler,
155,223
gesamte
Handelsund Wirtschaftsrecht [hereinafter ZHR]
(1991);
- Deliktsrecht und Haftungsbeschraenkungen, ZIP 1990,1445 (1451); T.
Hommelhoff, Produkthaftung im Konzern, ZIP 1990,761 ff.

Produzentenhaftung im Konzern
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when

its

subsidiary puts products with a high risk of danger on the market. In cases

where an intervention was possible and necessary
causing product, but where

it

to prevent the sales

has been omitted, the controlling

company

of the harm-

is

liable for the

consequences. '5' This result corresponds to the holding of the Supreme Court that any
enterprise that uses a third
either

its

company

duty to carefully observe

for

it

or

purposes

its

its

is to

be held liable

if

it

violates

duty to intervene where an intervention

is

necessary. '52
In

my opinion,

the key factor

is

whether the controlling company intends to take

a profit out of the combine-subsidiary, and whether the latter
former.
is

The extemalization of liability

is

dependant on the

for highly dangerous productions to a subsidiary

acceptable without consequences for the controlling

company

as long as the latter

does not get any profit out of the marketing of these products. In other words, the one

who
want

takes the entire risk should get the entire profit. However, a

any

to take

wrong

whether a controlling company intends

A

profit

that

does not

but wants the profit to be shared, enters a one-way-street in the

risk,

direction and should not get off scot-free.

subsidiary.

company

to

The question

profit,

is

now how

to determine

or in fact does profit, from

can either be gained as direct financial benefit

an agreement concerning the profit-sharing exists) or indirectly by

(e.g. in

its

cases where

somehow

controlling

the subsidiary. 153

Thus, even

if

a motor vehicle manufacturer transfers the production of goods

with a high risk of danger to

its

depending subsidiary, he will

to liability.

'51

Theisen, supra note 150,

•52

BGH NJW

153

Kremer, supra note 82,

1976,46 (46)

-

at

443; Oehler, supra note 150, at 1451.

Oelabfall (Oil-waste).

at 138.

still

potentially be subject

34

Liability of the manufacturer's / supplier's employees

-

now we have spoken of

Until
thus,

of the

parts.

liability

the liability of the "manufacturer" or "supplier",

of a company involved

However, the question

in the

manufacture of motor vehicles or their

whether the employees of these companies can be

arises

held personally liable for harm caused by defective products.

question
itself,

of particular importance

is

but

its

in the field

fact that

acting individuals can be subject to prosecution for an intentional or

On

the other hand,

its

weight

is

company

qualified with regard to civil cases

However,

(e.g.

it

will

to

by the

be important in cases where the manufacturing

still

a small supply enterprise)

is

bankrupt, or where plaintiffs claim

is

barred

of limitation (§ 852 BGB).'55 If then the plaintiff has a valid claim against

statute

an employee, especially against executives of the company, he might
get

harm

injury or to

an individual employee will generally not be as financially strong as a business

enterprise.

by the

the one hand, this

of criminal law, where not the company

negligent violation of their duties which leads to physical
property. '54

On

at least

be able to

some compensation.

When

discussing employees,

we must

board of directors or employees on similar

distinguish between the

level, '^6 the

members of

members of

the

the supervisory

board, the lab-managers responsible for design and manufacture of the motor vehicle,

and other employees below the management

154 See, e.g.,

5

-

BGH NJW

1990,2560 (2564

Lederspray (Leather-spray);

'55

Kremer, supra note 82,

company

forth in §

and the

is

852

at 135.

One might ask how

must be kept

NStE

§ 223

StGB

in

Nr.

BOB

is

that the three year time period set

begins to run at the time where the plaintiff got actual knowledge of the tortious act

tortfeasor. Thus, although the plaintiff

know who

plaintiff can sue an individual if his claim against

barred by the statute of limitation. The answer to this

might know

who

the defendant

company was, he might

individually committed a wrongful act. Accordingly, the limitation period with regard to

plainfitff s claim against the

company begins

'56 E.g., in a private limited

company which does

considered as "employees on similar level".
'57

BGH

it

Mandelbienenstich.

the

not

ff. ) -

level. '^^ Additionally,

Kremer, supra note 82,

at

136-137.

earlier than the

one for the claim against the individual.

not have a board of directors, the managers have to be

35

mind

for the following that liability

which means

under § 823

that everyone, regardless

sec.

of his position,

BGB

I

who

an "everybody"

liability,

unlawfully causes harm by

violating his duty of care, could be held liable. '^^

Liability of members of the board of directors and of managers

-

In the area of product recalls, each person within a group of executives has a

duty to

initiate the recall

of the harm-causing product

health risks caused by the product

come

in.'59 in

after the first serious hints

cases where the recall or similar

counter-measures have been omitted, although they would have been the adequate

of eliminating the product's danger,

With respect

liability will

way

be established. '6°

to responsibility for manufacturing, design,

the general holding of the

of

Supreme Court can be

applied. This

on each member of the board of directors or managers

is

and warnings defects,
that liability will fall

in situations

where

their duty to

carefully and entirely organize the enterprise has been violated. This is true even if none

of these persons has been actively involved in the actual harmful event, because,
according to the Supreme Court,
organization. 161 Thus, in cases

it

is

sufficient that

it

has been facilitated by faulty

where one of the above mentioned duties has been

flouted, the executive, director, or

manager

of the motor vehicle manufacturer or

its

supplier can be subject to liability.

158

Mat

159 See,

136.

BGH NJW

1990,2560 (2564

ff.) -

Mandelbienenstich; Kremer, supra note 82,
160
161

Lederspray (Leather-spray);

BGH

NStE § 223 StGB

Nr. 5

-

at 136.

m
BGHZ

109,297 (303); according to the legal literature, the Supreme Court is on the way to hold
the board of directors (in a corporation) and managers (in a private limited company)

members of

personally liable for every tortuous act, see, S. Reuse, Die Haftung von

DStR 1995,688

(689) m.w.N.; Kremer, supra note 82,

at 136.

Managern im Aussenverhaeltnis,

36
-

Liability of

members of the supervisory board

Next, one must examine the development of judicial decisions issued by the

Supreme Court

for the liability of directors

and managers and the establishment of

members of

the supervisory board. '^^ j\i\^ board has

personal legal responsibility for

the duty to supervise the activities of the board of directors '^^ or of the mamagement'^'*.
If

it

remains passive in situations where

that the executive organs

supervise. Thus,
directors or

-

its

it

has knowledge or could have had knowledge

of the company act or acted unlawfully,

members should be held

managers would when disregarding

it

violates

its

personally liable in the same

duty to

way

as

their duties.

Liability of lab managers responsible for design and manufacture

According to the Supreme Court the lab manager as well as the production

manager of a product are subject

The

to liability for design

and manufacturing

reasoning focuses on the fact that these

court's

responsible position which not only allows

them

hold a highly

individuals

to organize, supervise

and control

departments but which also imposes on them the corresponding duties to do
In

my

opinion

and manufacturing

it is

their

so.'^^

reasonable to hold this group of employees liable for design

defects.

After

all

is

it

they

who have

superior qualification,

knowledge, and power, which enables them to discover product defects and
product modifications

defects. '^^

if necessary. It is

they

who

to initiate

get detailed information concerning

the product so that they have the general overview about the ftinctioning of the product.

'^^

Kremer, supra note 82,

1"

See, §

1^

See, § 52 sec.

S.

1 1 1

sec.
1

I

BGH NJW

GmbHG]

v.

06.09.1965 (BGBl.

connection with §

in

1987,372 (372)

Spannkupplung.
'66 /J.

Aktiengesetz

I

1089) [hereinafter AtkG].

S.

Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter Haftung

477) [hereinafter

•65

at 137.

-

1

1 1

sec.

1

v.

20.04.1892 (RGBl.

AktG.

Verzinkungsspray (Galvanizing spray);

BGH NJW

1975,1827 (1828)

-

.
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Finally, possible objections alleging that

would be unfair

it

to

impose

these individuals, because a successful product liability suit could ruin

should be rejected.

First,

property. Secondly,

everyone takes a

knowing

risk

them

when he causes harm

liability

financially,

to a

person or

that a risk of being financially ruined exists, lab

and

production managers should be even more careful in the daily execution of their jobs
if

they do not want to take this risk, they should quit this position.

it

should be noted

that, particularly in the

motor vehicle branch, a

As

on

or,

a third argument,

series

of product

tests

(crash-tests, driving tests etc.) is carried out for several years before the final product is

put on the market.

Therefore,

the

responsible

managers have enough time and

opportunity to discover and eliminate product defects. Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the

burden of proving the defendant's faulty behavior, because the presumption of fault that
the

Supreme Court'^^ generally uses

in product liability cases'^^ is applied only

the company's employee can be considered as

its

representative.'^^

when

Lab and product

managers, although holding powerful positions within the company, can hardly be seen
as representatives. Consequently, the plaintiff bears the

against these persons, a burden that

fiill

in a suit

significantly reduces his chances of success.

Therefore, the personal liability of this group of defendants

-

burden of proof

is

entirely justified.

Employees underneath the management level

In contrast to the company's executives, the "blue-collar- worker" does not bear
as

much

responsibility in his job but

is

to a higher extent

dependent on directives.

Moreover, he does not usually have the specialized technological knowledge, and his
salary is usually lower than that of the executive organs. Accordingly, this group of

employees

is

subject to a higher risk of being financially bankrupt if involved as

•6''

BGHZ

'^^

See

169

Kremer, supra note 82,

51,91

ff.

infra, at pp.

-Huehnerpest (Fowl
41
at

136-137.

pest).

38
defendant in a product

liability suit

without having the power of influencing the design

and manufacturing process. Therefore, and because of constitutional objections based

on a possible violation of

art.

2 sec.

Grundgesetz'^° as well as a violation of the

I

principle of social justice and the welfare

some

state'"'',

courts and legal authors protest

against the liability of these employees. '"'^ However, in 1991 the

cook

in a family enterprise personally liable for defective

preceding line of arguments, nor must

working on the assembly
fact patterns

line

food products served during a

must neither be regarded

wedding.'"'^ This decision, however,

it

Supreme Court held a

as the opposite of the

automatically be applicable to the employee

of an automobile or motorcycle manufacturer, because the

of the "wedding-case" and the hypothetical "mess-up on the assembly-line-

case" can be clearly distinguished. In the decided case, the cook worked in a small

family business which consisted of a few "employees" only. In contrast, motor vehicle

manufacturers or suppliers are big enterprises with thousands of workers. Furthermore,
the

number of

potentially injured persons, and accordingly the

"wedding decision"

plaintiffs, in the

is

reduced to only a few individuals.

generally not be grasped in our hypothetical case. This also
the

employee has

to face is in general

number of

much higher

means

potential

This can

that the financial loss

in the latter situation.

For these reasons, the worker in a big motor vehicle manufacturing enterprise
should generally not be held individually liable for harm caused by a defective part of
the

motor vehicle.

•70

Grundgesetz (Constitution)

[hereinafter
'7'

'72

filer

die Bundesrepublik

Deutschiand

v.

23.05.1949 (BGBl.

S.

1)

GGj.

This principle

is

guaranteed and finds

its

roots in

art.

20

sec.

I

GG.
f.);

M.

Brueggemeier, Deliktsrechtliche Aspekte innerorganisatorischer Funktionsdifferenzierung, Archiv

fiier

M.

Brueggemeier,

Besprechung

die civilistische Praxis [hereinafter
173

BGHZ

1

16,104

ff.

des

Hochzeitsessen-Urteils,

AcP] 191,33 (1991).

-Hochzeitsessen (Wedding meal).

ZIP

1992,415

(415

39
Nevertheless, an exception of this general consideration

employee wrongfully manufactured the

gas tank of a car, leading to an explosion
car only, and there

would only be a few

be made

of the vehicle for which he

part

For example, one might think of a situation

may

in

when

which he forgot

is

the

if

responsible.

to install a gasket in the

would

affect

one

potential plaintiffs (the driver, passengers

and

fueled. Here, the defect

people injured by the explosion). In this case the risk of suffering financial loss would
not be higher for the defendant than in the "wedding case". Thus, one might argue that
in

such a situation

liability

must not be disregarded

should be established against the employee. However,

that there is

of a worker on an assembly

line

still

it

a difference between the job of a cook and that

of a car manufacturer. Only the

latter

can be considered

as hazardous employment, because in case of a mistake the occurrence of severe injuries
is

very likely, while a mistake in cooking a meal will usually only lead to a loss of taste.

Accordingly, in this kind of situation the worker should not be held liable for normal
negligence but only for gross negligence and intent.

-

Joint tortfeasors

If the plaintiff is able to successfully sue
liability action,

421 ff

BGB,

each defendant

is

,

more than one defendant

according to § 840 sec.

liable as a joint-debtor. This

means

I

BOB

in

in a

product

connection with §§

that the plaintiff can request full

payment of the amount of damages awarded from one defendant. The defendant who
completely satisfies the plaintiff then has a legal claim under § 426

sec. II

BGB

to get

proportional compensation fi^om the other debtors.

c) Distribution

The

of burden of proof - background information

distribution of the

burden of proof

will often be decisive in a torts action in

is

a very important factor that can and

which one party cannot provide evidence

for

its

40
where the party

claim, or

is

not able to give sufficient evidence.'^'* Then, the party that

bears the burden of proof for this particular prerequisite will at least partly loose
case.

Although the

of the distribution of burden of proof

details

in

its

products liability

cases will be discussed in connection with the different categories of product defects'''^,
there

some

are

general

aspects

to

be mentioned in order to provide important

background information.
In a non-products liability claim based on § 823 sec.

bears the burden of proof for

seven prerequisites of

all

true for products liability claims before 1968.
Court''^^ has

I

BGB

the plaintiff usually

this section. '^^

However, since

The same was

that time the

Supreme

developed an important reduction with regard to plaintiffs burden

in the

area of product liability,

(I.)

The situation before the fowl-pest decision: Plaintiff bears full
BURDEN OF PROOF

Since about 1916 the

liability

of the manufacturer for defective products was

recognized by the Supreme Court of the
rules of traditional tort

German

prove every single prerequisite of § 823

of a duty of care as well as

Heinz Thomas

&

See

'^^

Thomas, supra

this

fault

on the

means

time until 1968 the

sec.

I

that, at that time, the plaintiff

BGB,

Pin.

17-40

{6"^ ed.

had

to

including in particular the violation

side of the defendant.

As

the plaintiff normally

Hans Putzo, Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung

PUTZO], vor § 284 ZPO,
^''^

From

law were applied for such cases without modification concerning

the distribution of burden of proof This

1'^''

Reich. '^^

[hereinafter

Thomas-

1992).

infra, at 43.

note 66, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 167; ThoMAS-Putzo, supra note 174, § 284 ZPO, Rn. 17-

40.

BGHZ
•78
RG
•77

51,91

Recht

ff. -

Huehnerpest (Fowl

1918

Nr.

1363

pest).

=

JOACHIM

Schmidt-Salzer,

ProDUKTHAFTUNG Nr. I. 7, at 40 f RG LZ 1916 Sp. 1025 Entscheidungssammlung Produkthaftung Nr. I. 6 at 39
;

Freistelleiter
f.

(1976).

Entscheidungssammlung
= JOACHIM Schmidt-Salzer,

41

had knowledge neither about the internal organization of the manufacturer's enterprise
nor about the production process, his claim was rarely successful because of his
inability to provide

evidence for the two last-mentioned elements. In addition, the

manufacturer was often able to provide decentralized'^^ exculpatory evidence
escape

liability for vicarious

1

BGB'^^.

The situation since the fowl-pest decision

(II.)

plaintiff's

In

agents under § 83

(1968):

Reducing the

burden of proof in manufacturing defect cases
November

fowl-pest decision from

its

in order to

26,

which

1968,'^'

dealt with a

manufacturing defect of a medication for chicken against fowl pest, the Supreme Court
set

up the principles forming the foundation of product

liability

law

for the ftiture. First,

it

held that a privity between the plaintiff (consumer) and the defendant (manufacturer)

is

not necessary in order to bring a successful product liability action. Instead, only tort

law (§§ 823

sec.

I

and

sec. II

BGB)

provides the basis for such actions. Second, the

court modified the rules concerning the burden of proof in favor of the plaintiff in cases

involving a manufacturing defect.

It

decided that in such cases the plaintiff neither has

the burden of proving the breach of a duty of care, nor the
Instead, the prerequisites of § 823 sec.
that the defendant bears the
this

presumption. In

generally

its

I

BGB

are to be

fault

presumed

of the defendant. '^^

in this kind

burden of providing exculpatory evidence in order to

neither has an insight into the details of the manufacturing process, nor,
it.

Thus,

it

would be nearly impossible

With regard

•80 See, §
181

182

(2);

831

to the application

BGH VersR

BGHZ 51,91
BGHZ 51,91

ff. -

ff.

file

a successful

of decentralized exculpatory evidence also for big enterprises, see,

1964,297 (297); THOMAS, supra note 66, § 831

BGB, supra note

on

for the plaintiff to

get information necessary to gather the facts of the case so that he could

BGHZ 4,1

reftite

reasoning the court argued that on the one hand the plaintiff

the other hand, can he control

'^^

of case so

92.

Huehnerpest (Fowl-pest).

BGB, Rn.

15.

42

The manufacturer, on

suit. '8^

the other hand, initiates, controls,

and supervises the

manufacturing process, which enables him not only to easily discover the source of the
defect but also to gather the entire facts of the case.

Both the holding and the reasoning of the court should be agreed upon
reasons.

because

First,

of the

closeness

of the

manufacturer

to

manufacturing process, secondly, because the large majority of product

would otherwise be doomed

to failure,

and

unknowing consumer, who has

to face the

knowledgeable manufacturer

finally, as a

to provide exculpatory evidence concerning his lack

his

for three
internal

liability

cases

matter of fairness to the

who

is still

able

of fault and his compliance with a

duty of care.

(III.)

Extension of the shift of burden of proof to design defect
CASES

As

the fowl-pest decision dealt with a manufacturing defect, the principles

established by the
defect.

Supreme Court

in this case are limited to this particular type of

However, the court extended the scope of application of these principles

design defects in another landmark decision. '8"*
the lack of evidence, the plaintiff faces the

^^^

same

The

to

court argued that, with regard to

difficulties in

design defect cases as he

does in manufacturing defect cases. Thus, in both kinds of situations the breach of a
duty of care by the defendant and his fault are presumed.

'^^
-

BGHZ

51,91

ff.; in

which enables the

addition

it

has to be said

Procedure so that the plaintiff in Germany
'84

BGHZ 67,359 ff.

l«5Mat361.

that, in contrast to the

parties to gather information about the adversary
is

more

likely to

Schwimmschalter (Swim-switch).

United States, a

- is

pre-trial

not recognized in

discovery

German

be lacking evidence than the one

Civil

in the U.S.
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D)

Under § 823

Three different categories of product defects

sec.

I

BGB

the defendant

maintain safety J^^ The scope of this duty

is

is

to

liable for a violation

of his

legal duty to

be determined according to the phases

in

the course of the production process. Within this process, one can distinguish between
three different phases: the development of the product (design),

its

manufacture, and

its

equipping the consumer with information in order to not only instruct him about the
product's use but also to warn
structure, the different kinds

him about

the product's dangers. •^'^ According to this

of violations of the defendant's duty to maintain safety can

be divided into three categories: design defects, manufacturing defects, and instructions
or warning defects. '^^

(1.)

A product

is

Design defects

when

defective in design

the defect occurred within the planning,

development, or choice of the production method. '^^ Contrary to manufacturing defects,
this

kind of error typically affects the whole product

feared by the manufacturer. '^^ Although

series,

we now know

in

and therefore

it

is

the

most

which phase of the production

process the product error must have happened, in order to constitute a design defect the
question remains
that the

how

such a defect should be determined. i^i In general, one can say

key element of that question

is

whether the product

use in trade and business. Courts and legal literature

186

MERTENS, supra note

187

SCHIEMANN, supra note

188

BGHZ

86,256

-

67, § 823

BGB,

135, § 823

Gaszug;

BGHZ

safe or safe

make use of several

Rn. 282; SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, § 823

BGB, Rn.
51,91

Schubstrebe; MERTENS, supra note 52, § 823
189

is

ff.

-

enough

190

Wesch, supra

1^1

This question

infra,

Chapter

II,

(6"^ ed.

its

factors in order

BGB, Rn.

1

15.

15.

1

Huehnerpest (Fowl

BGB,

pest);

BGH NJW

1968,247

ff.

-

Rn. 283-289.

SUSANNE WESCH, DIE PRODUZENTENHAFTUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERGLEICH 104

Hein Koetz, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 435

for

(1994);

1994).

note 189, at 104.
is

actually subject to a controversy in the product liability laws in the United States, see

at pp. 107.
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The courts hold

to provide a satisfactory reply to this question.

defective in design if
In addition,

minimum

it

it is,

under safety aspects, not suitable for

its

that a product is

intended purpose. '^^

must provide both, operational safety ''^^ and compliance with existing

safety requirements'^'*. Nevertheless, these expositions are not yet complete

but bring up
suitable for

two new

its

issues: first,

what standard

is

used to decide whether a product

is

intended purpose, and second, which role the manufacturer's compliance

with cogent safety regulations plays.

(a) Issue:

Standard to determine whether a motor vehicle

is

safe

ENOUGH
As

to the first issue, the

Supreme Court focuses on

the expectations of the

consumer'^5 and on a kind of cost-benefit-anaiysis'^^. The product (motor vehicle) will
not be considered defective in design if

its

safety features are in accord with the

consumer's expectations. The level of expectations will of course vary depending on the
kind of consumer group for which the product

is

designed. Motor vehicles, especially

automobiles, are generally intended to be used by the majority of the people, because

automobiles are the most important means of individual transportation. '^^ Thus, in this
area the "reasonable" consumer must be the standard to measure whether the individual

motor vehicle

is

safe enough.

However, some vehicles,

like racing cars or cross-country

motorcycles, are not to be used by "everybody" but only by experts. In these situations
the reasonable expectations of the latter provide the applicable standard. In addition, the

'92
'93

RR

BGHZ 104,323 (327); BGH VersR 1967,498 (500); OLG Koeln VerR 1993,1 10 (1 1).
BGH VersR 1959,523 (524); OLG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1995,594 (596 ff.); OLG Saarbruecken NJW1

1993,990 (991).

BGH NJW
BGH NJW
'96 BGH NJW
'94
'95

OLG Koeln NJW-RR 1991, 285 (286).
1990,906 (906 f ); BGH VersR 1985,1093 (1094).
1990,906 (907); BGH NJW 1990,908 (909).
1990,908 (909);

'9^ See, Introduction,

supra

at 2-3.
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courts recognize the financial factor involved in the equipping of products with safety

and require

features

that

their

Moreover, several other factors

costs have to

be in accord with their benefits. '^^

that are equally recognized in the legal literature'^^ are

taken into consideration. Those factors are: the comparison of the actual product to that

which a reasonable manufacturer would have chosen

in order to reduce or avoid

unreasonable danger,2oo the state of science and technology

at the

put on the market, the likelihood of a realization of the danger,

damages (bodily

an

time the product was
its

resulting type of

injury or property damage), and the consequences.^^' Accordingly, the

outcome of a claim alleging the

failure

safety element in a passenger car, for

of an automobile manufacturer to provide a

example the lack of side-airbags,

is

not easily

foreseeable and will depend on the complex interaction of the mentioned factors.

This situation

comparable

is

to the

one

in the

United States where, depending on

the jurisdiction, a variety of tests to determine design defectiveness can be found.202

Among

those tests are a form of risk-utility^o^ or risk-benefit^o^ analysis, the consumer

expectations

test^o^^

the comparison to what a reasonable manufacturer

would have

done206 and, the reasonable alternative design requirement^o^.

'98

BGH NJW

'99

Mertens, supra note

1990,906 (907);

BGH NJW

67, § 823

1990,908 (909).

BGB,

Rn. 283; HEIN KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 447-449

(6"^ ed.

1994).
200

hein Koetz, Delitsrecht, Rn. 447

201

Id

at

ed. 1994).

Rn. 447, 449.

202 See, Chapter

II,

infra at pp. 107.

203 Thibault v. Sear,

Roebuck

2d 176 (Mich. 1984); Rix
Chapter

(6'*'

v.

& Co., 395 A.2d 843,846 (N.H.

1978); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365

N.W.

General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195,201-202 (Mont. 1986); see further,

II.

West V. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cal. App. 1985),
824 (1986); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175,182,183-184 (Colo. 1992).

204

205 Lester v.

Magic Chef, 641 P.2d 353,357 (Kan. 1982); Rahmig

v.

cert,

denied, 479 U.S.

Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W.

2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
206 Nichols V.

(W. Va. 1989).

Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W. 2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Church

v.

Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393
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The role of compliance with existing safety

(B) Issue:

REGULATIONS208

The non-compliance of

minimum

the manufacturer or supplier with existing obligatory

safety regulations (e.g. crash-test standards) will generally constitute a design

defect and be considered as negligent conduct.209

(c) Issue:

In section (a)

it

product defectiveness

technology

at the

No liability for development risks

was mentioned

is

that

one of the factors for the determination of

the manufacturer's compliance with the state of science and

time was introduced in the market. In this context the question arises

whether a product should also be considered defective
scientific

and technological standards

that

if

it

does not comply with

have been developed after

its

introduction on

the manufacturer be liable for development risks?

the market. In other words, should

Courts^io and legal scholars^" generally deny this kind of liability, and the legislature

has recognized

only for a few products, such as medical drugs.212 in the motor vehicle

it

area, though, liability for

development

risks does not exist

under § 823

sec.

I

BGB.^i^

This view should be entirely agreed upon considering that under the fault
standard of § 823 sec.

I

BGB

a defendant can only be held liable for intent or

207 III.

Comp. Stat. Ann. CH. 735 § 5/2-2104 (1993
S.E.2d671(Ga. 1994).

208

This topic

is

even a bigger issue

the

in

&

Supp. 1996); Banks

compliance serves as a defense

210

ICI Americas, Inc., 450

United States raising two questions:

manufacturer's compliance with federal safety regulations preempts state

209

v.

in a state tort action, see.

Chapter

11,

Whether

the

whether

tort law, and, if not,

infra at pp. 128.

BGH VersR 1959,523 (524); BGH VersR 1960,1095 (1096).
BGHZ 51,91 (105); OLG Muenchen VersR 1990,791 (792); OLG

Duesseldorf

NJW-RR

1992,284

(284).
211

Mertens, supra note

212 Gesetz zur

§§ 84
213

ff.

67, § 823

BGB, Rn.

288; Hein Koetz, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 448

Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts (Arzneimittelgesetz)

[hereinafter

Neither does

AMG], (Law

liability

for

Produkthaftungsgesetz, see, §

1

v.

(6"^ ed.

24.08.1976, BGBl.

1

1994).
S.

2245,

governing the manufacture and prescription of drugs).

development
sec. 11 Nr. 5

risks

exist

ProdHaftG.

under the

strict

liability

standard

of the
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negligence. This requires that he at least could have

known

that the actual product

design would lead to a violation of one of the plaintiffs rights protected under this
section.

However,

this prerequisite is not fulfilled

with regard to

new

technologies

through the application of which actual product damages could have been avoided,
because they would not have been discemable during the time the product was designed

and

means

finally marketed. This

that a plaintiff

who

alleges the defectiveness of his

automobile built in the 1960s because of the lack of a driver-airbag will not be
successful, as this safety feature

(D)

As

was developed

in the 1980s.

Distribution of burden of proof

the defendant's breach of duty of care and his fault are

presumed

in design

defect cases, the plaintiff only has to prove that one of his rights protected under § 823
sec.

I

BGB

was

violated due to the design defectiveness of the motor vehicle and that,

as a result, he suffered damages. In order to escape liability the manufacturer or supplier

has to provide evidence showing that he neither breached his duty of care nor acted with
fault.214

To provide
means of
party,2i'7

the necessary evidence both parties can

five different

proof: expert witnesses,^!^ inspection (judicial view),2i6 interrogation of a
instruments,^!^

protected right

and witnesses^i^. The plaintiffs proof of violation of a

and the resulting damages can generally be presented easily by

interrogating the party and

documents. More

214

make use of

BGHZ 67,359

by the provision of witnesses or instruments, such as medical

difficult,

(361

f.);

215 See,

§§402-414 ZPO.

216 5ee,

§§371-372aZPO.

217

5ee,§§ 445-455 ZPO.

218

5ee,§§ 415-444 ZPO.

219

5ee,§§ 373-401 ZPO.

BGH

however,

is

the provision of evidence for the product defect

VersR 1971,80

(82).
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and

its

causality for the damage, because, in the

motor vehicle area

in particular,

this

determination requires scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the plaintiff will generally

have

on expert witnesses

to rely

of proof with regard to product defect and
he does not have to provide

full

the

if different

damage

it is

him

sufficient for

was not

when

the

damage

damage

is

is

burden

reduced, and

to be considered as

allowed to provide prima facie evidence.220

circumstances point to the defectiveness of the product as a cause of

The defendant, on
the product

is

situations, though, his

causality for the

its

evidence. First,

a typical result of this kind of defect, he

Second,

two

engineers). In

(e.g.

to present circumstancial evidence.221

make use of expert

the other hand, will

witnesses to

show

that

defective. In addition, with respect to the provision of exculpatory

evidence for his non-breach of a duty of care and his non-fault, he has to show the two
elements. First, that the production process
that excluded the genesis

by mistakes of his employees223.

element cannot be proven, the defendant

220

BGHZ

in the production process

51,91, (104);

Mertens, supra note

of the following fact pattern: Plaintiff

He

suffers serious injuries,

among

is

first

has to

explode seconds before impact.

67, § 823

BGB,

that fractures

caused by defective airbags exploding too early. In so

221

He may

BGH NJW

If the last-mentioned

single

employee who

and collides with another vehicle.

broke the third neck vertebra. Plaintiff alleges that

known

was not

Rn. 298. As an example one could assume

inattentively driving in his car

others, he

It is

name every

it

manner

and then has to provide exculpatory evidence

of damage occurred before the collision because the airbag

defect.

in a

of sources of product defects,222 and, second, that

subject to any disruptions caused

was involved

was organized and supervised

far,

in his car

this

kind

was defective and happened

to

of the second and third vertebra are usually

plaintiffs

harm

is

a typical result of the airbag

introduce circumstancial evidence.

1987,1694 (1694 f ); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823

could think of the following situation: Plaintiff

is

BGB, Rn.

298.

As an example one

driving within the speed limit on a straight road, in dry

daylight, and there is no other traffic. Suddenly, the car gets out of control and
Under these circumstances nothing points to plaintiffs own misconduct. Also
misconduct of other traffic participants is excluded. Thus, there must have been a defect in the car.

weather condition,

it

is

plaintiff hits a tree.

Plaintiff

is

allowed to present circumstancial evidence.

222

BGHZ 51,91

223

Mertens, supra note

(105, 107

f );

BGHZ 59,303

67, § 823

BGB, Rn.

(309).

299.

49
that each

of them was selected and supervised appropriately.^^-* For

evidence instruments, witnesses, and the interrogation of the party will
as

this

come

kind of
into play

means of proof.

(II.)

As

already disclosed by

its

Manufacturing defects
name, manufacturing defects originate during the

manufacturing process of the product and are in most cases either caused by a failure of
a

human being

mistake of a worker automobile assembly-line) or by the

(e.g.

breakdown of a machine.^^sjn

contrast to design defects, the fault in the manufacture of

the product will typically not affect the

whole product

product.226 Thus, the latter kind of defect will have a

series

much

but only a single

less severe

financial

consequence for the manufacturer, because only one potential harmful event can occur,

and he will not have to

recall a

of being held liable for

this

whole product

series. In

order to avoid or reduce the risk

kind of defect, the motor vehicle manufacturer has to be

advised to completely organize and supervise the manufacturing process and to
introduce a reasonable

number of

quality checks for the incomplete as well as for the

complete vehicle.227

(a)

With regard

to the provision

design defects apply.

product before

it

Distribution of burden of proof
of evidence, generally the same principles

for

Therefore, the plaintiff must prove the defectiveness of the

has been put on the market and

its

causal link to the damage.

The

manufacturer has to provide the pursuant exculpatory evidence.

224

BGH NJW

1968,247 (248);

BGH NJW

1973,1602 (1603); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823

292, 299.
225

Wesch, supra note

226

m

227

Mertens, supra note

189, at 105.

67, § 823

BGB, Rn.

287.

BGB,

Rn.
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(B)

Presumption of existence of defect before marketing of product

However, the Supreme Court introduced,
of mineral

defects

water

(Befiindsicherungspflicht)

bottles,^^^

the

"duty

to

or

so

in cases dealing

"duty

called

secure

the

to

status

with manufacturing
secure

of

the

the

results"

product"

(Statussicherungspflicht). This duty obliges the manufacturer of products that
"specific tendency to cause damage"229 to

them through a
controls.

specific quality

The reason

when

those products

check that

examine the condition
is

("status")

show

a

of each of

even more thorough than the usual quality

for the introduction of this duty

is

to guarantee the faultlessness

of

put on the market, because they contain a particularly high risk of

danger for the consumer.

A

violation of this duty leads to the presumption that the

manufacturing defect already existed before the product was marketed, and that this
defect
this

would have been noticed

if the status

had been appropriately secured.^^o Through

presumption the Supreme Court has again shifted the burden of proof

manufacturer,

who now

has to offer additional exculpatory evidence showing that the

defect did not exist until the product

As

was put on

the market.

a result of this legal development, the question arises whether this holding

not only applies to mineral water bottles but also to the entire motor vehicle or
to parts

to the

at least

of it. The Supreme Court emphasized that the duty to secure the status exists in

situations in

which the product shows a

tendency can be shown

if the

product in question contains considerable risks for the

consumer which are deeply rooted

228

"specific tendency to cause damage".^^! This

manufacture so that a normal quality check

in its

is

BGHZ 104,323 - Mehrwegflasche (Returnable bottle I) with comment Ekkehart Reinelt, Comment,
NJW 1988,2614 (2614); BGH NJW 1993,528 - Mehrwegflasche II (Returnable bottle II); BGH NJW
I

1995,2162

-

Mehrwegflasche

III

(Returnable bottle

III).

BGHZ 104,323 (334); BGH NJW 1993,528 (529).
BGHZ 104,323 (336) - Mehrwegflasche (Returnable

229 5ee,
230

I

Mehrwegflasche
231

II

(Returnable bottle

See supra, note 230.

II).

bottle

I);

BGH NJW

1993,528 (529)

-

51
insufficient,

and a particular status inquiry

several parts

is

necessary.

A

motor vehicle consists of

which could meet these requirements. For example, brakes,

tires

and

steering gears-^- create a ver>' high risk of danger to automobile passengers and third

persons

if

they are faulty.

(C)

No LIABILITY FOR "RUN-AWAY-PRODUCTS"

Although courts are generally reluctant
defendant, an exception

made

is

for

in recognizing gaps

of

liability for the

so called "run-away-products".^^^ These are

manufacturing defects that occur in spite of all precautions. ^^-^ Because the manufacturer
did everything reasonably possible to prevent the occurrence of this kind of defect, he

did not act with fault.^^s Accordingly, one of the main prerequisites of § 823

missing in those cases, and

liability

BGB

is

cannot be established.

Instructions and warnings defects

(III.)

In contrast to design and manufacturing defects, an instructions or warnings
defect does not affect the constitution of the product itself but describes a lack of

information which the defendant should have reasonably included either
sale (pre-sale failure to instruct or
failure to instruct or

warn) or

wam).^^^ Whether a

after the

dut}' to

time of

marketing of the product (post-sale

inform

the information should be, should be determined

at the

exists,

and what the content of

on a case-by-case

basis.

Within

this

determination, the following factors have to be taken into consideration: the state of
science and technology at the time which the product

^^^ Birkmann, supra note
233

Wesch, supra note

234

Thomas, supra note

235 id.\ see also,

236

1

14, at 129.

189, at 105.
66, § 823

BGB, Rn.

WESCH, supra note

205.

189, at 105.

hein Koetz, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 454 (6*

ed. 1994).

was put on

the market, the
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likelihood of realization of the danger, the kind and extent of potential damages, and, in
particular, the

knowledge of the expected consumer group.^^?

Before entering into detailed discussion, a notice serving semantic clarification
has to be given.

Some

authors^^^

^q ^ot

differentiate

between instructions defects and

warnings defects but use the term "instruction defect" as generic term. However,

if

using a generic term, the words "information defect" should be chosen instead, because
this

When

term comprises more appropriately the two other terms.

"instructions" or "warnings" semantic differences should be kept in mind.

how one

indicates

do something,

to

is

in particular,

"warn", on the other hand, indicates that something
at the

how
is

talking about

To

"instruct"

the product has to be used.

dangerous, in particular,

it

To

points

dangers involved in the use of the product.^^^ In the following these terms are

used with

this

meaning.

(a)

The maimer
has to create

its

in

Contents and form of pre-sale information

which the manufacturer or supplier

in the

motor vehicle branch

pre-sale information for his products not to be subject to liability

was

determined in a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court.^^o Although some of these

do involve other manufacturers than those of motor vehicles,

this

does not affect their

adoption for our topic, as the holdings and the reasoning in these decisions have a
general scope of application.

237

BGHZ

238 E.g..

80,186 (192)

-

Apfelschorf I (Derosal); Hein KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 455

Mertens, supra note

67, § 823

BGB,

(6*^ ed.

Rn. 284; SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, § 823

1994).

BGB,

Rn.

122.

239 This semantic distinction

is

borrowed from U.S. product

liability

the terms "instruction" and "warning" in an adequate way, see,

Products Liability, Proposed
240

BGHZ

(Child tea

116,60 (64
II);

ff.;

BGH NJW

68

Final Draft, § 2,

ff.) -

Kindertee

1995,1286 (1287

I

f.) -

cmt

1,

law which,

in

my

opinion, defines

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

at 3 1.

(Child tea

Kindertee

I);

III

BGH NJW

(Child tea

1994,932 (933)

III).

-

Kindertee

II
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First, the

how

automobile or motorcycle manufacturer has to inform the consumers

to operate the vehicle

and

requirement will generally be

to point out the risks involved in its operation. ^^i

fulfilled, as

This

motor vehicle manufacturers usually provide

extensive operating instructions manuals. However, the information provided has to be
as clear, detailed,

visually emphasis

with people

and as understandable as reasonably possible, and,

may

who have

has to adjust

its

be used to reach the average user.242
inferior or superior

knowledge

Of course, when

(e.g. experts),

statutory

its user.2'»5

in this context

regulated duty to warn

the manufacturer

misuse^'*''

of the

has to be mentioned that the compliance with a

it

"not always"

is

sufficient.^''^

manufacturer's duty to warn ends where the product misuse
obvious^"*^ to the

not dealing

information to this group of consumer.243 in addition, the potential

defendant also has to provide warnings concerning a foreseeable
vehicle by

if necessEiry,

is

247

However, the

absolutely unusuaP^s or

consumer.

BGH NJW 1975,1827 (1829); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 284.
242 BGHZ
Kindertee
(Child tea I); BGH NJW 1994,932 (933) - Kindertee II
16,60 (64 ff.; 68 ff.)
(Child tea II); BGH NJW 1995,1286 (1287 f.) - Kindertee III (Child tea III); OLG Koeln VersR 1987,573
241

-

1

(573

f.);

Mertens, supra note

I

67, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 286.

BGHZ 11 6,60 (65 f ); BGH NJW 1992,2016 (2018); Hans Josef KuUmann, Die Rechtsprechung des
BGHzum Produkthaftpflichtrecht in denJahren 1995 - 1997, NJW 1997,1746 (1749).
244 BGHZ 129,353
(353); BGH z 106,273 (283); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 285.
243

245

As an example one might

think of a manufacturer's duty to

warn of the dangers

when

starting

product

liability

arising

a car with stick shift while in gear.
246

BGHZ

247

The

laws
248

106,273 (280 ff );

BGH NJW

1987,372 (373).

role of compliance with federal regulations

in the

United States, see. Chapter

BGH NJW

II, infi-a

is

equally an important issue

in the

at pp. 128.

1981,2514 (2514). For example: Plaintiff wants to commit suicide and locks himself into
Then he changes his mind and suffers harm because he is captured in the trunk for

the trunk of his car.

He sues manufacturer for defectively designed trunk
and manufacturer did not have a duty to warn of this danger.
several days.

249

lock. Plaintiffs

misuse was unusual

Koblenz VersR 1981,740 (740). For example: Plaintiff uses 1971 VW-van as cross country
harm because the car rolled over. Plaintiffs misuse was obvious and manufacturer
did not have a duty to warn of this danger.

OLG

vehicle and suffers
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(B)

Duty to observe products and post-sale duty to warn

Aside from cases dealing with a pre-sale
cases in which the product information

due

to

new dangers

one can also think of

failure to inform,

was appropriate

at the

time of marketing but,

discovered in the course of technological development, became

inappropriate in the future. Already the

Supreme Court of

the

German

Reich^^o has

basically recognized the manufacturer's duty not only to control the product until

marketing but also to constantly observers
obligation of the manufacturer to collect
253as well as to

i

all

it

in the future.

new

Connected

scientific findings

its

to this duty is the

and empirical data252

observe the product development of his most important competitors^^-*.

Out of this information he has

to take appropriate counter-measures,

which can

either be

the provision of additional warnings (post-sale warnings), the elimination of the source

of danger by

or

repair,

the

recallof the

product.255

The determination of

the

appropriateness of the measure depends not only on the concrete situation but also, in

any case, the factors "extent of risk of danger" and the "kind of potential damages" have
to be considered.256 In order to guarantee the
institutions,

and especially from the consumer

RG DR

250

RGZ

251

Mertens, supra note

163,21 (26);

1940,1293;

67, § 823

see,

BGB,

flow of information from

scientific

to the manufacturer, the latter has to take

Birkmann, supra note

1

14, at 126.

Rn. 289; Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Neue Gesichtspunkie

Juer die Produxentenhaftung, Betriebsberater [hereinafter BB] 1971,152 (156).
252
II

BGHZ

99,167

ff. -

Honda;

BGHZ

80.186

ff. -

Apfelschorf

I

(Derosa!);

BGHZ

80.199

ff.

Apfelschorf

(Benomyl).

253

£g

these data could and should be gathered by analyzing test reports, specialist journals (scientific

and technological journals)

etc.,

see,

Hans Josef Kullmann, Die Produktbeobachtungspflicht des

Krafifahr-eugherstellers im Hinblick aufZubehoer,
254

BGH NJW

BB

1987,1957 (1958).

1990,906 (907); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 289; Birkmann, supra note

114, at 127.
255

BGHZ

80,186 (190)

-

256 Birkmann, supra note

Apfelschorf I (Derosal);
1

14, at 127.

BGHZ 64,46 (49 ff.) - Haartonicum.
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adequate organizational precautions.257 For example, a motor vehicle could

set

up of an

Auto-Safety-Hotline to which vehicle malfunctions could be reported. ^^^
If the

sec.

I

manufacturer violates any of these duties he can be held liable under § 823

BGB.

(c)

Duty to observe product accessories

In addition to the potential defendant's potential duty to observe his

own

products, he also has a duty to observe other company's accessories that could be used
in

combination with his products in order

this

to discover potential
26o

combination (combination danger).^^^

established by the
driver of a

Supreme Court

in

j^ the motor vehicle area, this duty

a crash-barrier while riding at a speed of 140 to 150

due

the accident

to the fact that its

was

was

1986 in the famous "Honda-decision"26i where the

Honda GL 1 000 "Goldwing" motorcycle was

The cause of

dangers resulting out of

when he

killed

crashed against

km/h (approx. 87

to

94 mph).^^^

the reduction of the driving stability of the motorcycle

former owner had equipped

with a steering gear cover

it

manufactured and marketed by a German accessories-marketing company.263 The

Supreme Court held
the

that, in

company which produces

addition to the

motor vehicle manufacturer also could be held

liable.

the accessories,

The reasoning focused on

the

25^ In the United States a nationwide Auto-Safety-Hotline exists; however, this hotline has not been set

up by motor vehicle manufacturers but by a
which
is
part
of
Administration

federal agency, the National

the

Department

of

Highway

Traffic Safety

Transportation,

see,

<http:www.nhtsa.dot.gov./hotline/>.
259

BGHZ 99,167 (172

ff.) -

Honda.

260 ^i^i^ regard to the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals the duty to instruct and

dangers

is

regulated by statute, see, §

supra note 253,
261

at

BGHZ 99,167

ff. -

sec,

I

AMG

Nr. 7

and §

Honda.

262 For further facts, see,
263

1 1

1959.

Kallmann, supra note 253,

Kulhnann, supra note 253,

at 1958.

at

1958.

1

la sec.

I

Nr. 7

warn of combination

AMG;

see,

Kulhnann,
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circumstance that the

latter is better

able to test the accessories' influence on the entire

motor vehicle than the former. In addition, he saves costs

development and

for the

manufacture of accessories, the existence of which might increase the sale of his
vehicles.264

However, the question has

to

be raised whether this decision establishes

excessive demands on the motor vehicle manufacturers,

automobile and motorcycle accessories
overview.265
case,

is

large

as

world-market of

the

and almost impossible

to

keep in general

A reply to this question has been given by the Supreme Court in the Honda

which distinguished between four

categories are

commonly used

which has been

facilitated

different categories

of accessories. The four

accessories, necessary accessories, accessories the use of

by the manufacturer and,

finally, accessories that require the

addition of special mountings.

-

Commonly used

accessories are the ones frequently used by consumers.

regard to these accessories, a
sufficient.

Commonly used accessories

strict

duty to observe exists and

at the

same time

This means that the manufacturer does not generally have the additional duty

to inspect these items.^^^ Nevertheless, the latter duty

cause exists
items not

is

With

(e.g.

car accident probably caused by

commonly

establish any duty

.

used,

can originate

commonly used

if

an immediate

accessories). For

on the other hand, the Supreme Court did not expressly

Therefore,

it

can be concluded that for those no

strict

duty to

actively observe exists.

^^

E.g.,

one can think of accessories provided by tuning companies

appearance of the automobile, and
265

Kulbnann, supra note 253,

266

BGHZ 99,167,174.

its

interior

at 1958.

elements

(e.g.,

that

more luxury

or

enhance both, the outward

more powerful

engine).
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-

Necessary accessories and accessories facilitated by the

manufacturer
Necessary accessories are ones that are urgently needed for the functioning of
tires). ^^^

the motor vehicle (e.g.

Accessories are facilitated

if the

installed holes, hooks, bore holes or similar things so that they

the

motor vehicle

own test

test in his

roads.^^s In case he has doubts concerning

he either has to recommend the ones which he successfully tested, and

which he estimates

to

be

-

For

can easily be added to

a roof rack). For both kinds, the manufacturer not only has the

(e.g.

duty to observe but also to
their safety,

manufacturer pre-

this

safe, or to

warn of their

use.^^^

Accessories requiring special mountings

group of accessories, mounting

facilities

do not already

yet to be installed. Here, generally, only a duty to observe

is

exist but

have

placed the motor vehicle

manufacturer, unless concrete circumstances advise him to take further measures.

-

Existence of administrative operating permissions:

No influence

ON the manufacturer's liability

A

last

issue that

comes up

in

connection with accessories

is

whether the

potential defendant can be held responsible if the registration office issued a general

operating permission for them in accordance with §§ 22, 22a StYZO^''^. In the
case the

Supreme Court answered

this question in the affirmative

Honda

and held that the

existence of operating permissions for accessories neither reduces the manufacturer's

duty to observe or

test

them nor

267

Kullmann, supra note 253,

268

m

at

1958.

269 /J.
270 See supra, note 8.
271

BGHZ 99,167 (172 ff.) - Honda.

his obligation to

warn of their

dangers.^^^

It

based

its

58
holding on the reason that a manufacturer

is

not allowed to conclude from the existence

of such permissions that the accessories companies developed and tested their products

presume

carefully; neither shall he be allowed to

that every potential defect

of the

accessories has been already discovered.^^^

This

meaning and purpose of operating

a proper consideration of the

is

instructions because, according to § 18 sec.

I

StVZO,

their issue

shows

their

admission

for traffic but does not constitute a guarantee for their faultless functioning.

(D)

Duty to recall defective motor vehicles

Aside from his post-sale duties to provide additional instructions or warnings,

motor vehicle manufacturer can be obliged

the
sec.

I

BGB.

A

recall is the request

of

out

traditional

it

or to take

back.^^^ Today, a manufacturer can

it

under two different aspects.

recall

law.^^^

tort

Produktsicherheitsgesetz in August

823

of the manufacturer to the consumer to turn in the

product in order to repair or exchange

be subject to a duty to

to recall defective vehicles under §

1

Second,

First, this

since

duty can originate

enactment

the

of

the

997, the same duty can be imposed by the Federal

Office for Motor Traffic, thus by an administrative agency.

-

Duty to recall under § 823

Recalls of motor vehicles took place for the
are provable for the years

272

first

1903, 1916 and 1924.2^5

sec.

I

BGB

time in the United States and

^s

a recall in the automobile

BGHZ 99,167 (172 ff.) - Honda.

273

Theo

Bodewig,

Automobilindustrie,

Zivilrechtliche

DAR 4/96,

Probleme

des

Rueckrufs

fehlerhafier

Produkte

in

der

341 (341) (1996).

274 Although the existence of a duty to recall

commonly recognized its dogmatic foundation is
controversial; it is discussed to base it on either § 823 sec. I BGB, § 1004 sec. I, cl. 1 BGB, or § 1004 sec.
I, cl. 2 BGB; see, Bodewig, supra note 273, at 344; see also, Ingeborg Schwenzer, Rueckruf- und
is

Warnpflichten des Warenherstellers, Juristenzeitung [hereinafter JZ] 1987,1059 (1060).
275 Levenson, Recalls: Tracing
also,

Bodewig, supra note 273,

them back
at

341.

to the

Turn of the Century,

1

13

Dun's Review 117 (1979); see
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industry normally affects thousands of vehicles,

is

it

connected with a high financial

expenditure. Thus, manufacturers will consider this measure as "ultima ratio" only and,
if

reasonably possible, will try to solve any problem,

warnings,

instructions

or

Considering

this as

answer to

is

in

danger

(e.g.

life

is

the manufacturer forced to

to the question can

be given, the

factors:^''^

which

or property), the likelihood of the

of the danger, the number of potentially affected persons, the magnitude of

the violation of the object of legal protection, the

of the

when

has to be determined by using the following

object of legal protection
realization

arises,

Although no universal reply

this question

by providing additional

which generally involve a smaller amount of money.

background, the question

recall his products ?

first

recall, the

manufacturer,

the

consequences of the
existence

recall

amount of expected damages,

the costs

on the reputation and goodwill of the

of alternative counter-measures,

the

relation

of his

individual advantage to the social benefit of the product, the kind of product and the

way of its marketing and the need of protection
According

to these factors a recall

for the affected

group of persons.

of motor vehicles will be inevitable for the

manufacturer in cases involving defects of safety-relevant parts (such as brakes,
airbags, steering gear, gas tanks) that affect a large

number of

products.

On

tires,

the other

hand, a recall will not be necessary in cases where the defect only deteriorates the

outward appearance of the automobile or motorcycle. However,

and executed, the manufacturer will have

to bear

its

if

a recall

costs as well as

expenditures like repair, exchange^'''' and putting a substitute car
disposal for the duration of the recall procedure. If the latter

at the

is

is

necessary
its

related

consumer's

not possible, the

manufacturer has to provide compensation for the consumer's inability to use the

2^^ See, Bodewig, supra note 273, at 342.
2^^

Mertens, supra note

note 274, at 1063.

67, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 289; Bodewig, supra note 273,

at

344; Schwenzer, supra
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vehicle.278

On

the other hand, the manufacturer

not obliged to

is

refit

motor vehicles

with safety features that have been developed or become the technical standard after the

marketing of the vehicle
Therefore, a duty to

time of

its

at

refit

no

cost,

because

would favor

this

consumer too much.^^^

the

a vehicle with airbags or side-bags, which did not exist

marketing, does not exist, even

if

at the

newly manufactured vehicles would be

considered defective without these safety features.^so

-

Duty to recall under the Produktsicherheitsgesetz

The Produktsicherheitsgesetz from August 1997 obliges
only "safe" products on the market (§ 4 sec.

I

the manufacturer to put

ProdSG). If a product

is

not safe

according to the definition contained in § 6 ProdSG, the Federal Office for Motor
Traffic

can intervene before or after the product has been marketed. Before

marketing the Office has the power to forbid or to temporarily forbid

placement on the market (§ 7

sec.

II

ProdSG). After

force the manufacturer to give warnings, or

it

danger (§ 8 ProdSG). In the same way

it

its

its

the product's

marketing the agency can either

can give the warnings

itself in case

of near

can force the manufacturer to recall

its

products (§ 9 ProdSG). In cases where the manufacturer does not comply wdth the

agency's orders, an administrative fine up to 50.000,-

DM

can be imposed (§ 15

ProdSG).

2^^ In order to determine the

amount of compensation

special catalogue can be used.
different kinds of cars

awarded per day

is

It

from different manufacturers

150,-

DM.

the

consumer

is

allowed to recover

in

such a case a

how much the daily use of
maximum amount that can be

contains specific information with regard to
is

worth. However, the

as an example, the use of a

use of a "Chevrolet Corvette Coupe"

DM

134,- per

"BMW

3

1

SIS"

is

worth

DM

98,- per day, the

day and the use of a Mercedes-Benz 500 SL 150,-

DM; see, Tabelle von Sanden/Danner/Kueppersbusch Stand 01.01.1995, in Palandt KOMMENTAR
ZUM BUERGERLICHEN Gesetzbuch, Anhang zu §§ 249, 250 BOB, PkW-Nutzungsausfallentschaedigung.
2^^ Bodewig, supra note 273, at 344.
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The existence of the Produktsicherheitsgesetz serves

the prevention of accidents,

and thus extends^^' the protection of the consumer provided by traditional

which both focus on a compensatory function. Moreover,

the Produkthaftungsgesetz282,
it

new

creates

its

law and

tort

incentives for product manufacturers to create safer products. Therefore,

enactment should be approved.

(E)

Peculiarities in the distribution of burden of proof

With regard

Supreme Court^^^ distinguishes between two

cases, the

which an

of the burden of proof in instructions or warnings

to the distribution

situations.

instruction or warning defect existed before the product

marketing situation), and one in which

it

became defective

after

it

The

situation in

was marketed

was put on

(pre-

the market

(post-marketing situation).

-

In the

first

The pre-marketing situation

mentioned case, the same rules of distribution of burden of proof

apply for design and manufacturing defects.^^'^Eventually,
the

consumer

in the

same

position, as he does not

all

three kinds of defects put

have any knowledge about the

of the manufacturer's enterprise and thus has

internal structure

to

face a lack of

evidence.

-

The post-marketing situation

In contrast, such a lack of evidence does not exits

warnings defect occurs

after the product's marketing.

Now,

when

the instructions or

the plaintiff, as well as the

2^'

Before the enactment of the Produktsicherheitsgesetz the Federal Office for Motor Traffic only had

the

power

to

revoke the operating permission for a vehicle (§ 20

marketing could be prevented; see, Wegener, supra note
282

See

283

BGHZ
BGHZ

284

infra, at 82.
1

16,60 ff

1

16,60 (73)

-

Kindertee
-

I

Kindertee

(Child tea
I

1).

(Child tea

I).

1

14, at 133.

sec.

V StVZO)

so that

its

further
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defendant, has the

same sources of information (news,

practical proving

of the product so that they are equally "strong". Accordingly, a

reduction of the plaintiffs burden of proof

been

criticized^^^,

were the

need for a

-

not necessary. Although this view has

Supreme Court's invention of

like in post-marketing situations, this difficulty

shift

concerning the

appropriately considers that the difficulties of providing evidence

it

starting point for the

proof Where,

is

test reports etc.)

of this burden

the shift of the burden of

does not

exist, there is

no

to the manufacturer,

Presumption that the consumer would have followed adequate
instructions and warnings

Another peculiarity within

this third

category of defect exists with regard to the

proof of causality of omission of adequate information and occurrence of the damage.
Usually,

it is

the plaintiffs responsibility to provide this evidence,

will be required to prove that the

which means

damage would not have occurred had

that

he

the manufacturer

provided adequate institutions or wamings.^^^ In practice, the plaintiff would argue that

he would have followed the information

if

it

had been appropriate. However,

in this

area the courts reduce the plaintiffs burden of proof by presuming that the consumer

would have complied with

clear

and understandable instructions or wamings.^^^

(IV.)

As can be concluded

fi^om the preceding, legislation

constantly increased the duty of

course of the

2^^

Some

their

last

and judicial decisions have

motor vehicle manufacturers and suppliers

decade, either by intensifying already existing duties

{e.g.

in the

duty to

authors consider the distinction between the pre-marketing and the post-marketing situation and

consequences as

"artificial", see, e.g.,

SCHIEMANN, supra note

KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, RN. 448.
286

Comment

BGHZ
287 BGHZ

106,273 (284)
1

16,60 (73)

-

-

Asthma-Spray.

Kindertee

I

(Child tea

I).

135, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 122, Hein
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new

observe product) or by introducing
severe practical consequences.

One

duties (e.g. duty to secure product status) with

explanation for this pro-consumer development

could be the influence of European law on German national law, because in the field of
legislation the Product Liability

Act and the Product Safety Act found

E.G. directives. Another explanation
practical matter, be
this context,

it

made by

in

mind

However,

to his customers

that the

in the

consumers who will bear the product

by taking insurance

the belief that a risk-utility assessment must, as a

the product manufacturer rather than by the consumer.^*^ In

must also be kept

insure against this risk.289

is

their origin in

end

it

risk, as the

former generally has a better chance to
will at least partly be the totality

manufacturer will

by increasing

E)

of the

shift its loss suffered

his product prices.

Defenses

In a products liability action the manufacturer could plead for dismissal of the

complaint based on five main arguments:
or operating permissions,

of the

plaintiff, (iv.)

(ii.)

(i.)

compliance with cogent safety standards

a nin-away-product defense,

product misuse, and finally

(v.) that

(iii.)

contributory negligence

the time set forth in the statute

of limitation elapsed.

(I.)

Compliance with cogent safety standards / operating
PERMISSIONS

This kind of defense could be brought by the manufacturer in design or
information defect cases in which he complied with mandatory safety standards or
operating permissions (§§ 22, 22a StVZO). However, since safety standards constitute

only

minimum

standards, evidence of compliance

on the question whether a manufacturer acted

288

Mertens, supra note

289/^.

67, § 823

BGB,

Rn. 269.

may

be introduced but

negligently.

is

not decisive
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(II.)

RUN-AWAY-PRODUCT DEFENSE

This type of defense can be presented

in

manufacturing defect cases only as

deals with a manufacturing defect that occurred in spite of

of fault the defendant cannot be held

(III.)

all

precautions.

Due

it

to a lack

liable in this situation.

Contributory negligence (§ 254

If the plaintiff has contributed to the occurrence

sec.

I

and II bgb)

of the damage

driving

{e.g.

while intoxicated, speeding), the defendant's duty to compensate and the extent to

which the defendant

will

be required to provide compensation depend on the

circumstances, particularly, to what extent the damages have been caused by one party
or the other (§ 254 sec.

amount of damages
will either

for

I

BGB). Thus, when

which the manufacturer

be reduced to a smaller amount

The same

is

true under §

254

sec.

or,

II

refiises

will

more

have to compensate the consumer

rarely, to zero.

BGB, which provides

where not the occurrence of the damages but
plaintiff

successfully presenting this defense the

their extent has

a defense in situations

been partly caused by the

because of the violation of his duty to minimize the damages

medical treatment although he knows that he

(IV.)

is

(e.g.

plaintiff

seriously injured).

Misuse of product

Eventually, the manufacturer can claim no responsibility for the harmful event,

because the plaintiff misused his product. However,
the manufacturer can

still

be held

foreseeable and where he did not
the misuse.

On the

liable for

fulfill

it

has been mentioned already that

such a misuse in situations where

his duty to

warn of the dangers

it

was

resulting out of

other hand, the defendant will not be subject to legal responsibility in

cases where the misuse

was absolutely unusual

290 Yox examples, see supra, at 54, notes 248,249.

or obvious to the plaintiff.^^o
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(v.)

Statute of limitation: § 852 bgb

Finally, the manufacturer can allege that plaintiffs claim

of limitation. According to § 852

sec.

I

BGB

is

barred by the statute

this is the case if plaintiff did not file a

lawsuit within three years after he gained knowledge of the tortious act of the tortfeasor.

F)

Damages

If the plaintiff succeeds in the product liability suit,

compensation from the defendant for his loss under § 823
compensation for

all

damages

that

sec.

have to be considered as a

right protected under this section,^^! like

he will be entitled to

BGB.

I

result

This includes

of a violation of a

compensation for medical expenses, loss of

earnings, property damage292, etc. In addition, in cases

where the plaintiffs motor

vehicle has been recalled, he does not have to bear the costs of the repair

measures.

Furthermore,

he

has

the

right

to

a

vehicle

substitute

/

or

exchange
adequate

compensation.

Compensation for pain and suffering (§§ 823

(I.)

Moreover, under § 823
is

sec.

I

BGB,

in

connection with § 847

also allowed to get compensation for pain and suffering

one

of the

most

important

differences

sec.

between

when

1,

847

BGB,

BGB)

the plaintiff

bodily injured. This

traditional

tort

law

and

is

the

Produkthaftungsgesetz, under which compensation for pain and suffering does not
exist.293

291

292
in

Mertens, supra note
With regard

BGHZ

to

67,359

67, § 823

BGB, Rn.

293.

compensation for property damage the peculiarities developed by the Supreme Court
ff.

have

to

be considered, see, SCHIEN4ANN, supra note 135, § 623

headword: "Weiterfressender Mangelschaden".
293

See

infra, at pp. 82.

BGB, Rn.

124,

66
(II.)

§ 823 sec.
liberty,

No COMPENSATION FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS

BGB

I

requires either the violation of

life,

body, health, personal

property or other rights. Because a violation of a pure pecuniary right

is

neither

expressively mentioned nor comprised in the field of "other rights"^^^, a compensation

economic

for pure

a loss which did not occur as a result of a violation of a right

loss,

protected under § 823 sec.

I

BGB,

is

not given.^^s

(III.)

No PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In contrast to U.S. product liability laws, an award of punitive
plaintiff and

/

or the state^^^ does not exist in

German

tort law. In

damages

for the

1992, in a case dealing

with the recognition and enforceability of of U.S. judgment awarding $ 400,000 in
punitive damages, the

damages
law.297

German Supreme Court held

are incompatible with basic principles of

However, important arguments

particular, traffic safety)

that
to

(e.g.

that, in general,

German

these kind of

constitutional

and

tort

increase of traffic consumer safety, in

can be provided against

this

holding and lead to the conclusion

capped punitive damages should be introduced by the German

understand the rationale for this proposal,

it

is

legislature. In order

necessary to analyze the legal,

economic, and social background governing the institution of punitive damages

in the

United States.

294

Thomas, supra note

295

Mertens, supra note

296

To which

66, § 823

BGB,

67, § 823

Rn. 217.

BGB,

Rn. 293.

damages are awarded to the plaintiff depends on the jurisdiction. In most
amount of punitive damages awarded. Some states, however, have
enacted statutes that apportion punitive damages between the plaintiff and the state, see. e.g., Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 768.73(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1992) (35 % of punitive damage awards must be paid into state funds);
of the uncapped punitive damage award must be paid into state
Ga. Code Ann. § 5 1-12-5. 1(e)(2) (75
treasury); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.675.2 (West Supp. 1992) (50 % of punitive damage award must be paid
of
to the Tort Victims Compensation Fund); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (20
extent punitive

satates the plaintiff receives the entire

%

%

punitive
297

damage award must be paid

BGHZ

118,312,337-345.

to state).

67

Punitive damages

(a)

Since
punitive

damages
punitive
clear

law traditionally belongs

tort

damages

is

governed by

are treated differently

damage awards,

to the province

common and

state

from

the United States

in

raised the burden of proof

states,^^^ iYiq

statutory law.

Some

state to state.

of the

states

As

award of

a result, punitive

have introduced caps on

from preponderance of evidence

to

and convincing evidence, or passed legislation to apportion punitive damages

between the

state

and the

plaintiff.299

These differences and the

governs the state court's determination of
to excessive punitive

liability

vagueness

fact that

and assessments of amounts leading

damages awards, have kindled a controversy on whether punitive

damages should be subject

to

uniform federal

legislation.^^o

While the

critics

of such a

reform fear an encroachment of federal law upon a domain which historically belongs to
the states, the proponents favor

it

because

it

would provide more

certainty,

and

predictability, while protecting the defendant against excessive awards, leading to a

reduction of lawsuits.^^' However,

it

is

important to notice that this controversy does

not question the existence of punitive damages. Rather,

it

focuses on

how

punitive damages. Moreover, with regard to the issue of introducing punitive
into

German

law, this controversy

is irrelevant.

According

to art. 72,

(Grundgesetz, Constitution) tort law, as a domain of private law,
the

federal

is

74

sec.

I,

to

award

damages
Nr.

1

GG

solely regulated

by

government. Thus, punitive damages would be introduced uniformly.

Therefore, the question of whether to favor state or federal tort reform in the United

need to be answered. The same

States does not

^^^

Thomas A. Eaton

&

Susette

M.

Talarico,

A

Profile

is

true for issues arising out of the

of Tort Litigation

in

Georgia and Reflections on

Tort Reform, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 627,632 (1996).
2^^ See supra, notes 50 and 296.
^00 See,

e.g..

Eaton

&. Talarico,

301 Pace, 5M/?ra note

41

,

at

supra note 298,

1615

-

1616.

at

670

-

691; Pace, supra note 41,

at

1615

-

1632.
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German

existence of a jury because this institution does not exist in

law. Instead,

we can

focus on the objectives, prerequisites, and the constitutionality of punitive damages.

-

Objectives of punitive damages: Deterrence and punishment

Punitive
deter the

damages seek

individual

to achieve three basic goals. First, they are

defendant

{e.g.

awarded

manufacturer) from repeating his misconduct

(specific or individual deterrence), second, to deter other potential defendants

engaging

in similar kind

of behavior

to

in the future (general deterrence),^^^

and

from

third, they

serve to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct.^^^

-

Prerequisite to award punitive damages: Reprehensible conduct

The key

factor

on which courts and

award punitive damages, and

if so, to

what

juries focus in order to decide

extent, is the reprehensibility

whether to

of defendant's

conduct. According to the definitions provided by the courts, reprehensibility can be

found

defendant acted maliciously, willfully, egregiously, or with reckless

if the

disregard for the rights of others.^^'*

was met

is

Grimshaw

v.

A

significant

example

Ford Motor Co?^^. The

facts

in

of

numerous Ford Pinto vehicles were equipped with a defective
fire in the vehicle's interior in

and

retrofitting the

20

to

30 mile-per-hour

which

this case

fuel

collisions.

302

7X0

303 Id.

Production Corp.
Inc. v.

v.

system which caused

The

cost of recalling

fiiel

system (180

Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,456 (1993);

Gore, 5 1 7 U.S. 559,560

(BMW, TXO,

provided that

automobiles would have been $ 137 million. Ford estimated that the

costs resulting from liability for injuries caused by the defective

America,

this prerequisite

( 1

996); Pace, supra note 4 1

,

at

1

BMW

bum

of North

579- 1 580.

Pace).

304

Hood V. Fulkerson, 699 P.2d 608,611 (N.M. 1985) (Holding that punitive damages may be awarded
only when the conduct of the tortfeasor is maliciously intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed
recklessly or with a

wanton disregard

to the plaintiffs rights);

Masaki

v.

General Motros Corp., 780 P.2d

566,570 (Haw. 1989) (stating that punitive damages are awarded only when the egregious nature of
defendant's conduct makes this remedy appropriate).
305 174 Cal. Rptr.

348

(Cal. Ct.

App.1981).

69

bum

180 serious

deaths.

injuries,

Ford

Consequently,

million.^06

and 2,100 destroyed vehicles) were only $ 49.5

decided

management was aware of the crash

tests

although

the

showing the vulnerability of the Pinto's

fuel

not

to

recall

vehicles,

its

tank to rupture at low speed rear impacts. ^^^ The court held that Ford's decision to

expose consimiers to a high risk of injury and death constituted an unethical cost-benefit
analysis that egregiously undervalued "[h]uman lives and limbs against corporate

The jury awarded $ 127.5 million

profit."30^

for the plaintiff, including $ 125 million in

punitive damages.^^^

-

In

most

part

it

if

of the

jury determines the amount of punitive damages. ^'o However,

states, the

the judge retains the

reverse

Assessment of punitive damages awards

power

he believes that

to

it is

jury.311 In order to

review the jury award on punitive damages and can
excessive, or the result of a prejudice or passion on the

determine whether and to what amount punitive damages

should be awarded, courts and juries should take several factors into consideration.
In

BMW

examined the

^^^

of North America,

constitutionality

Thomas Koenig

&

Inc.

Supreme Court recently

Gore,^^- the

v.

of a pimitive damage award

in light

of the Due Process

Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" As Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. Mich.

J.L. Ref.

289,312(1998).
307

Grimshaw

v.

Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,385 (Cal. Cl App. 1981)

308 Id. at 384. (Grimshaw, Ford)
309

The punitive damage award was reduced by the

trial

judge to $ 3.5 million,

see, id, at 358.

310 In

some states, however, the judge determines the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, see,
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b (West 1991) (stating that the judge determines the amount of
punitive damages in products liability cases); OHIO REV. CODE Ann. § 2307.80 (Anderson 1995); Lisa
M. Sharkey, Judge or Jury: Who should assess Punitive Damages ?, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1089 (1996).
e.g..

3"

See, e.g.,

Grimshaw

v.

Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (the court upheld the

remittitur to $ 3.5 million of a jury

312

517 U.S. 559 (1996).

BMW

repainted (presumably because

BMW's

American

distributor

in

it

dealer. After nine

months

new

black

had been exposed to acid rain during

BMW automobiles. At

trial,

court's

BMW sports sedan

plaintiff noticed that the car
transit

preparation center in Brunswick, Georgia) and he sued

of

trial

punitive damages).

In 1990, plaintiff. Dr. Ira Gore, purchased a

40,750.88 from an Alabama
plant and

award of $ 125 million

for S

had been

between the manufacturing

BMW

of North America, the

BMW acknowledged that since

1983

it

had adopted

70
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment^'^ and provided three guideposts to determine

this

question. First, and most importantly, the defendant's degree of reprehensibility has to

be considered in order to decide on the excessiveness of punitive damages since "[s]ome

wrongs are more blameworthy than
this determination are the

harm

others."^''*

that has

Factors which should be considered in

been caused

{e.g. in

Gore pure economic

loss

without impact on the vehicle's safety or performance), the harm that could have
occurred (potential harm), whether the defendant
faith,^^5 the

is

a recidivist, whether he acted in bad

defendant's wealth,^'^ and whether the defendant gained a profit from his

misconduct. Second, the relationship between the plaintiffs compensatory damages and

amount of punitive damages awarded must be a "reasonable

the

the nationwide policy to sell previously
cost did not exceed 3

since 1983

BMW

%

damaged

of the suggested

cars as

retail price.

new without

one".^^' In Gore, the

advising the dealer

if the repair

Furthermore, plaintiff introduced evidence that

had sold nationwide 983 refmished cars as new, including 14

in

Alabama, without

disclosing that they had been repainted prior to sale. The jury returned a verdict awarding to the plaintiff

$ 4,000 in compensatory damages and $ 4 million in punitive damages, fmding that the nondisclosure
policy constituted gross, oppressive or malicious fraud.

BMW

filed a post-trial

motion to

set aside the

punitive damages, arguing that the award exceeded the constitutionally permissible amount.

judge denied

this

motion and held

Amendment because

that the

award did not

violate the

The

trial

due process clause of the Fourteenth

was not "grossly excessive". The Alabama Supreme Court agreed on the ground
it reduced the punitive damages award to $ 2 million
because the jury had improperly multiplied plaintiffs compensatory damages by the number of similar
sales nationwide, not only those in Alabama. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that the $
2 million punitive damage award is grossly excessive and violates the due process clause of the

that

BMW's

Fourteenth

Amendment and

^'^ U.S. Const,

of life,

it

conduct was reprehensible. However,

reversed the judgment.

amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
without the due process of law...". Also before Gore, the Supreme Court has

liberty, or property,

examined punitive damage awards in light of the due process clause, see, e.g, Pacific Mutual Life Ins.,
Co. V. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,21 (1991) (holding that a jury award of $ 1,04 million in compensatory and
punitive damages did not violate the due process clause); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443,462 (1993) (holding that a $ 10 million punitive damage award - which was 526
times the actual

damage

-

did not violate the due process clause).

314

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517. U.S. 559,575 (1996).

315

Mat 575-581.

316

Whether defendant's wealth should be taken

into consideration

is

controversial, see, e.g., Pace, supra

note 41, at 1584 (stating that a jury should take the defendant's fmancial position into consideration

more to punish a wealthy defendant that a poor one."); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869,911 (1998) (arguing that
wealth should not be considered because punitive damages imposed on the basis of wealth would impose

"[bjecause

it

takes

Shavell, Punitive

a tax
317

on large and successful corporations, discouraging development).

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,580 (1996).

71

between the plaintiffs compensatory damages ($ 4,000) and the punitive

relation

damages awarded by
held that this

a standard

the

Alabama Supreme Court

was not a "reasonable"

when such

($ 2 million)

relationship.^ '^

a relation should be

was 500

1

:

.

The court

However, the Court did not define

deemed reasonable and

explicitly rejected to

adopt a mathematical formula that compares actual and potential damages to the
punitive

damage

award.^'^

be compared to the

As

a third guidepost, the amount of punitive damages must

civil or criminal penalties that

could be imposed for a comparable

misconduct.320 jf ^he award in punitive damages
available statutory fines, there

the

maximum

civil

penalty for

is

is

an indication of excessiveness of the award. In Gore,

BMW's

behavior was $ 2,000 (compared to $ 2 million

damages) and, consequently, served as one factor

in punitive

damage award "grossly

The

Constitutionality of punitive damages

constitutionality of punitive

Amendment

damages can not only be challenged

but also under the Fifth and Eighth

Amendment.

In providing "[N]or shall any person be subject for the

same offence

the Fourteenth

put in jeopardy of

life

or limb..." the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

prohibits punishment of a defendant twice for the

^'^ In

to declare the punitive

excessive".^^!

-

Halper

"substantially greater" than the

^22 this

its

clause

was

previous decision,

interpreted to limit the

TXO

Production Corp.

v.

in light

to

be twice

Amendment

same reason. In United States

amount

of

v.

the government can recover

Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,462

(1993), however, the Supreme Court held that a $ 10 million punitive damage award which was 526
times the actual damage did not violate the due process clause.
319

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,582 (1996); some legal scholars propose to adopt

a mathematical formula, see,

harm caused

{e.g.

e.g.,

Polinsky

&

Shavell, supra note 316, at 875 (proposing to multiply the

$ 100.000) by the reciprocal of the probability of the defendant being found liable

25 %)).
320

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,583 (1996).

321 Id. at 584.

322

490 U.S. 435 (1989).

{e.g.

72
for

punishment

in a civil action after the defendant

had already been punished under

criminal law.323 in this case, the government brought a civil action against the defendant
after

he had already been sentenced to two years imprisonment. In the

civil action a $

5,000 penalty was assessed against the defendant. The Supreme Court held that the
fine

was

unconstitutional, because

it

constituted a second punishment for the

civil

same

offense.324

With the same argument, one could declare a punitive damage award

to

be

unconstitutional in cases where the defendant has either been previously criminally

punished or when considering awarded compensatory damages as
punitive

damages

as second.

However, the Supreme Court

protection under the double jeopardy clause
private parties,"^25 ^ut only if one

damage award

that entirely

Amendment.

some

and the

In

state. ^26

the defendant

questionable

states,

is

is

"[n]ot triggered

the government.

goes to the plaintiff

however,

this

in

award

is

is

Given

first

punishment and

Halper held

that the

by

between

litigation

this premise, a punitive

constitutional imder the Fifth

apportioned between the plaintiff

Thus, in these cases one could argue that the state acts as a party, so that

would be protected under the double jeopardy

when

clause. This, however, is

considering the fact that the state does not act as a plaintiff in the

action but only receives a portion of the punitive

damages awarded. Moreover,

in

most

cases the defendant will not have been punished previously under criminal law. Then,
the argument that compensatory

since this kind of

damage

is

damages

constitute a

"punishment" has

intended the plaintiff to the position he

was

to

be rejected

in before the

harmful event occurred but does not pursue the goal of punishing the defendant.

323 United States v. Halper,

324 Id. at 448-449.
325 /rf at 451.

326 See supra, note 296.

490 U.S. 435,446 (1989).
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damages

Punitive

awards

also

have

been

Amendment,^27 because they can constitute excessive
prohibited under this

Kelco Disposal

Amendment. However,

Inc.,^^^ the

in

Supreme Court held

attacked

under

the

Eighth

imposition of which

fines, the

Browning-Ferris Indus, of

that the Excessive Fines

Vt.,

Inc.

is

v.

Clause did not

apply to damages awarded in litigation between private parties. In particular, the Court
stated that this Clause "[d]oes not constrain an

when

in a civil suit

the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a

share of the

damages awarded."329 jhjs language reveals

plaintiff receives the entire

unconstitutional.

when

award of money damages

amount of punitive damages

However, constitutional concerns could

the punitive

that in jurisdictions

damage award

is

this

arise

award should not be

under

this

Amendment

apportioned between the plaintiff and the

Court in Browning-Ferris did not provide a solution for

where the

state.

The

this concern, but left this

question explicitly open.^^^

-

As we can
United States.
points:

It

see, punitive

damages

Comment

are subject to a controversial discussion in the

should be emphasized that this discussion centers on three different

whether punitive damages should be subject

to federal or state tort reform,

what

solutions can be provided in order to determine their reasonableness, and whether they

have to be deemed unconstitutional when the
existence of punitive

With regard

state gets part

of them. However, the

damages has not been questioned.

to the following discussion

on the introduction of punitive damages

law, the controversy about federal or state tort reform will never be raised.

in

German

•^^^

U.S. Const, amend. VIII, provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
328

492 U.S. 257 (1989).

329 Browning-Ferris Indus, of Vt., Inc. v.

330

m

at

276 note 21.

Kelco Disposal,

Inc.,

492 U.S. 257,264 (1989).

74
because

tort

law

Germany

in

is

mentioned issues

federal law. Thus, only the latter

(reasonableness and state apportionment) remain to be answered under

(B)

Punitive damages under

German

law.

German law

Since punitive damages do not exist in Germany, there are obviously not
cases dealing with this issue.

when

The only chance

the plaintiffs seek to enforce a foreign

damages

punitive

in

Doe,33' a U.S. and

for courts to decide

judgment of a

Germany. That was the case

German

citizen,

on

plaintiff $

750,260

this issue arises

jurisdiction that recognizes

in 1992,

where the

plaintiff,

John

sought to enforce a judgment issued by the Superior

yg

judgment

in past

and future

Court of California against the defendant living in Germany.332 j\^q

awarded the

many

in

damages, including $ 350,260

medical expenses, cost of placement, pain and suffering, and $ 400,000 in punitive

damages. The

judgment

to

court (Landgericht Duesseldorf, regional court) declared the U.S.

trial

be enforceable in Germany. The Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht

Dueseeldorf, regional appeal court) declared the judgment to be enforceable to the
extent of $ 275,325. Before the

Supreme Court, which subsequently

dealt with the issue,

the defendant requested dismissal of the action, and the plaintiff requested to receive the
entire

amount of damages. The Supreme Court held

that the complaint

had

to

be

dismissed with regard to the punitive damages, because punitive damages were
incompatible with basic principles of

German

law.

Other than

that,

the plaintiff

prevailed.

^^'

The name "John Doe"

California, see,

332

BGHZ

BGHZ

1

is

the code

name given

to the plaintiff

by the Superior Court of the

State of

18,312,313.

live in South California before where the
was sexually abused by the defendant. After a lifelong sentence of
imprisonment had been issued against the defendant by a another U.S. court, the defendant escaped to
Germany on May 10, 1984. The defendant, at the time of the decision, lived in Germany where he owed

plaintiff,

at

real estate.

118,312 ff: Both plaintiff and defendant used to
the age of 14,

75
-

Holding of the German Supreme Court

in

BGHZ

118,312: "Punitive

damages are incompatible with basic principles of german law"
The Court

started

its

analysis

by focusing on §§ 723 sec

II,

328

sec.

I

ZPO

(Code of Civil Procedure). These sections contain the rules governing the enforceability
of foreign judgments. § 723
its

sec.

II, cl.

2

ZPO

refers to §

328

sec.

I

ZPO

Nr. 4 that the "Recognition of a judgment issued by a foreign court

the recognition of this

German

basic principles of
rights."

judgment leads

The court held

which
is

states in

impossible

if

to a result that is obviously incompatible with

law, in particular, if the recognition violates constitutional

that, in general, punitive

damages

are incompatible with

German

law, because they violate constitutional law and are incompatible with principles of

German

tort law.^^s

to those

addressed under U.S. law. In particular,

With regard

to constitutional

a double punishment, and therefore violate

punishment)334^

tj^^t t^gij.

art.

law the Court addressed issues similar
it

held that punitive damages constitute

103 sec.

GG

Ill

(prohibition of double

determination and their relation to the actual harm caused

too indefinite so that they violate the principle that a punishment has to be definite

103 sec.

II

20

sec. Ill

GG.^^^ With respect to the incompatibility with German

law, the Court stated that deterrence and punishment are objectives that are only

German

(art.

GG)335, and that they violate the principle of the reasonableness of the means

set forth in art.

to

is

tort

known

criminal law.337 Furthermore, the Court held that punitive damages lead to an

enrichment of the plaintiff but that the general rules governing the law of damages, §§

249 -253 BGB, solely seek

333
334

BGHZ
BGHZ

to

compensate the

BGHZ
336 BGHZ
337 BGHZ

harm he

suffered.

118,312,337-345.
118,312,337. Art. 103 sec.

Ill

laws, be punished multiple times for the
335

plaintiff for the

118,312,345.
118,312,343.
118,312,338.

GG

reads:

"Nobody may, on

same offense."

the basis of the general criminal

76
-

Counter-arguments: Rejection of the Supreme Court's view.

Although these arguments do not seem
punitive

damages

German

in

law,

by the Supreme Court can be

it

for an introduction

of

proved that every single argument provided

will be

rejected,

room

to leave

and

why

that there are several reasons

punitive

damages should be adopted.

The

issue of double

punishment

Supreme Court focused on the

Amendment does

is

addressed in both countries. In U.S. law, the

not apply to private parties. This

Although one objective of punitive damages
language used in

and

Double Jeopardy Clause of the

fact that the

art.

"'...offense...'''')

103 sec.

Ill

GG

is

is

("...on the basis of the general criminal laws..."

prohibited w^hen

is

the government

upon a

private parties. Thus,
as long as the

art.

in art.

103 sec.

private party but are

103 sec.

Ill

Ill

is

based on

is

German

law, they
differ

GG in that they are not imposed by

awarded

in civil litigation

between two

GG is not applicable for punitive damages, at least

government does not receive a portion

The same

it

law and not criminal law. Furthermore, punitive damages

from criminal sanctions addressed

law.

the punishment of the defendant, the

implies that a double punishment

tort

German

also true for

criminal law. However, if punitive damages were introduced in

would supplement

Fifth

true for art. 103 sec.

II

GG

offense can only be punished if the punishability

it.

which, according to

was

its

wording ("An

definitely determined

by law..."),

equally applies to punishments issued under criminal law. Moreover, the criticism on
the indefiniteness of punitive
forth

and defines the objectives, prerequisites, amounts, and factors according

punitive
sec. Ill

damages should be awarded. ^^8 Because of this,

the argument based

GG (reasonableness of the means) has to be rejected

pimitive

3^^

damages can be solved by introducing a law which

damages could be determined

The same

solution

is

provided

in

explicitly

in

to

on

sets

which
art.

20

since the reasonableness of

a statute.

Consequently, the

U.S. law by the proponents of a federal reform on punitive damages.

77

Supreme Court's arguments based on

103 sec.

art.

GG and art.

II

20

sec. Ill

GG

are not

convincing.

The Supreme Court's arguments

known

(deterrence and punishment) are

that

the

to criminal

objectives

of punitive damages

law only, and that §§ 249-253

BGB

generally seek to compensate instead of punishing, are generally true. However, with

BGB

§§ 253, 847

(pain and suffering),

compensation and "satisfaction"
notion of punishment
the fact that

is

German

penalties. Thus,

it

not

German

(retaliation). ^39

unknown

tort

law seeks to achieve two goals,

Thus, with the

its

§ 336

-

goal at least the

latter

to tort law. This finding can

contract law recognizes in

its

even be enhanced by

BGB

345

can be concluded that the notion of punishment

is

contractual

not exclusively to

be found in criminal law. Accordingly, the Courts arguments are not compelling.

As

a result of the precedent analysis

provided by the Court could be rejected. Thus,

we

can see that every single argument

we now

turn to the arguments that favor

the introduction of punitive damages.

(c)

Arguments in favor of the introduction of punitive damages in

German law
The main argument

in favor

punitive damages. Punitive
tortfeasors fi^om engaging in
plaintiffs.

time.

Cases

And, indeed,

damages

in

v.

339

provided by the goals of

deter the actual tortfeasor and other potential

Ford Motor

Co. ^'^^ could happen in

1994 the automobile manufacturer Opel violated

"Astra" vehicles that used to catch
tanks.

is

misconduct that brings or could bring harm

Grimshaw

like

of punitive damages

fire as

to potential

Germany
its

all

the

duty to recall

a result of popping gas out of defective fuel

Although Opel already had knowledge of the existence of the defective condition.

Thomas, supra note

66, §

340i74Cal.Rptr. 348(1978).

847 BGB, Rn.

4.
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it

did not intervene.^'" Thus, the manufacturer exposed numerous users to a high risk of

danger to Hfe and limb. One of the explanations for

Germany do

that manufacturers in

damages.
able to

Of course,

fulfill

minimum

level

even

but,

his

if

kind of corporate conduct

not have the fear of paying a high

they would be liable for plaintiffs economic loss

burden of proof. However, noneconomic loss

and rarely exceeds
is

it

this

successful,

administrative fine of

DM

it

DM

is

50,000 set forth in §

individual,

1

5

compensated

may be

not the

mechanism and
products.3'*3

for the

at the

Moreover,

harm they

a

The

of the Product Safety Act hardly

Given

this

of punitive damages would constitute an effective deterrence

same time provide an incentive
it

at

started,

entity.^'*^

deters manufacturers fi-om engaging or repeating their wrongful conduct.
situation, the introduction

amount of

if the plaintiff is

100,000. Criminal prosecution

punishes the

is

would guarantee

for manufacturers to create safer

that plaintiffs receive adequate

compensation

suffered.

However, manufacturers and other opponents

to this proposal will provide the

Some of

same arguments against punitive damages

as those used in the United States.

them have already been presented

Other important arguments often stated are

that punitive

damages

earlier.

will cause unnecessary litigation

by increasing the plaintiffs

motivation to go to court, that they are or will be "skyrocketing", and increase insurance
costs.3'*'*

^'^^

Empirical analyses show, however, that this fear

Bodewig, supra note 273,

is

over-exaggerated.^'*^ For the

346 note 36.

at

^'*2

It is not overseen that at the end the shareholders and the consumers carry the entity's financial loss
which is going to be reflected in increased product prices. However, as for shareholders, the ones that
have a high stock are partly responsible for the corporation's decision. Thus, it is not unfair that the
effects of punitive damages affect them. Shareholders with a low stock will suffer only a small loss. As
for the consumers it has to be said that nobody is forced to buy products of a company which increased
their prices since there is enough competition.

^'^^

As

good

note by U.S. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C): "[W]e could spend an afternoon pointing out the

that product liability has done.

antilock brakes. That elevator

is

(statement of Sen. Hollings).
3'*'*

Pace, supra note 41, at 1575.

We

do not get blown up by

checked...", see, 142 Cong. Rec.

that Pinto gas tank.

S2344

(daily ed.

Cars have

all

Mar. 20, 1996)
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United States

it

damage awards

has been found that from 1965 to 1990, there were only 355 punitive
in

product

liability cases,

and more than half of those were reduced

settlement or by appellate courts. ^^^ Nothing else
legislature enacts a reasonably designed statute

is

to be expected in

on punitive damages

Germany,

in

if the

that foresees the

imposition of punitive damages as "ultima ratio".

(D)

From
damages

in

the precedent analysis can be concluded that the introduction of punitive

Germany

is

not only possible but also desirable.

view there are no hurdles
prerequisite

Proposal

is

comes from a

that

that could not

the legal point of

be taken. However, the most important

one wants and dares to introduce something that

different legal system,

As can be

From

is

new, which

and which might not please everyone.

gathered from the preceding

it

is

the

German

legislature

which should

introduce punitive damages by statute. In order to meet the constitutional requirements

capped punitive damages should be adopted. Prerequisites

(e.g.

reckless conduct),

determinative factors (degree of recklessness or reprehensibility, wealth

should be explicitly defined in the

statute.

Moreover, a comment

and caps

etc.),

to the statute

should be

issued in order to provide examples for the (non-) imposition of this kind of damages in
different areas of tort

could by providing

law (motor vehicles, aviation

own

solutions

etc.).

Further upcoming problems

combined with borrowing solutions from

the

law

governing punitive damages in the United States.

^^^ See, Eaton

accounted

1

.3

&

Talarico, supra note 298, at 637, and

% of tort

650 (noting

that products liability cases only

claims filed in Georgia courts outside Atlanta and that punitive damages were

rarely awarded); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1992).

^^^ Rustad, supra note 345, at 57-58.
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3.

§ 823 sec.

product

liability

II

LIABILITY

BGB^'''^

UNDER § 823

SEC.

II

the second section under

is

action could be held liable.

It

BGB

which the defendant

in a

requires the existence of a protective law

that

must have been negligently or intentionally violated by the defendant. According

art.

2

EGBGB

a protective

law

is

every legal

norm

to

of an

that intends the protection

individualized group of persons. Thus, a law that seeks to protect the public at large

does not

requirement.^'*^

fulfill this

A)

Protective laws concerning the motor vehicle area

With regard
of importance.

motor vehicle branch, three recognized protective laws can be

to the

First, in

cases where bodily injury or even the death of a consumer has

been caused by a defective product, §§212, 222, 223, and 230 StGB^'*^ can be relevant.

Under these

sections negligent or intentional behavior of the manufacturer's employees

will be prosecuted.350

§ 823 sec.

II

BGB

At the same time those provisions

for a violation of

which the

constitute protective laws under

plaintiff has a claim to

be compensated.

Second, the Road Traffic Registration Act (Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung,

StVZO)

that also constitutes a protective law, has to

violated

by an automobile accessories manufacturer when a product

marketed

although

a

lacks

it

necessary

be mentioned. This law could be

operating

is

permission.^^i

going to be
Finally,

the

Produktsicherheitsgesetz from August 1997 has to be considered as protective law, as

it

intends to protect the individual consumer from being exposed to dangerous products.

^*' See, § 823 sec.
348

II

BGB, supra note

Thomas, supra note

66, § 823

349 See, StGB, supra note 81
350 See, e.g.,
351 This

BGH NJW

would

91.

BGB, Rn.

141;

Hein KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 170

..

1995,2930

-

Holzschutzmittel

constitute a violation of §§ 22,

(Wood

22a StVZO.

preservative).

(6"^

ed. 1994).

81

Thus,

823

negligent or intentional violation also gives the plaintiff a valid claim under §

its

sec. II

BGB.

B)

Peculiarities of § 823 sec.

(I.)

II

BGB compared to § 823 sec. BGB
I

Compensation for pure economic loss

BGB

resides in

the fact that only under the latter can the plaintiff get compensation for pure

economic

The main

difference between § 823 sec.

loss as long as this kind

of compensation

is

I

BGB

rights

it

sec.

II

intended by the violated protective law. This

kind of compensation does not exist under § 823
recoverable only if

and § 823

sec. I

BGB

as here the

damage

the result of a violation of one of the enumerated protected

is

of this section.352

(ii.)

§ 823 sec.

II, cl.

acted with fault,

even

2

Distribution of burden of proof

BGB

if the

states that the defendant

protective

can only be held liable

if

under § 823

sec.

I

BGB^^a would be a

therefore, has generally not

he

law does not require such a behavior.

Accordingly, a shift in the burden of proof with regard to fault to the defendant as
exists

is

it

violation of the section's wording, and

been recognized by the

courts. Therefore, the

normal rules

of providing evidence are applicable, which means that the plaintiff generally has to
prove

all

prerequisites that favor his claim,

protective law.

However, also under

including the faulty violation of the

this section a lightening for plaintiffs

been established by the Supreme Court.

It

held that in cases where

violation of a protective right occurred, the fault of the defendant

352

Hein KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, Rn. 75 (6*

353

See supra, note 90.

354

BGHZ

51,91 (103

f.) -

ed. 1994).

Huehnerpest (Fowl

pest).

is

it is

claim has

sure that the

presumed.354
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under the Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz)

C. Liability

Since 1990, a product

law (§§ 823

853

-

BGB)

The

ProdHaftG).355.

liability for all three

liability action

can not only be based on traditional

tort

but also on the Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz,

peculiarity of this

Act resides

in the fact that

it

establishes strict

kinds of product defects (manufacturing, design and instructions or

warnings defects).^^^ This means

of a product defect and

its

that,

contrary to traditional tort law, only the existence

harm

causality for the resulting

are necessary requirements in

order to establish a valid claim. The breach of a duty or fault of the defendant are not
prerequisites, therefore, his provision of exculpatory evidence with regard to these

elements

under

is irrelevant.

Accordingly, the plaintiff initially bears a lighter burden of proof

this statute^^"^ than

BGB. However,

this

two

under the main provision of traditional

seeming advantage for the

tort law,

§ 823 sec.

plaintiff is balanced out

I

by many

disadvantages which are evaluated together with similarities and other advantages in the
following comparison to §§ 823

-

1.

853

BGB.

Structure of the statute

In total, the statute contains 19 sections. §

main provision, because

it

establishes

sec.

liability

strict

defective products cause a harmful event. §

1

1

sec. II

I

ProdHaftG^^s

for the

and

III

is

the statute's

manufacturer whose

ProdHaftG^^^ contain

^^^ See, ProdHaftG, supra note 32.

356 5ee, §

sec.

1

I

ProdHaftG

[Liability]:

is killed by the defectiveness of a product, his body or health is injured or a thing is
damaged, the maker of the product is obliged to compensate the injured person for damages arising
therefrom. This is only applicable in a case of damage to property if a thing other than the defective

(1) If a person

product

is

damaged and

that other thing according to

its

nature

is

destined for private use or consumption

and has been applied by the injured person mainly for that purpose.
35^ See, §

causality
358
359
(2)

1

sec. IV, cl.

1

ProdHaftG which reads: "The burden of proof concerning the defect and the
lies on the person who suffered the damage."

between the defect and the damage

Supra note 356.
§

1

sec. II

The duty

and

to

III

ProdHaftG

read:

compensate of the maker [of the defective product]

is

excluded

if:

.
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provisions under which defendant's liability

by the definition of "defect" under

1

sec.

IV ProdHaftG

§ 3

ProdHaftG^^'. Potential defendants are explicitly

4 ProdHaftG^^^^ and § 5 ProdHaftG^^^ contains the rule for joint

in §

he did not the thing into circulation;

1

according to the circumstances, the conclusion

2.

caused the damage when the maker put
3. that

he did not

did he

make

4. the

defect

was

in

make

or market

it

is

have the defect which

form of distribution for economic gain, nor

the product for sale or any other

it

within the scope of his professional activity;

based on the fact that the product,

is

that the product did not yet

into circulation;

at the

time

when

the

maker put

it

into circulation,

compliance with the compulsory requirements of the law applicable therefore;

the defect could not be discovered considering the state of science and technology at the time

5.

the
(3)

excluded, and §

burden of proof. § 2 ProdHaftG^^o defines the notion of product, followed

distributes the

mentioned

is

maker put

The duty

to

when

the product on the market.

compensate of the maker of a part-product

is

furthermore excluded

if the

defect

was

caused by the construction of the product into which the part-product was integrated, or resulted from the
instructions of the

maker of the product. The

firs

sentence shall also apply to the makers of raw materials

mutatis mutandis.
360

§ 2

ProdHaftG [Product]: Product within the meaning of this Act

is

every movable thing, also

forms the part of another movable thing or of an immovable thing, as

electricity.

when

it

Excepted are

products of the land, animal husbandry, bee-keeping and fishery (natural agricultural
which have not undergone primary manufacturing process; the same applies to hunter's booty.

agricultural

products),
361

§ 3

ProdHaftG [Defect]:

(1)

A

product has a defect

if

it

fails to offer the

safety which,

by considering

all

circumstances,

especially:
a)

its

offering;

b) the use,

which can

c) the time at

which

fairly

it

be relied upon;

has been put on the market

can be legitimately expected.
(2)

A

product does not have a defect merely for the reason that subsequently an improved product was

put on the market.
362
(1)

§

4 ProdHaftG [Producer]:

A producer within the meaning of this Act is who produced the fmal product, a raw material or a partA person is also considered a producer if he, by lending his name, his trade mark or other

product.

distinctive

(2)

A

mark, holds himself out as producer.

person

sale, lease,

is

furthermore considered a producer

if

he introduces or passes a product for the purpose of

hire-purchase or any other form of marketing for economic gain within the scope of his

business activity within the territorial scope of application of the Treaty Establishing the European

Economic Community.
of a product carmot be ascertained, every supplier is deemed its producer, unless he
name of the producer or of the person who was his supplier, to the person suffering the damage,
one month following the date on which a demand therefor was delivered to him. This also applies

(3) If the producer

gives the

within

to an introduced product

if,

in that case, the

though the name of the producer

is

known.

person specified

in

subsection (2) cannot be ascertained, even

84

which

tortfeasors,

§§421

refers basically to

negligence, § 6 ProdHaftG^^'* applies the

-

same

426 BGB. With regard

rules as §

254

BGB

to

to contributory

which

it

refers.

§§

7 to 10 ProdHaftG^^^ contains peculiarities that have to be taken into consideration in

cases of bodily injury or death. §

where harm

1 1

to property occurred.

ProdHaftG^^^ establishes a deductible in situations

The

statute

of limitation, according to which a claim

barred after three years from the time at which the plaintiff obtained knowledge or

is

could have had knowledge of the damage, the defect and the defendant,
12 ProdHaftG^^^, followed by the statute of repose in § 13 sec.

^^^

§ 5

ProdHaftG [When several persons

If several

I

is

contained in §

ProdHaftG^^s

are liable]:

producers are jointly liable for the same damage, they are jointly and severally

relationship as

among

under

,

the persons liable, unless otherwise provided, the obligation to

make

liable.

The

restitution, as

well as the amounts of damages, depends on the circumstances, especially on the extent to which the

damage was caused mainly by one
and sec. II of the Civil Code aply.
364

§

or another party; otherwise §§ 421 to 425 as well as §

426

sec.

I, cl.

2

6 ProdHaftG [Reduction of liability]:
person suffering the damage negligently contributed to the causation of the damage, § 254 of
applies; in case of damage to property, fault of the person who has the actual control over

(1) If the

the Civil

Code

the thing

is

equal to a fauh by the person suffering the damage.

The liability of the producer is not reduced if the damage is caused by a
same time, by the act of a third party. § 5 cl.2 applies mutatis mutandis.

defect of the product and, at

the
^^^

Of particular

maximum

cap for the compensation of

(2)

importance

is

§

ProdHaftG which contains a

1

bodily injuries; § 10 ProdHaftG provides:
(1) If personal injuries
defect, the person

have been caused by a product or products of the same kind with an identical
to pay compensation is liable only to a maximum amount of 160

having the duty

DM.

million

(2) If the

compensation payable

to several injured parties

relates to the

366 §

1 1

In case

of

1.

maximum

amount.

ProdHaftG [Deductible

in

case of property damage]:

of property damage, the person suffering the damage

125

367

§ 12

(1)

A

maximum amount of specified in
same proportion as their total amount

exceeds the

subsection (1), the individual compensations shall be reduced in the

shall

himself bear the damage to the amount

DM.
ProdHaftG

[Prescription]:

claim under §

1

is

barred after three years from the time

at

which the person

entitled to

compensation obtained knowledge of the damage, the defect and the identity of the person

liable,

or

ought to have obtained knowledge thereof
(2) If negotiations concerning the

compensation payable are pending between the person

person entitled, the running of the prescriptive period
is

is

refiised.

(3) Otherwise, the provisions

liable

and the

stayed until the continuation of the negotiations

of the Civil Code on prescription

shall apply.
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which a claim extinguishes
the market. §

after 10 years fi-om the

time

at

which the product was put on

14 ProdHaftG declares that the provisions of this statute cannot be

excluded or altered by mutual agreement. The applicability of other laws, such as
traditional tort

law under the Civil Code,

is

established in § 15 sec.

II

ProdHaftG^^^. §

16 ProdHaftG defines the scope of the application of this statute and only applies to

products that were put on the market before

it

As

entered into force.

provides that the Produkthaftungsgesetz enters into force on January

under

1,

ProdHaftG

1990, liability

cannot be established for products marketed before that time.

statute

this

§ 19

Consequently, a motor vehicle manufacturer will not be held liable for damages

from defective vehicles put

resulting

ProdHaftG,

2.

finally, contains

in the stream

of commerce before 1990.

17

§

only formalities concerning the legislative procedure.

Similarities between Produkthaftungsgesetz and traditional

TORT LAW
As under

traditional tort law, the Product Liability

not recognize the

defendant's

liability

for

development

damages, both laws deny compensation for pure economic
product

itself (§

sec.

1

I,

cl.

governing joint and several

•^^^

§ 13 sec.

I

2)372.

liability,

Act

(§

1

sec. II Nr. 5)

risks. ^''o

loss^^'

does

With regard

to

and for the defective

Also, the scope of potential defendants, the rule

and the provision for contributory negligence

set

ProdHaftG [Extinction of claims]:

A claim under § 1 becomes extinct in ten years from the time at which the producer of the product
which caused the harm put it on the market. This does not apply when there is a legal dispute or a
(1)

collection proceeding pending.

'^^

§ 15 sec.

3'^^

See, §

37'

1

For the

II

ProdHaftG

sec.

1

Nr.

fact that

Thomas, supra
372 See, §

II

sec.

5,

reads: Liability under other provisions remains unaffected.

supra note 359.

pure economic loss

note 66, at §
I, cl.

2,

1

is

not allowed compensation imder the Product Liability Act, see,

ProdHaftG, Rn.

supra note 356.

8.

86

Act are closely related

forth in the Product Liability

to the rules applicable

under

traditional tort law.

3.

Differences between the Product Liability Act and traditional

TORT LAW
However, there
from

are several aspects in

which the Product

Liability

Act

differs

traditional tort law:

A)

The standard of
Liability

Act

is

traditional tort

one of

Standard of liability
which the defendant

to

liability

strict liability

law negligence

is

(§

1

sec.

I,

cl.

1

held under the Product

is

ProdHaftG), whereas under
Thus, a consumer

the governing legal standard.

who

sues a motor vehicle manufacturer under the Product Liability Act does not have to

prove faulty conduct of the
under traditional
fault is

tort

latter.

However,

this

advantage

diminished by the fact that

law the breach of a duty of care of the defendant as well as

presumed. Accordingly, in product

liability actions the

and negligence

strict liability

standard of the Product Liability Act

is

eliminated.

is that, in

law, the defendant's provision of exculpatory evidence

seeming advantage has

lost

much of

by the courts

its

is

that

remains under the

contrast to traditional tort
irrelevant.

However,

that,

to provide exculpatory evidence are very high,

although in theory a big difference between

Product Liability Act and traditional

tort

this

importance, because under traditional tort law

defendant will rarely be able to successfully present this kind of evidence. Thus,

be concluded

his

main difference between

The only advantage

strict liability

the requirements set

is

law

strict liability

and a
it

can

under the

exists, this difference is small in reality.
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b)

no liability for run-away products under the product liability
Act

As
fault,

the standard of liability under the Produkthaftungsgesetz

the motor vehicle manufacturer will, in contrast to § 823 sec.

is

I

not based on

BGB,

be held

manufacturing defects that are inevitable despite

liable for products containing

all

precautions (run-away products).

c)

no duty to observe or recall products under the product
Liability Act

One of the main

difference between both laws

is

that the manufacturer's duty to

observe or recall products after their placement on the market

Product Liability Act but only exists under traditional
resides in the fact that

defective product

is

it

only covers

liability

tort law.

is

not established in the

This weakness of the Act

from the time

marketed but does not cover the time

until,

or at which, a

after its marketing^'^.

Therefore, the plaintiff will be without remedy if the manufacturer violates one of his

post-marketing duties.

D)

Limited scope of application of the Product Liability Act

As we have

seen, § 16

ProdHaftG

in

connection with § 19 ProdHaftG limits the

scope of the application of the Product Liability Act to products put on the market after
January

such a

1,

1990. Liability under traditional tort law, on the other hand, does not contain

limit.

Thus, plaintiffs seeking remedies for damages caused by vehicles marketed

before that date can base their action successfully only on §§ 823

373 See,

Hein KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT,

at

Rn. 462 (6* ed. 1994).

I

or

II

BGB.
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E)

Limited award of damages under the Product Liability Act

The damages recoverable under

the Product Liability Act are, in contrast to

traditional tort law, limited. In cases involving personal injury, the recoverable

is

DM

limited to 160 million

suffers property

damage, he

10 ProdHaftG)^'''*. In situations where the plaintiff

(§

will

have to pay a deductible of 1.125,-

ProdHaftG); moreover, according to §

damage

is

restricted to things

damage on

for

for that person

pain and suffering

is

fact that

set

up by

§

253

it

to private use or

under §§ 823 ff

§

BGB

852

time limit of § 12 ProdHaftG

is

In contrast, the time limit of § 852
act

kind of

factors constitute the

why most of the

statute

of limitations

product

most

liability actions

stricter in that

BGB

and the

See, § 10 ProdHaftG, supra note 365.

in the Products Liability

are both three years, there is a difference.

it

begins to run only

tortfeasor.

The

runs either if the plaintiff had

knowledge or could have had knowledge of the damage, the

knowledge of the tortuous

this

Statute of limitation

Although the time period of the
ProdHaftG) and

does not explicitly mention

BOB.

F)

^""^

consumption and

by the injured person. Thus, recovery

BOB. These

important disadvantage of the Act and explain

(§ 12

11

under the Product Liability Act a recovery for

not recognized, because

damage, a requirement

Act

(§

things used commercially will not be awarded. Furthermore, special

emphasis should be put on the

will be brought

DM

ProdHaftG, recovery for property

sec. 1, cl.2

1

which are destined

which have been applied mainly

amount

defect,

and the defendant.

if the plaintiff

has actual

89
G) Statute of repose

In contrast to traditional tort law, the Product Liability
sec.

I

ProdHaftG a provision of repose according

to

Act contains

which the

in its § 13

plaintiff has to file a

lawsuit within ten years from the time at which the product has been put on the market.

Conclusion

D.

From

the preceding analysis of

German

tort

plaintiff in a product liability suit has three options

either base his claim

on

strict liability

on negligence under §§ 823

sec.

I, II

law can be concluded

how to

proceed in his action.

consumer expectations

traditional tort law,

test is

He can

under the Product Liability Act, or base his claim

BOB,

or he can combine these two claims. With

regard to defendant's conduct the Product Liability Act applies a

A

that the

strict liability standard.

used to determine the existence of a defect. Under

on the other hand, a reasonable manufacturer standard

is

used to

determine whether defendant's conduct was negligent. In order to determine product
defectiveness, however, the courts use a

which

is

supplemented by a

consumer expectations

risk-utility analysis

test as starting point

and several other factors (reasonably

prudent manufacturer standard, state of science and technology).

As

for the relation

between the Product

Liability

Act and

traditional tort

law

it

might seem that the former should be favored as basis for plaintiffs claims because of
its strict liability

standard which eases plaintiffs burden of proof However, the facts

that the Product Liability

Act

fails to

address important issues

(e.g.

post-sale duty to

does not recognize damages

warn and

recall) characterizing

for pain

and suffering and even introduces caps on economic damages makes

relatively

inefficient.

traditional tort

product

liability law, that

it

Accordingly, plaintiffs base their claims in most cases on

law which has been developed by courts to the extent

issue arising in

it

modem

product

liability law. Its fiirther

advantage

that

is

it

covers every

that

it

applies a
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presumption of the manufacturer's violation of duty of care and of

its

fault

which eases

plaintiffs burden of proof remarkably. Moreover, the plaintiff can recover for almost

every kind of damage, including pain and suffering, except for pure economic

Thus,

we

reach the conclusion that traditional tort law from 1900, as

developed by the courts,
the

is

much more

modem Product Liability Act from
Another important finding

product
as

liability

law

related to

1

and advantageous for the

common

that

due

to the

States. In the following

factor also the material

one another. This

is

Chapter

law

in

have the same importance
II

we

even see that in

will

both countries

is

very closely

true for almost every aspect except the important fact that

damages

German

legislature adopts the proposal to enact a statute introducing
is

plaintiff than

absence of a statute covering

punitive

damages which

has been

990.

in its entirety, judicial decisions almost

common law in the United

addition to this

is

efficient

it

loss.

are solely recognized in U.S. law. This, however, could change if the

capped punitive

not only desirable but also necessary. The, the differences between

the law in both countries

would be reduced

to a

few

details only.

Chapter II

Product liability

in

the motor vehicle area

in

A. Sources of product liability

the United States

law

In the United States three sources of product liabiHty law can be distinguished.

The

first is state

common

law, the second one

is state

and federal

legislation,

and the

of the Restatements of Torts. This enumeration already points

third arises out

at the

interconnection between state and federal law, and for the following discussion, special

emphasis must be put on the
to

50

Germany ,^"^5
states

has

federal law,

product

liability

law as part of tort law, in contrast

traditionally belongs in the field state law.^^^ Accordingly, each

its

law applicable

fact that

own

product

liability

nationwide.^''''

we must keep

in

law so

that there is

Thus, although product

mind

that this is

no uniform product

liability

law

is

an encroachment upon

of the

liability

influenced by
state law,

an

important fact in situations where both state and federal law conflict.

^^^

Compared

art.

72

sec.

I

in

to the United States the distribution

connection with

legislation excluding the 16

there

is

The

R.R.

V.

74

sec.

I,

German Laender

only one uniform product

376 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
377

art.

1

liability

Nr.

1

of competence

GG,

(states)

tort

in

Germany

is

reversed: According to

law as part of private law

from enacting separate product

law applicable

in the entire

is

subject to federal

liability laws.

Thus,

country.

16 S.Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).

idea of a uniform federal common law was rejected by the United States Supreme Court
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

91

in

Erie

92
1.

State common law - comparison to the German Civil law system

Unlike under the German
the United States

civil

law system, the most important source of law

not legislation but state

is

common law

which finds

(case law),

in

its

roots in English law.^^s 379

A product liability action can either be brought
federal court system. In the first one, the action

is

in the state court

system or

in the

started in a state trial court^^o, then

on

appeal goes to an intermediate appellate court,^^' and finally comes to the state Supreme
Court382. In the federal court system, in

which

state

law

is

applied, the action

is first

brought in a federal District Court383^ then goes to a U.S. Court of Appeal (Circuit
Court)^^'*,

and eventually comes to the United States Supreme Court. However, these

two systems
situations

are not entirely separated

where an action brought

from each other but can be cormected

in the state court

system contains issues involving

by a

federal law. Then, for example, a decision issued

in

state

Supreme Court can be

appealed to the United States Supreme Court^ss^ which can grant certiorari on the case.

^^^

^^^

law

Harald Koch, et al.,

Ipr

und Rechtsvergleichung

§

1

5 B.

I., II.,

at

26

1

-

262.

However, in the area of products liability the role of German courts in the development of this field of
is of extraordinary importance and comparable to the role of courts in the common law system of the

United States,

see,

Chapter

^^^ In Georgia, state

trial

I,

supra, at 15.

courts are: Superior Court, State Court, Probate Court, Magistrate Court, Civil

Court, Municipal Court.
^^'

The names of the intermediate

intermediate appellate court

is

appellate courts vary from state to state: E.g.,

called "Court of Appeals", in

New

in

Georgia, the

York, on the other hand,

it

is

called

"Appellate Division".
'^^ In Georgia, the

Supreme Court which has its seat in Atlanta consists of seven Justices; the current
members of the Georgia Supreme Court are: Robert Benham, Chief Justice; Norman S. Fletcher,
Presiding Justice; George H. Carley, Justice; P. Harris Hines, Justice; Carol W. Hunstein, Justice; Leah J.
Sears, Justice; Hugh P. Thompson, Justice.
^^^ In Georgia, for example, there are three District Courts (for the Northern-, MiddleDistrict

^*^ In total, there are 12 Circuit Courts; each of them has jurisdiction over several states,
the 1 1* Circuit Court has jurisdiction over Georgia, Florida and Alabama.
^^^

and Southern

of Georgia).
e.g., in

Georgia,

The United States Supreme Court resides in Washington D.C. and consists of nine Justices; the
members of this court are: Justice Rehnquist (Chief Justice), Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer,

current

Justice Ginsberg, Justice

Kennedy, Justice O'Connor, Justice

Scalia, Justice Souter, Justice Stevens.
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This happened, for example, in

BMW of North

Supreme Court granted

on the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.

In contrast to

certiorari

Germany,

the

America,

common law

Inc.

Gore,^^^ where the

v.

system of the United States

is

characterized by the doctrine of "stare decisis",^^'' which describes the fact that lower
courts are

bound by precedent cases decided by higher

decisions issued by the

Germany, although

courts.^^^ In

Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) or

the regional appeal

courts (Oberlandesgerichte) are strong authority, generally, and in theory,

court

is

bound by

their decisions.

One

exception, however, is

made

no lower

for decisions of the

Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which are considered to be

binding for

all

U.S. and the

courts like statutory law.389 Another important difference between the

German

the United States

(are)

is

it

judicial institution

charged with

court system concerns the process of fact finding during a

is

some

unknown

to

German

law, and

it is

the court (the judge(s)) that

is

this duty.

states the

common law

which product

legislation under

In

the task of the jury^^o to find the facts of the case. In contrast, this

2.

In

trial.

Legislation
of products

liability is

supplemented by

state

have been enacted. Some of them

liability statutes

contain codifications of important matters, such as the applicable standard for the

3«6

517 U.S. 559,568(1996).

387

pexer Hay, Einfuehrung in das amerikanische Recht

^89 See, § 31 sec.

BVerfGG)
(1)

in

I,

Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz,

der Fassung der Bekanntmachung

The decisions of the Federal

organs as well as for
(2)

II

With regard

all

8 (4* ed. 1995).

vom

12.

Dezember 1985, BGBl.

I

S 2229, which reads:

Constitutional Court are binding for the federal and state constitutional

courts and governmental agencies."

to § 13 Nr. 6, 11, 12

and

14. ..the decision

of the Federal Constitutional Court has the

statutory power.

^^^

The jury

"is a

body of persons temporarily

selected from the citizens of a particular district, and

invested with power... to try a question of fact.", see,

Dictionary 855 (6*

ed. 1990).

HENRY Campbell

Black., Black's

Law
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determination of design defectiveness^^' or the treatment of the defendant's compliance

with federal regulatory standards^^^
Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety

These standards can

Act^^^^

arise out

of the National

which was enacted by Congress

in 1966.

This

Act gives a special agency of the Department of Transportation, the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA)^^'*, the authority to promulgate and

enforce mandatory performance standards for motor vehicles (Federal Motor Vehicle
396

Safety Standards, FMVSS).395

Thus,
law.

Out of

whether

we can

see that federal regulatory standards

may

overlap with state tort

overlapping arise two important issues relevant for our topic:

this

state tort

law

is

preempted by federal

^nd second,

law,397

first,

question

if the first

is

negated, what consequences result out of compliance with those standards^^s.

39^ See, e.g.,

Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. Rev. Stat., § 9:2800.56 (1988) (requiring proof of a

reasonable, safer alternative design); Mississippi, MiSS.
Jersey, N.J.

Rev. Stat. § 2 A:58c

392 See, e.g., Kansas,

-

CODE ANN.

§

11-1-63 (1993) (same);

KAN. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304

(a), (c)

(1994) (presumption that compliance with

regulatory standards illustrates non-defectiveness of product); Tennessee, Tenn.

(1980

&

CODE ANN.

§ 29-28-104

Supp. 1995) (Rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness of product and of defendant's

exercise of due care); Colorado,
393

New

3a.(l) (1987) (same).

49 u.S.C. §§ 30101

-

COLO. REV. Stat. § 13-21-403

30169 (formerly codified

(1) (B)

(1989

U.S.C. §§ 1381

at 15

&
-

Supp. 1996) (same).
1431 [hereinafter Traffic

Safety Act].
39'*

This agency builds the American counterpart to the

German

Federal Office for Motor Traffic

(Kraftfahrtbundesamt).
395

&

Ralph Nader

Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance With Federal

Standards, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 415,416-417 (1996).
396

As the Traffic Safety Act was passed, the regulatory authority was first delegated to
Commerce. However, Congress created the Department of Transportation two months
Act's passage and transferred
responsibility for writing the

its

the Secretary of
after the Safety

administration to the newly established Department within which the

FMVSS

rested

upon

the National

Highway Safety Bureau.

Congress transferred the administration of the Safety Act to the

NHTSA,

Cipollone and Myrick: Deflating the Airbag Preemption Defense, 30 Ind. L.

In 1970, finally,

McCauley, Note,
Rev. 827, note 29 (1997).

see,

John

F.

397 Cases dealing with the preemption issue are for example: Johnson v. General Motors Corp., F. Supp.

451 (W.D. Okla. 1995); Freightliner
398 E.g., in Jackson v. Spagnola, 503

whether

compliance

(Volkswagen) from

with

v.

Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).

A.2d 944,949

federal

strict liability; for

automobile

(Pa.

Super Ct. 1986) the court deah with the question

safety

standards

immunizes

a

car

manufacturer

a further discussion of the compliance issue, see infra, at pp. 128.

1
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3.

As

Restatements

third legal authority the Restatements

of the law issued by the American

be mentioned. These are compendiums of case law, structured

Institute (A.L.I.p^^ n^ust

systematically like a statute reflecting current

law ("prestatements").'*oo However,

it

common law

and intended to develop the

should be stressed that the Restatements are no

of law, as they do not provide conclusive

real source

Law

authority.'*^'

Nevertheless, they

provide persuasive authority and are, especially in the field of product

liability,

often

consulted by courts and legal professionals in order to support their arguments.'*^^ in

product

law two different Restatements

liability

from 1965 and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products

Torts, Products Liability

Proposed Final Draft, from April

Liability,

Restatement

^^^

literally

The American Law

been founded

in

adopted in

Institute is

KoCH, supra note 378,

'^Ol

Hay, supra note 387,

at

importantly, the Second

A,'*^'^

a

strict liability

standard

an association of Professors of Law, Judges and Attorneys which has

at

1

5;

of the Restatements of the Law, see Hay, supra note 387,

KoCH, supra note 378,

recent example can be found in

1

Most

at

264.

Georgia Supreme Court cited
Draft No.

1997.

main provision, § 402

institute is the publication

"OO

A

its

1,

1923; the A.L.L pursues the goal of unifying and improving American law; today, the

main focus of the
14 and note 30.

'*^^

The Restatement (Second) of

exist:

to the

Banks

v.

at

264.

ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671 (Ga. 1994) where the

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

(April 20, 1993) in order to support

its

LIABILITY, Preliminary

application of the reasonable alternative design

requirement as standard to determine design defectiveness; see also. Pries

v.

Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 3
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

F.3d 543,545 (7* Cir. 1994) (applying Indiana law), where the court cited to the

OF TORTS: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No.
403 §
(1)

402 A. Special

One who

sells

or to his property

Liability

(1994), § 2 (b) and cmt.

of Seller of Product for Physical

any product
is

1

in a defective condition

subject to liability for physical

Harm

to

c.

User or Consumer

unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer

harm thereby caused

to the

uhimate user or consumer,

or to his property, if
(a) the seller is

(b)

it is

which
(2)

in the

business of selling such a product, and

expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change

it is

The

engaged

condition in

rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation

(b) the user or
seller.

in the

sold.

consumer has not bought the product

and

sale

of his product, and

fi-om or entered into

any contractual relation with the

96
between different

for "[a]ny product in a defective condition../' without distinguishing

kinds of product defects. This distinction

Restatement. This section

is at

the

criticized provisions set forth in the

it

is

now made

same time one of

new

in § 2 (a)

the

-

(c)-*^

most important and highly

Restatement. In reflecting current

states that a strict liability standard applies to

of the Third

common law

manufacturing defects only (§ 2

design and instructions or warnings defects § 2 (b) and § 2

(a)).

(c) require the plaintiff to

prove the availability of a reasonable and safer alternative design or information.
the legal

academy reacted

to this

For

How

change will be discussed subsequently.

Development of product liability law

B.

1.

The privity requirement and its abolition

Like in Germany ,'*05 the courts in the United States have dealt with the question

whether the existence of

privity, a "[mjutual or successive relationship'*^^,

consumers and manufacturers

is

between

a prerequisite for bringing a product liability action. In

the middle of the nineteenth century the liability of manufacturers for injuries to

consumers resulting from defective products was limited by requiring

^

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

§ 2 of the

privity in order to

Liability, Proposed Final Draft, April

1,

1997, provides:

A

product

defective when, at the time of sale or distribution,

is

defective in design, or
(a) contains a

possible care
(b)

is

is

it

contains a manufacturing defect,

defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings.

manufacturing defect when the product departs from

was exercised

defective in design

in the

when

its

A

is

product:

intended design even though

all

preparation and marketing of the product;
the foreseeable risks of

harm posed by

the product could have been

reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or
a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe;

because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
(c) is defective

the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
'*^^

See supra,

^^^

Black's

at pp. 12.

Law Dictionary, supra note

390, at 11 99.
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protect the defendants (manufacturers).'*^''

However, the

privity requirement

protective attitude towards manufacturers were abolished in

MacPherson

decision

v.

Buick Motor Company^^^, a decision

concluded that the duty to rescue

life

1916
in

and the

landmark

in the

which Judge Cardozo

and limb can not only grow out of a contractual

relationship but also out of tort law.''09 Subsequently, the holding in

MacPherson was

confirmed in other cases involving motor vehicle manufacturers, which held that

modem

business transactions no longer involve a only buyer and a seller but the public

in general.'*'^

Thus, not only the parties of a contract but also injured third persons can

successfully bring a products liability suit against the manufacturer; the

reached in 1968 by the

2.

German Supreme Court

famous fowl pest

liability action

Each of these theories focuses on
is

was

case."*"

based on three theories of

negligence, breach of an express or implied warranty, and

the defendant

result

Development of three theories of liability

Today, a plaintiff can bring a product
liability:

in its

same

strict liability .'•^

different aspects. In negligence cases the conduct of

subject to examination, while breach of warranty cases concentrate on

the performance of the product, and for strict liability actions the decisive question

whether a product

^^^

The

is defective.'* ^^

privity requirement derived

Wright, 10

M.

&

is

from the

W. 109,152 Eng. Rep. 402

British

Common Law

as set forth in Winterbottom v.

(Ex. 1842).

408 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
'*09

Id

at

1053; Judge Cardozo's words "[T]he law..." have to be read as "Tort law", see Robert L.

Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30 U. Mich
'*10

See, e.g.. General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d

320

manufacturer owes the public a duty to use reasonable care

in

(4*^ Cir.

J.

L. Ref. 197 (1997).

1943), holding that a motor truck

manufacturing and inspecting the vehicle,

irrespective of contract; Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W. 2d 805 (N.D. 1965) (as the defendant
had actively advertised its product to the general consumer public, the lack of privity of contract was no

defense and did not bar the action).
'*^^

''•^

See, Chapter

I,

supra, at pp. 41.

Keith C. Miller, Automobile Accident

7.01[2], at7(1989).
413

M

Law and

Practice, Chapter

7,

Products Liability, §

98

Negligence

A)

Negligence
product

in

is

the oldest and

still

of four basic elements: (1) the existence of a duty

liability suits.'*''' It consists

to use reasonable care

owed

most commonly raised theory of recovery

the

to the plaintiff, (2) the breach

of that duty of care by the

defendant, (3) causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
injury (cause in fact and proximate cause) and, finally, (4) actual harm,

says

which the law

measurable and compensable.'' '^

is

(I.)

Defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care

This element requires the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct
necessary to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to

others.**'^

In order to satisfy the

element of duty, the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant must be such that

imposes upon the

of the

former.'' '"^ In the

make

to

the

designing^'^i,

may

duty

manufacturer's

It

and

§ 7.02, at

Id. at

reasonably
exercise

to

this

which

expect

it is

the

reasonable

intended'"^ or for purposes for

vehicle
care

^^^

Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 166

'^^'1

Rossell V.

^^^ Sours V. General Motors Co., 7171 F.2d 151
in

Stammer

v.

Necaise

v.

''2'

Sours

General Motors Co., 7171 F.2d 151

''22

King

V.

to

warning of hazards related
and

The

manufacturing^'^o,

test also

1

(6*^ ed.

to

it''23.

extends to

1995).

(Ariz. 1985), cert, denied, 106 S.Ct.

(6*^ Cri.

1983) (applying Ohio law).

General Motors Corp., 259 N.E. 2d 352 (1970).

''20

V.

employed'*'^.

131 (5* ed. 1994).

Volkswagen of America, 709 P.2d 517

implied

extends

which

8.

William Lloyd Prosser et al.. Torts

is

be

to

that a manufacturer's duty to inspect

^^^

^^^ This

for the protection

duty has been described as an obligation

inspecting''22 the vehicle, as well as

must be emphasized

''i^

motor vehicle area

the product safe for the use for

manufacturer

some degree of care

a legal obligation to use

latter

Chrysler Corp., 335 F.2d 562 (5* Cir. 1968).

Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436 (5*

423 Id.; Schaeffer v. General

1

(6* Cri. 1983) (applying Ohio law).

Cir.

it

1979) (applying Alabama law).

Motors Corp., 360 N.E. 2d 1062 (1977).

1957 (1986).
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component

integrated

parts

vehicle

the

in

were manufactured

that

by

another

company.'*24

Standard of care: Reasonable person standard

(a)

With regard

to the execution

reasonable or ordinary care.

conduct

measured, the

is

As

of these duties, the manufacturer has to use

this is a legal standard against

test for

negligence

is

objective.'^^s

which the defendant's

Accordingly,

it

neither

matters whether he intended to exercise due care nor whether he did the best he could,

only whether defendant's behavior was that of a hypothetical reasonably prudent person
placed in the same circumstances
question depends on

how the

trier

is decisive.'*^^

of fact (jury) thinks a reasonable person (a reasonable

motor vehicle manufacturer) would have

(B)

Although industry custom
owed,

is

acted.'*^^

Effect of custom
admissible as evidence of the standard of care

may be found

never conclusive, as some customs

is

it

in a particular case the answer to that

themselves.'^^s Thus, the standard of care is not defined

^^'^

Alexander

v.

Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d

Cir.

to

be negligent

by what other manufacturers

in

1958) (applying Pennsylvania law);

Bendix Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973);
Karczewski v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ind. 1974), aff d mem., 515 F.2d 511 (7'*' Cir.
1975) (applying Indiana law); see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, P.F.D.,
Bradford

v.

§5.

Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).

"^25

Vaughan

v.

426

Brown

Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); Triestram

427 Ford

v.

Motor Co.

428 Rossell V.

v.

Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8*

that the

Way, 281 N.W. 420 (Mich.

1938).

Cir. 1959).

Volkswagen of America, 709 P.2d 517

The defendant alleged

v.

(Ariz. 1985), cert, denied, 106 S.Ct.

"reasonable man" standard was

1957 (1986):

inapplicable in a negligent design case and

as product manufacturers are held to an expert's standard of care, the appropriate standard should be

The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument and quoted from Judge
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir. 1932): "What usually is done may be
evidence of what ought to be done but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
custom

in the profession.

Learned Hand

in

prudence, whether

The
it

T.J.

usually

is

complied with or not."
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motor vehicle industry are doing, but the

the

manufacturer would have

done.'*^^

Breach of duty to exercise due care

(II.)

After

is

it

shown

plaintiff (consumer),

it

that the defendant (manufacturer)

must then be shown

is

unreasonable was

Carrol Towing

Co."^^^ In

owed a duty of

care to the

that the former breached this duty

exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.

of harm

what a reasonable

remains

test

A

test for

by

determining whether a risk

provided by Judge Learned Hand

in

United States

v.

using three algebraic variables he balanced the risks of the

defendant's conduct against the benefits (utility) of running the risk and reached the
result that

is

created.

where the

The

risk

outweighs

its utility

an unreasonable

risk,

and thus negligence,

three variables are: (1) the probability that the injury will occur (P), (2)

the gravity of the injury (L), and (3) the burden of taking adequate precautions in order
to avoid the injury (B).

established only if B

is less

no negligence according
specific automobile

A

risk will be

than P multiplied by L. Thus,

to the

model

deemed unreasonable and

Hand

Formula.'^^i

if

B

is less

For example,

liability will

than P x

if the

L

there

be
is

gas tanks of a

are likely to explode because the manufacturer decided to

use thin sealing rings instead of available thick ones for the sealing of the gas tanks.

The

probability of the occurrence of the injury

is

high, as

(serious bums), while the burden of taking precautions

rings

were available

unreasonable

would be

risk.

at slightly increased costs.

Id

low, because thicker sealing

Here, the manufacturer has created an

liable.

430 159 F.2d 169
(1947).

the gravity of the injury

Therefore, he acted negligently, and in the case of an injury he

429 See, in general, Texas

431

is

is

& Pacific Ry.

v.

Behymer, 189 U.S. 468 (1903).

.
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(III.)

Causation

The defendant's negligent behavior must be
order to impose

liability.

This involves two determinations: (1) whether the defendant's

conduct was the cause in fact of the

The

thereof.

determination

first

injuries,

and

made by

is

comparable to the Aequivalenztheorie
plaintiff would not

the cause of plaintiffs injuries in

in

(2)

whether

was

it

the proximate cause

the so-called "but for test",

German product

liability

which

if t^g

law.''32.

have been injured but for the defendant's act or omission, the act

cause in fact of the injury .'*33 The second determination

is

is

is

a

more a policy assessment than

an aspect of causation. Like the Adaequanztheorie in German product

liability law,

proximate cause limits the responsibility of the defendant, because under some
circumstances

it

would be

conduct.

wrongfiil

unfair to hold

Therefore, the

foreseeable circumstances'^^s.

As

him responsible

common law

there

is

cuase issues, a discussion of these issues

is

must show

433

Chaney

"•34

Palsgraf V.

Ltd. V.

v.

that he suffered

Beckman

Smithkline

Long

Mortsdock

1

2.

Under

his

liability

to

omitted and referred to special

literature.'*^^

Harm

damages

resulting therefrom in order to

impose

supra, at 22.

I,

Corp., 764 F.2d 527 (8* Cir. 1985).

Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (Court of App. N.Y. 1928); Overseas Tankship (U.K.)

&

"Wagon Mound No.
Steamship Co., "Wagon Mound No.

Engeneering Co.

Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. V. Miller
^^^

limits

once a negligent act (or omission) and causation are established, the

Finally,

^^^ See, Chapter

majority'*34

number of very complex proximate

a high

(IV.)

plaintiff

for all consequences of his

Ltd.,

1",

1961 A.C. 338 (1961); Overseas

2",

1967

1

A.C. 617 (1967).

the foreseeability approach, proximate cause questions can be divided into three basic patterns:

Unforeseeable manner:

Unforeseeable

result:

A

foreseeable resuh occurs but

The foreseeable

plaintiff has

it

happened

in

an unforeseeable manner;

been injured but an unexpected

result or type

of

injury has occurred;
3.

Unforeseeable

was
'*36

plaintiff:

The

injured person

was not

a

member of the group of

potential victims that

exposed to a foreseeable risk.

E.g.,

Prosser, supra note 415,

at

284-343; EPSTEIN, supra note 416,

at

491-558.
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liability

on the defendant. The

and,

the

if

comprise
profits,

all

prerequisites

plaintiff is entitled to recover for

are

met,

for

punitive

compensatory damages,

damages. Compensatory damages

economic losses and expenses such as medical

bills, lost

wages or business

and pain and suffering. Recovery for punitive damages can only be awarded

if

the defendant has engaged in "reckless conduct".'*^^
If

each of these four

defendant will be held
will

liable,

(i.

-

iv.)

and the

general elements of negligence
plaintiff will

is fulfilled,

be able to recover. However, as

the

we

see in the section dealing with design and information defects, the general

negligence standard has slightly changed to the requirement of proving the availability

of a reasonable alternative design or information.'*^^

B)

Breach of express or implied warranty

The second theory of liability on which

the plaintiff can base his action

of warranty. This theory, developed from contract law,
Article 2 of the

implied,

or

Uniform Commercial Code

and

merchantability'*'*

1

implied

and

warranties

is

is

breach

governed by the provisions of

(U.C.C.).'*^^ Warranties are either express'*^^

can

be

given

fitness for a particular purpose'*'*^

in

two

fhe

different

forms,

prerequisites of this

theory are: (1) the existence of an express or implied warranty, (2) breach of that
warranty, (3) injury, (4) proximate cause between breach of warranty and injury, (5)
reliance of plaintiff

'*37

Taylor

v.

on warranty and

(6) notice requirement.'*'*^ If the plaintiff

Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890 (1979); Johnson

^^^ See infra, at pp. 108.
'*39

Miller, supra note 412,

at § 7.03, at 33.

'*40§ 2-313 U.C.C.
441

§

2-314 U.C.C.

442

§ 2-315 U.C.C.

443

MILLER, supra note 412,

at § 7.03, at

36-64.

v.

can prove

Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988).

.
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fulfillment

the

of these

he

prerequisites,

sue

successfully

will

the

defendant

first

applied in

manufacturer.

c)

The concept of strict

Strict liability

liability, thus,

of liability without

the product liability context in cases involving

has been adopted in the landmark case

food.'*'*''

Greenman

v.

fault,

modem

In

was

times, strict liability

Yuba Power Products,

Inc.'^^.

The

opinion, by Justice Traynor, stated that due to the manufacturer's ability to anticipate
the occurrence of hazards'*'*^, to take insurance against the risk of injuries of consumers,

and the possibility of spreading the increasing costs through product

prices,

of increased incentives for manufacturers to provide safer products,
tort,

instead of negligence, should govern products liability

Almost the same position has been adopted by
(Second) of Torts, a section, which
only.'*^^

Although

§

402

A

was intended

defects,'''*^ in

language allowed the courts to interpret

^^

According to Suvada

strict liability

445

back

377 p.2d 897

v.

447

v.

defects.'*^^

its

However,

scope of
its

be applicable,

broad

at least

White Motor Co., 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965), Dean Prosser traced the theory of

to the year 143

1

(Cal. 1962).

their vehicles are involved

Greenman

Greenman,

this liability standrad to

446 Especially motor vehicle manufacturers can anticipate that

which

of the Restatement

was supported by Greenman

contrast to

be limited to manufacturing

to

A

402

does not expressly distinguish between manufacturing,

design and instructions or warnings
application

strict liability in

cases.'*^''

§

at its creation in 1965,

and because

Yuba Power

because

this is

Prods., Inc.,

common

many

(serious) accidents will occur in

knowledge.

377 P.2d 897,900-901

Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,440-444 (Cal. 1944); Cronin

(Cal. 1962); see also, Escola v.

v. J.B.E.

Coca

Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153,

1162-1163 (Cal. 1972).
448 Michael

J. Tdoke, Categorical Liability For Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment
Caveat Should be Removedfrom the Restatement (Third), 8 1 Cornell L. Rev. 1 8 1 1 1 96 ( 1 996).
1

449 §
450

402

A

George

(1989).

only speaks of a "[p]roduct

in

D

,

a defective condition unreasonably dangerous...".

L. Priest, Strict Products Liability:

The Original

Intent,

10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2301,2311

104
in

its

wording, to

kinds of product defects''^' which were then categorized as

all

manufacturing, design, and instructions or warnings

defects.'*^^

out of the fact that the Third Restatement limits

strict

7^^ controversy

liability to

manufacturing defects will only be discussed in connection with design

liability

be applicable to
defects.'^^s

Comparison to German product liability law

D)

With regard

arising

to the different theories

of

U.S. and

liability,

German product

laws are very similar. The law in both countries recognizes a negligence and a

strict liability theory.'*^''

However,

based on breach of warranty

in contrast to the

not recognized in

is

United States, a cause of action

German product

of theory can only be brought under contract law (§§ 459

C.

liability

law; this kind

BGB).

ff.

Manufacturing and design defects

Today, product defects are divided into three different categories: manufacturing
defects'*^^,

design

plaintiff to

and instructions or warnings

defects'*^^,

recover in an automotive product

liability

defects'*^^.

case,

In order for the

he must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the motor vehicle contained a defect

'^^^

Tdoke, supra note 448,

at

1

191;

it

has to be stressed that the

determine design- or information defects
liability",

however,

in reality,

liability

may sometimes have been

at the

time of

standard applied by the courts to

hidden under the label of

most of the courts used a negligence standard

to

"strict

determine these kinds of

defects, see infra, at pp. 107.

^^^

James A. Henderson,

Jr.

&

Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402 A of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, 11 Cornell L. Rev. 1512,1515 (1992); Tdoke, supra note 448,
^^•^

See, design defects, infra at pp. 108,

'*5''

In

German products

the strict liability theory
"•SS

liability law, the

to be

is

found

negligence theory

in §

1

sec.

is

based upon §§ 823 sec.

of the Produkthaftungsgesetz.

I

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,881 (Alaska 1979).

^^^ General

Motors Corp.

457 LaCoste v. Ford

v.

Motor

Edwards, 482 So. 2d

Co., 322

1

176 (Ala. 1985).

N.W. 2d 898 (Iowa

Ct.

App. 1982).

I

and

191.

at

1

II

BGB

and
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the accident.''^^ In order to prove the defect, the plaintiff can either provide direct'*^^ or

circumstancial evidence'*^^. In addition to this burden of proof, the plaintiff also has the

burden to provide evidence

that the vehicle

was defective when

it

the control of the

left

defendant.'*^'

1.

A

product

contains

own

manufacturer's

Manufacturing defects

manufacturing

a

defect

when

it

from

departs

the

design specifications for that product.'*^^ Typically, manufacturing

appear in products that are incorrectly assembled, physically flawed, or

defects

damaged. '^^

a)

The governing standard of
This

liability.

"^^S

Hurt

Motor

V.

Co.,

is

recognized by

Standard of liability
liability for

common

General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d
438 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 1983).

1

manufacturing defects

"^^O

Holloway

461

Baughman

v.

v.

Toyota Motor

cmt.

'*62

strict

181 (8* Cir. 1977) (applying Missouri law); Segler v. Ford

usaully presented in the form of expert
360 N.W. 2d 2 ((Wis. 1984).

is

Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,

General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 271 N.W. 2d 777 (Mich. 1978).
General Motors Corp., 627 F. Supp. 871 (D.S.C. 1985), aff d 780 F.2d

v.

1985) (applying South Carolina law);
2,

one of

law^^, both Restatements of Torts'*^^^ and legal

^^^ Direct evidence in automotive product liability cases

testimony, see, Sumnicht

is

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

1

131 (4* Cir.

LIABILITY, P.F.D., §

c, at 17.

Barker

v.

Lull

Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,454

(Cal. 1978); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck,

593 P.2d

871,881 (Alaska 1979).
'^^

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Manufacturer's employee

is

inattentive

and

installs

Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt.

screws retaining the

left

c, at

front

17.

For example:

wheel of a passenger

car not appropriately. After plaintiff used the car for one week, the wheel falls off while he
Plaintiff

can

sue

the

manufacturer (and the

employee)

in

strict

liability

is

because there

driving.

was

a

manufacturing defect.
"^64

Suvada V.White Motor Co., 210 N.E. 2d 182,186(111. 1965).

'^65

For the Second Restatement, see

contains a manufacturing defect
possible care

was exercised

§

when

402 A;

for the Third Restatement, see § 2 (a):

the product departs from

in the preparation

its

"[A product:]

intended design even though

and marketing of the product."

all
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scholars"*^^.

As

already stated in Greenmart*^'' , one of the rationales for the application

of such a standard

is

that

is

it

not only a deterrent for manufacturers to create

unnecessary risks but also a safety
liability

was

introduced

the

is

incentive.''^^

Another principle reason why
of more

development

complex

strict

products

(e.g.

automobiles) in which a multiplicity of hazards could be incorporated that are often

hidden from physical

Closely related to this aspect

view.'*^^

sellers are generally better able to identify the

basically unable to protect themselves

consumer discovers product

risks

it

the fact that product

product risks and that consumers are

from defective

might be too

already have occurred. Then, the plaintiff

is

late,

would have

products.'*''^

At the time the

and the harmful event might
difficulty in discovering

and

proving negligence on the part of the defendant. Moreover, since the defendant has
superior knowledge of the product related risks and
position than the plaintiff,

is

it

addition, strict liability is based
is

easier for

him

on the grounds

is

generally in a better financial

to obtain adequate insurance.'*^'

that, unlike plaintiffs, the

able to spread the risk or loss he suffers through increased product

B)

BGB

is

manufacturer

prices.'*''^

Run- AW AY PRODUCTS

As we have seen under German product
motor vehicle manufacturer

In

liability law,

due

to a lack

of

fault, the

not liable under the negligence standard of § 823 sec.

I

for manufacturing defects that are inevitable despite all precautions ("run-away

products"). In contrast, such an exemption from liability cannot be

made under U.S.

466

David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Product Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 427 (1993).

467

377 p 2d 897

468

Hoven

^69

David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products

470

m

471

John W. Wade,

472/^.

v.

(Cal. 1992).

Kelble, 256

N.W. 2d 379,391 (Wis.

On the Nature

1977).
Liability,

33 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (1980).

ofStrict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.

L.J.

825 (1973).
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product

liability

liability.

Thus, the non-existence of fault

law, as the exclusive standard for manufacturing defects

2.

a) Definition

The

is

(I.)

strict

is irrelevant.

Design defects

and standard to determine design defectiveness

definition of design defctiveness depends

design defects

is

determined. This, however,

is

on

how

the liability standard for

highly controversial.

Former common law approach and §

402

A of the Second

Restatement
In Greenman^'^'^ and § 402

was adopted

A of the Second Restatement a strict liability standard

for all kinds of product defects without distinguishing

between the three

categories of product defects. In response to this failure, courts have developed a variety

of methods

to

determine whether a product

in varying detail, a

defectively designed.

Some

courts apply,

risk-benefif^'^^analysis.

Under

this analysis,

is

form of risk-utility'*'''* or

the risks and benefits of the product itself or of the product

compared

to

an alternative

version are evaluated. If this evaluation shows that the overall risk of injury could have

been significantly reduced or avoided by the use of an alternative
without

''3

significant loss of utility, the product

Greenman

v.

Yuba Power

Prods., Inc.,

&

377 P.2d 897

is

at

considered to be

reasonable cost
defective.'*''^

In

(Gal. 1962).

474 Thibault v. Sears,

Roebuck

N.W. 2d 176 (Mich.

1984); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195,201-202 (Mont. 1986); see

further John H.

Chun, The

New

Co., 395

Citadel:

A.2d 843,846 (N.H. 1978);

Prentis v. Yale

A Reasonably Designed Products

Mfg. Co., 365

Liability Restatement,

79

Cornell L. Rev. 1654,1681, note 33 (1994).

West V. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cal. App. 1985),
824 (1986); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175,182,183-184 (Colo. 1992).

475

476 Tdoke, supra note 448, at

1

192.

cert,

denied, 479 U.S.

108

connection with the application of this
factors,

the

courts'*''''

which have been developed by Professor Wade
Other

courts'*''^

is

it

this analysis, a

a condition that

in

(the

often use seven risk-utility

"seven

Wade

factors").'*''*

use a "consumer expectations test" to define design defectiveness

of a product. Applying
sale,

test,

product

is

defective in design

if,

at the

time of

could not have been reasonably expected by the

consumer.'*^^ Again, different courts'*^' have chosen to adopt an approach introduced

the California

Supreme Court

in

Barker

above mentioned methods are applied

v.

Lull Engineering Co.'**^ under which both

in order to determine the defectiveness

product. Thus, according to this so-called "two-prong" test**^, a product
either if it fails to

consumer

the

'•'7

expectations.'*^'* Still other courts'*^^

608 A.2d 1276,1280 (Md.

On
Wade

John W. Wade,

(1973); the "seven
(1)
(2)

risk-utility analysis, or if

it

The
The

useftilness

and

Ct. Spec.

of a

defective

is

does not satisfy

consider a product to be defective in

Roebuck

See, e.g.. Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,883 (Alaska 1979); Klein v. Sears,

Co.,
^'^^

meet the requirements of a

by

&.

App. 1992).

the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,

44 Miss.

L.

J.

825,837-838

factors" are:

desirability

of the product

safety aspects of the product

-

-

its utility

to the user

the likelihood that

it

and

to the public as a

will cause

injury,

whole.

and the probable

seriousness of the injury.
(3)

The

(4)

The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.

availability

of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe.
the product without impairing

its

usefiihiess or

(5)

The

user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.

The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because
of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or the existence of suitable
(6)

warnings or instructions.
(7)

The

feasibility,

product or carrying
'•''9

Lester

v.

on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the

Magic Chef, 641 P.2d 353,357 (Kan.

consumer expectations

test to

(Second) of Torts); Rahmig

v.

^^^ Tdoke, supra note 448, at
'*8l

loss

by

setting the price

1982):

The Supreme Court of Kansas adopted

defme the term "unreasonably dangerous" in § 402 A, cmt
Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W. 2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
1

i

193.

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v. Straub Clinic

&

Hosp., Inc.

482 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,457-458 (Cal. 1978).

Chun, supra note 474,

at

the

(Restatement

659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983).

^^^

of the

liability insurance.

1655 (stating that California and Alaska apply the two-prong

484 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal. 1978).

test).
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design

if

a reasonable product manufacturer

not have decided to place

on the

it

who

is

aware of the product's

would

market.'**^

Today's common law and legislative approach and

(II.)

risk

§ 2 (b)

of the

Third Restatement
Today's majority
the risk of

opinion'*^^ considers a product to

harm posed by

be defective in design when

the product could have been avoided, or at least reduced,

through a reasonable, safer alternative design whose omission rendered the product not
reasonably safe. However, this approach
rejected

is

subject to high criticism and has been

by a minority of courts'*^^ and numerous

485 Nichols V.

scholars'*^^. Criticisms

Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W. 2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Church

v.

have been based

Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393

(W. Va. 1989).
486 Nichols V.
487

Union Underwear

Co.,

602 S.W. 2d 429,433 (Ky. 1980).

The majority opinion comprises common

scholars: For

common

1985); Armentrout v.

law, state legislation, the third Restatement and legal
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1191 (Ala.
Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184-185 (Colo. 1992); Betts v. Robertshaw Controls

law, see, e.g.. General

FMC

WL 436727,*

1 (Del. Super Ct.
1992); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,674 (Ga.
Warrum, 535 N.E. 2d 1207,1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384
N.E. 2d 188,1193 (Mass. 1978); Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 439 N.W. 2d 326 (Mich. 1989); Kallio v.
Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W. 2d 92,96 (Minn. 1987); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P. 2d 195,202
(Mont. 1986); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S. 2d 378,380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,1326-1327 (Or. 1978); Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322,326 (Pa. Super Ct.
1993); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470,1479 (lO"" Cir.1993); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393,396
(W. Va. 1989); for legislation, see, e.g.. La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.56 (1988); ILL. COMP. STAT. +ANN.

Co., 1992

1994); Jackson v.
1

Ch. 735 § 5/2-2104 (1993

&

Supp. 1996); MiSS.

CODE ANN.

2A:58C-3A.(1) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (A)

Rem. Code Ann. § 82.005 (West

1993);

-

§ 11-1-63 (1993); N.J. REV. STAT. §

(F) (Anderson 1993); TEX. CiV. Prac.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

&

Liability, P.F.D.,

§ 2 (b); for legal scholars, see, e.g., Chun, supra note 474; Tdoke, supra note 448; James A. Henderson,
Jr.,

&

Mich.

Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving At Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters Travelogue, 30 U.
J.

L.Ref 563(1997).

488 Potter v.

Co.,

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,219 (Conn. 1997); Binakonsky

133 F.3d 281,285

established under §

402

(4"^

Cir.

A of the

489 Oscjir S. Gray, The
Draft

v.

Ford Motor

1998) (adhering to die standard to determine design defectiveness

Restatement (Second) of Torts.

ALI Product

Liability Proposals: Progress or

Anachronism

?,

61 Term. L.

1105 (1994); Howard Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the
Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1173 (1994);

Rev.

Jerry

J.

Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61

Tenn. L Rev. 1265 (1994); Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified

Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1277
(1994); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B): The
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407 (1994); Frank J. Vandall, The
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on the following seven arguments.
and

policy^'^o

risk-utility

Its

(2)

(1)

The approach

is

neither supported by current law

balancing does not constitute a narrow

determining design defectiveness'*^'. (3) The approach

consumer, too manufacturer-friendly

must be regarded as a
product

in placing

is,

to

it

for

the detriment of the

an undue burden on

political statemenf*^^. (5) Finally,

test

missed

plaintiffs'*^^^

^nd

(4)

goal of clarifying

its

liability law.'*^'*

(III.)

(a)

The criticism on today's majority approach

Argument of critics that the reasonable alternative design

requirement is not supported by current law and counter-arguments
The

first

argument brought against the new approach, which

Restatement (Third) of Torts as black
inaccurate legal analysis so that
In particular,

is

it

design requirement of § 2

it

letter rule in

§ 2

(b), is that

does not reflect the current law and

is

adopted in the
is

it

based on an

policy''^^

contended that only three jurisdictions support the alternative
(b).'*^^

The jurisdictions

that apply this standard as legislation

Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2 (b): Design Defect, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 167
(1995); Angela C. Rushton, Design Defects under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of

and the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45 Emory L. J. 389 (1996); John F. Vargo, The
Emperor 's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402 A Products
Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493
Strict Liability

(1996); David G.
(1997); Frank
(Third)

J.

Owen,

Risk-Utility Balancing in

Vandall, Constructing a

of Torts: Products

Liability Section

Design Defect Cases, 30 U. Mich.

Roof before

the Foundation

is

2 (B) Design Defect, 30 U. Mich.

^^^ Potter V. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241

Conn.

199,219 (Conn.

J.

L. Ref.

1997);

Constructing A Roof Before The Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third)
Liability Section 2 (b) Design Defect, 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 261,273 (1997).
"^^l

Owen, supra note 489,

''92

Potter V.

at

J.

L. Ref.

239

prepared: The Restatement

261 (1997).
Frank

Of

J.

Vandall,

Torts: Products

241.

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,217 (Conn. 1997); Vandall, supra note 490,

at

269,279.
'*93

Price,

'*94

Vandall, supra note 490, at 278.

'*95

Potter V.

261.

supra note 489,

at

1355; Vandall, supra note 490, at 279.

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,219 (Conn. 1997); Vandall, supra note 490,

at

Ill

Louisiana, Mississippi,

(Illinois,

into consideration, because,

Jersey, Ohio,

due to the

and

fact that the

should not be taken

Texas)'*^''

founders of the American

which issues the Restatements had an "aversion against

Institute,

would

New

violate basic principles of the A.L.I.'*^^. Unlike § 2 (b),

its

Law

legislation", this

predecessor, § 402 A,

is

the provision that should be considered as accurately reflecting the law^^^, because

is

based on over 500 years of tort cases that have been "put into the paper shredder"50o

it

by the new approach.

-

Counter arguments

In this line of arguments, however, several factors are neglected. First, the

Reporter's notes expressly cite to the jurisdictions that have adopted the reasonable
alternative design requirement through legislation-^^' This

the A.L.I.) agree to take

them

into account.

Only

if they

shows

that the Reporters (and

had not done so would there be

a basis for criticism, because in that case they would have neglected an important source

of law. Moreover, the
A.L.I. has changed

critics

compared

had an antipathy against

same way

overlook the fact that the personnel composition of the
to former times so that,

legislation, there is

even

now room

if

the founders of the A.L.I,

for a different opinion. In the

the contention that the reasonable alternative design standard has only been

adopted by three jurisdictions,

is

wrong. In

total, six jurisdictions

have codified

this

496 Vargo, supra note 489, at 556; Vandall, supra note 490, at 274.
'97 See, La. Rev. Stat.
§ 9:2800.56 (1988); III.

1996); Miss.

Ann.

Code Ann.

§ 2307.75 (A)

^^^ Frank

J.

-

§

1

Comp. Stat. Ann. Ch. 735

§

5/2-2104 (1993

1-1-63 (1993); N.J. Rev. Stat.. § 2A:58C-3A.(1) (1987);

(F) (Anderson 1993); TEX. CiV.

Prac.

&.

REM. CODE ANN.

&.

Supp.

Ohio Rev. Code

§ 82.005 (West 1993).

Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B): The Reasonable

Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407,1408-1409 (1994).
'*99

Frank

J.

Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2 (b): Design Defect,

68 Temp. L. Rev. 167,196 (1995).
500 Vandall, supra note 490, at 265.
50'

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,

Mississippi,

New Jersey and Texas),

Products Liability, P.F.D., Reporters notes to § 2, cmt.

cmt. d,

II

d, L(citing

(citing Ohio).
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standard^02 and 13 have adopted

new Restatement

is

it

as their case law^o^.

argument

based on 500 years of case law and

Inc.^^^.

change

common

critic's

law,

in a short period

now have become

(B)

that the

still

is

out of question that the

is

case,

Greenman

argument discloses

exposed

A

approach chosen under § 402

reflects the current law,

was only based on one

Furthermore the

especially the

it

not supported by current law.^o^

In response to the

in fact this section

Thus

to a high

v.

it

has been

should be noted that

Yuba Power Products,

that they neglect the factor that law,

dynamism. ^^^ This means

that

law can

of time, and what might have been "true" in former times

may

questionable.

Critic's

argument that the new approach does not leave room
FOR A STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH

Another argument on which the
not leave

room

of the new approach focus

is

for a strict liability standard for design defects, although

available.^^'' In not

wrong

critics

doing so

it

that

it

it

does

would be

has to be considered as giving a misleading trend in a

through creating a disincentive for manufacturers to produce

direction,508 ie..

^^^ Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,

New

Jersey,

Ohio and Texas,

see, P.F.D, Reporter's note to § 2, cmt.

d L, n.
503 General

Motors Corp.

v.

Edwards, 482 So. 2d

P.2d 175, 184-185 (Colo. 1992); Betts
1992);

Banks

v.

v.

11 76,1 191 (Ala. 1985);

Robertshaw Controls Co., 1992

ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,674 (Ga.

alternative design requirement

is

relevant evidence); Jackson v.

Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842
WL 436727,* 1 (Del. Super Ct.

1994) (holding that the reasonable

Warrum, 535 N.E. 2d 1207,1220

(Ind.

App. 1989); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E. 2d 1188,1193 (Mass. 1978); Reeves v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 439 N.W. 2d 326 (Mich. 1989); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W. 2d 92,96 (Minn. 1987); Rix v.
General Motors Corp., 723 P. 2d 195,202 (Mont. 1986); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S. 2d 378,380 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,1326-1327 (Or. 1978); Fitzpatrick v.
Ct.

Madonna, 623 A.2d 322,326 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470,1479 (10*
Cir.1993); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393,396 (W. Va. 1989); see, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
ToRTS: Products Liability, P.F.D. Reporter's note
,

504

Tdoke, supra note 448,

505

377 p.2d 897

506 Rabin,

at

1

197.

(Cal. 1962).

supra note 409,

at

204.

507 Phillips, supra note 489, at 1272.

508

m

to § 2, cmt. d

I., II.

.
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safer

products. ^^^

However, the severity of

considering the following aspects.

First,

argument can be qualified by

this

can be said that the

it

new

approach, in

establishing a negligence liability standard, does not in fact create a totally different

standard compared to that which courts formally applied under the approach contained
in §

402 A. Although some courts used

a fault-based

liability scrutiny,

to cite the

term

"strict liability",

which was hidden behind the

label

Thus, the criticized change appears to be "more semantic than

they carried out

of "strict

liability".5io

real". 5'

Finally, the

•

existence of strict liability can also be viewed as a disincentive and overdeterrence for

manufacturers to create

(c)

new and

Disproving of the argument that the reasonable alternative
DESIGN APPROACH

It

by using new technologies.^'^

better products

IS

A "GRAB-BAG" APPROACH

has been held that the reasonable alternative design requirement does not

constitute a proper balancing test for design defect cases in that

it

uses a "grab-bag"

approach, which throws almost everything into the balance.^'^ Indeed,

comment

to § 2 (b),^''* as well as the courts

approving

factors that can be relevant in determining

this section,^!^

out the above

named

it is

is

true that the

mention several

whether the omission of a reasonable

alternative rendered a product not reasonably safe. But, in order to

case-by-case basis possible,

it

make a

decision on a

necessary that a variety of factors are available to carry

determination. This

makes

the law flexible and allows

its

application not merely to a few, but to a broad range of different cases that are based on

509/^. at 1274.
510

Chun, supra note 474,

511

Banks

ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,674 note 3 (Ga. 1994); Chun, supra note 474,

v.

512 Phillips,

1670 and note 122.

at

supra note 489,

at

1274.

513

Owen, supra note 489,

514

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

515 See, e.g..

Banks

v.

at

24 1
Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt.

ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.

f.

2d 671,675 and note 6 (Ga. 1994).

at

1670.
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different fact patterns. Thus, instead

one should appreciate

(D)

its

of condemning the availability of various factors,

existence.

Disproving of the argument that the new approach neglects the

CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST
Some

scholars lament that the reasonable alternative design requirement does

not give an adequate position

However, although

it

is

to,

or even neglects, the role of

consumer expectations.^!^

consumer expectations alone

correct that

are

no longer

considered to be the determinative factor in showing design defectiveness,^!'' this result
is

justified

view

because the drafters of the

new Restatement and

same

that the reasonable alternative design requirement is the preferable standard.

Furthermore, the importance of consumer expectations
Restatement, because

it

considers

them

the necessity for" and "the adequacy

-

not neglected within the third

to "constitute an important factor in determining

of an alternative design.^'^

it

is interesting to

compare the standard of determination

design defects chosen in U.S. law to the one applied in

common law

is

Comparison to German product liability law

In this context

the

the courts share the

German

law.

We

for

have seen that

majority in the United States uses a risk-utility test in which the

reasonable alternative design requirement plays an important role. However, a consumer
expectations test supplements this approach.
Liability Act,

^!^

Roland

F.

German

traditional tort

on the other hand, use a consumer expectations

Banks

&

law and the Product

test as a starting point in

Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second). Section 402

Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 41 1,420 (1993); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the

A - Design

Law of Products

The ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631,666 (1995).
51"'

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt.

g.

518

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt.

g.
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their analysis.^ '^ Nevertheless, at least
test is

used

sequence

another

Thus,

in addition to that.

in

their

under traditional

tort law, a risk-utility

German and U.S. law only

determination

of design

defects.

balancing

differ in that they use

The

result

of

this

determination, however, will be similar since the law in both countries basically applies
the

same

factors.

Argument that the new Restatement is too manufacturer-

(e)

friendly - TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE CONSUMER520

An

important argument against the

the aspect that

it

new

standard for design defects focuses on

protects the potential defendants (manufacturers) and, at the

same time

ignores, or even damages, the interests of the plaintiff (consumer). In particular,

it

is

argued that through the requirement of showing a reasonable alternative design, which

can be called "radical' negligence,^^! the plaintiff has to jump higher hurdles than in the
case of strict liability or traditional negligence. ^^2 jhjs

[^ true,

because the plaintiff bears

knowledge and proof. Of course, one could reply

the burden of

that

he could use expert

testimony to show the availability of a reasonable alternative design. But

it

should be

considered that obtaining expert testimony in these cases creates enormous costs523, a
factor

which might deter the

elimination of smaller

suits.^^'*

purpose of the

new

^^^

supra, at 90.

See Chapter

I,

plaintiff

from bringing

"1

at

and which can lead

This effect constitutes, in the eyes of the

Restatement.^^s

One

^2° Professor Vandall considers §2 (b) as a "wish

note 490,

suit,

objection to this

list

is

to the

critics, the

that the plaintiff can

from manufacturing America",

see, Vandall,

make

supra

261.

Vandall, supra note 490, at 262.

522 Potter V.

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,217 (Conn. 1997) (holding that "[t]he feasible
imposes an undue burden on plaintiffs..."); Vandall, supra note 539, at

alternative design requirement

1424.
523 Vandall,

supra note 498,

at.

1425.

524 Vandall, supra note 490, at 277-278.
525 Vandall,

supra note 498,

at

1426.
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use of § 3 of the Restatement (Third)^26 which provides

he

circumstances,

allowed to provide circumstantial evidence without having the burden of proving

is

the specific nature of the defect. ^27 Nevertheless,

it

must not be neglected

might be a reduction of the plaintiffs burden,

this

that, in certain

burden of proof Furthermore, the question has

to

it

that,

although

does not rescue him from his

be raised whether the protection of the

manufacturer can be justified under the aspect of fairness. Against the position taken by
the majority approach,

it

can be argued that a motor vehicle manufacturer can take

insurance against the risk of injury to consumers through defective products and that he

can spread the increased costs by raising his product prices. ^28 Although the consumer
could insure against bodily harm or damage to his property, he can neither spread these
costs, nor is

he as financially strong as the manufacturing company. Thus, the

latter is

able to protect the consumer better than the consumer can. In connection herewith,

held in support of the majority opinion that a manufacturer might find
impossible, to provide himself with adequate insurance. ^^9
true, this is a risk

he

is

difficult, if

is

not

this contention is

of which a manufacturer has to think before entering in business. If he

willing to take the profits of

is

Assuming

it

it

making

business, then he should also carry the losses. If

not willing to do that, he should quit. Thus, the mentioned counter argument has to

526 § 3 Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It

may

be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product defect existing

time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the
(a)

was of a kind

(b)

was

of product defect; and

not, in the particular case, solely the result

of sale or
527

that ordinarily occurs as a result

at the

plaintiff:

of causes other than product defect existing

at the

time

distribution.

James A. Henderson, Jr. &. Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at a Reasonable Alternative Design: The
30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 563,578-581 (1997).

Reporters' Travelogue

,

528 Escola V.

Prods., Inc.,

Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,440-444 (Cal. 1944); Greenman
377 P.2d 897,900-901 (Cal. 1962); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d

v.
1

Yuba Power

153,1 162-1 163

(Cal. 1972).

529
see,

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Gray, supra note 489,

at

1

134 and note 34.

Liability, Tent. Draft No.

1,

1994, § 2, cmt.

a, at 13;

.
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be rejected, so that under the aspect of fairness the direction chosen by the majority of
courts, legislators, scholars

-

and the Third Restatement can not be approved.

Comment: Solving the problem through presumption of
availability of an alternative design

It

has been stressed that the majority approach does not provide adequate

protection for the consumer. Although the adoption of strict liability, not only for

manufacturing but also for design and warnings defects, could be considered as one
possibility for solving the problem,

manufacturer. Therefore,

it

would be too

from the point of view of the

radical

favor the following proposal. Similar to

I

German

law,530 a

balanced compromise could be found through the introduction of a presumption that a
reasonable alternative design was available for the manufacturer at the time of sale.

Then, the plaintiff would be relieved from his burden of proof, and he would no longer
be deterred from bringing a products
succeeding.

was not
is

Now,

the manufacturer

liability action,

would have

available at the time of sale, a result

the one

who

is

design did not exist? Here, the

show

how

comment

to the

new Restatement

to

"reflects the safest

and most advanced technology"

that his product

"reflects technology at the cutting

conforms

edge of

defendant would meet this burden of proof
alternative design are unreasonably higher than

531

I,

with regard to the fact that he

can a defendant prove that a reasonable alternative

The defendant has

^^^ See, Chapter

is fair

produces the product and the danger, not the "innocent" consumer. The

question that arises, however,

it

prove that a reasonable alternative

to

which

giving his suit a better chance of

supra,

at pp.

either to industry custom, or that

that

was

scientific

if

it

available at the time or that

knowledge. "^^i Moreover, the

he could show that the costs of the

its

benefits.

41

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

provides one answer.

Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt. d.
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Argument that the reasonable alternative design approach of

(F)

THE Third Restatement is a political statement

Some

scholars consider the

new Restatement

base their statement on the fact that the writings of the

They

as a political statement.532
last

twenty years of the Reporters

of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Professors Henderson and Twerski, disclose their
for conservatism, negligence,

affection

one may object

that the so-called

and pro-manufacturer

attitude. "3

Against

this,

"Habush-Amendment''^^^ has been introduced.

It

provides that the plaintiff does not always need to prove the availability of a reasonable
alternative design.

When

a product possesses only

low

danger, this requirement can be dropped. However,

comment

to § 2 (b) refers to this

it

social utility but a high risk

of

has to be outlined that only the

amendment, whereas the black

letter text

of § 2 (b)

does not take any position thereto. In addition, the cases dealing with products with low
social utility

and high danger will neither represent the majority

in product liability

cases in general, nor will one find them in the motor vehicle area, because automobiles

and motorcycles have

to

be considered as highly socially valuable for the reasons

forth above. ^35 Thus, the advantageous effect for the plaintiff resulting

Amendment

will generally not find application in the

(G)

It

motor vehicle

set

from the Habush-

area.

Conclusion

has been shown that the reasonable alternative design requirement established

in the majority

prevailing

of jurisdictions and contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts

is

the

approach to determining design defectiveness, and that almost every

532 Phillips, supra note 489, at 1265; Price, supra note 489, at 1277; Vandall, supra note 490, at 279.
533 Phillips,

supra note 489,

at

1265.

534

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D.,
Amendment" because one of the advisers, Robert Habush, a plaintiffs
see,

Henderson

& Twerski, supra note

535 See, Introduction,

supra

at 2-3.

102, at 587.

§2, cmt. e

is

called the

"Habush

lawyer, proposed this amendment,
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argument brought against
this

approach

consumer. If
product

is

its

this

liability

can be objected

to. Critics

allege that the weakest point of

favoring of manufacturers, which goes to the detriment of the

were

law

it

true,

in

we

could find contrary tendencies in the development of

Germany (and

United States, because the laws

in the

in the

whole European Union) compared

Member

states

to the

of the European Union are

characterized by a growing trend towards consumer protection. However,

it

seems

that

the critics of the reasonable design requirement overlook one important fact. In the

overwhelming majority of cases the
Thus,

it

seems

plaintiff voluntarily offers evidence

that this evidence, as a practical matter, is already part

In presenting this kind of evidence, plaintiffs presumably

on

this issue.536

of plaintiff s case.

expect to increase the

likelihood of winning the case. Thus, the argument presented by the critics seems to be

of more theoretical than practical importance. Nevertheless, the introduction of evidence

on a reasonable

alternative design

still

places a high burden on plaintiffs

financial expenses for expert witnesses). Therefore, a

between the

plaintiff

(e.g.

increased

more equalized balance of power

and the motor vehicle manufacturer could be established by

adopting the proposal of introducing a presumption of availability of an alternative
design.

536 See, e.g.,

Finchum

v.

Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526,531 (T^

Cir. 1995);

Montag

v.

Honda Motor

Co.,

1996) (plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence that Honda could have used an
alternative restraint system (airbag)); Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V. 112 F.3d 291,293 (7*^ Cir.

75 F.3d 141,1416

(10"" Cir.

1997); Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.Supp. 606,614-615 (D. N.D.
Motors Corp., 1998 WL 116851,*9 (Mar. 18, 1998, N.J. Super A.D.).

Ind.

1997); Green v. General
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D. Special issues pertaining

1.

to automobile design litigation

Crashworthiness: Definition and development of the

crashworthiness doctrine
In connection with design defects the problem

commonly

referred to as the issue

of "crashworthiness", "enhanced injury", or "second collision" has been raised since the

mid- 1960s. 537 The doctrine of crashworthiness, which most frequently arises
automobile

accident

deals

cases,

with

question

the

whether

a

motor

in

vehicle

manufacturer can be held liable for plaintiffs enhanced injuries in the following
situation. Initially, a traffic accident

defect

(e.g.

through plaintiffs or another driver's negligence) occurred, and the plaintiff

some

suffered

caused by circumstances other than the vehicle's

injuries (e.g. a

broken arm) as a

plaintiff alleges that his initial injuries

result

were enhanced

of

(e.g.

this accident.

he was burnt) by a defect

by the vehicle's

the vehicle (e.g. a faulty designed gas tank), in particular,

reasonably protect

its

In 1966, in

v.

collision.

construct

53^

The
a

rails,

The

was

killed

when

this

his Chevrolet station

plaintiff alleged that the car's design

which would protect occupants

in a side

was

impact

court held that an automobile manufacturer does not have the duty to

crashworthy

The courts consider

Motor

in a side collision.

lacked side

it

failure to

General Motors Corp.^^^, the Seventh Circuit denied

question. In this case the plaintiffs decedent

defective in that

in

occupants in the case of an accident.^^*

Evans

wagon was involved

However, the

court

argued

the three mentioned terms to be interchangeable, see, e.g.,

Sumnicht

vehicle^^o.

In

its

360 N.W. 2d 2 (1984); see

Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

reasoning

also.

the

that

v.

MILLER, supra note 412, § 7.05[4],

a

Toyota
at

131-

133.
538

Volkswagen of Am.,

Co., 133 F.3d 281,284
539

359 F.2d 822

overruled later
540

Evans

v.

in

Inc. v.

(4"^ Cir.

(7*^ Cir.

Young, 321 A.2d 131, 139-1 AS (Md. 1974); Binakonsky

v.

Ford Motor

1998); Miller, supra note 412, § 7.05 [4], at 133-134.

1966) (applying Indiana law),

Huff v. White Motor Co., 565 F.2d

cert,

denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1066); Evans

104,1 10 (7* Cir. 1977).

General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822,824-825 (7* Cir. 1966).

was
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manufacturer's duty only extends to build an automobile which

is

safe for

its

intended

purposes, and that such purposes do not comprise collisions with other vehicles,

although they might be foreseeable for the manufacturer. 5'*'

However,

in

1

968, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit took the opposite

point of view in Larsen

v.

General Motors Corp^^^. In

this case the plaintiff collided

head-on with another vehicle while driving his 1963 Chevrolet Corvair and contended
that the

design and placement of the steering column was defective, leading to

aggravated injuries. The court

first

held that automobile manufacturers can anticipate

the risk and the occurrence of collisions of vehicles, because
that they are driven

Based on

condition.

on crowded roads,

it is

in high-speed situations,

common knowledge
and

in

any weather

then concluded that a manufacturer has the

this finding, the court

duty to design a vehicle so as to withstand

at least

some highway crashes and

to

minimize foreseeable harm resulting out of such crashes. Thus, the court established the
manufacturer's duty to build crashworthy motor vehicles.

Today, the controversy on the issue

in question is settled,

and the overwhelming

majority of jurisdictions approves the position taken in Larsen, holding a motor vehicle

manufacturer potentially liable for injuries aggravated because of the defective design of
the vehicle if it

541

Id. at

See, e.g.,

liable

the manufacturer's duty to

825.

542 391 F.2d
543

was not reasonably crashworthy. ^43 However,

495

(8"" Cir.

Nanda

v.

1968) (applying Minnesota law).

Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213

(V"*"

Cir. 1974):

because of the defective design of a fuel tank catching

Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359 (1976):

fire in

The manufacturer has been held
Horn v. General

a rear-end collision;

Liability of manufacturer has been established for the faulty design

of a horn cap coming off the steering wheel and exposing sharp prongs aggravating the injuries the driver
would have suffered from the initial collision; Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (1978):

Decedent was ejected and killed when the door of his Opel opened in a collision with a metal divider
fence; the plaintiff contended that the vehicle was not crash-worthy because the door latch was
defectively designed; Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law):
Plaintiff (a

policeman) contended that the door of the 1974 Dodge Monaco police car was defectively

designed because

it

was not strong enough

to resist foreseeable side-impact collisions (here: a collision

with a steel pole); the court held that Chrysler had a duty to protect vehicle occupants against harm
resulting
cert,

from such automobile accidents; Camacho

denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988)

:

A

motorcycle

v.

Honda Motor

may be

Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987),

defective because

it

lacks crash bars protecting
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build crashworthy vehicles also has limits, because he cannot be required to construct

automobiles and motorcycles that are crash-proof or accident-proof^'*'* or that have the
crash-resistance of an

M-2 army

a) Issues arising in

(I.)

tank^^'s.

connection with the crashworthiness doctrine

Determination of defect and of what harm would have occurred
in its

The

plaintiff,

who

absence

alleges in a crashworthiness case that the

motor vehicle

should have been designed more safely in order to avoid enhanced injuries, must
establish that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted,

would have reduced
vehicle.5'*^

harm but

also increased the overall safety of the

Moreover, the plaintiff must show that the defect was an essential factor in

increasing his
collision.

the plaintiffs

which not only

5'*''

damage beyond

Thus,

it

harm

that

would have occurred

as result of the initial

has to be determined what portion of the harm occurred as a

consequence of the collision
the vehicle defect. This

responsible for the

the

is

(in

absence of the defect) and which portion was caused by

important and necessary to apportion

initial collision

liability

between the one

on the one hand and the vehicle manufacturer on the

other hand. If this apportionment can be proven and accomplished, the latter will

damage but only

usually not be held liable for the entire

for that portion of the

harm

the driver's legs; for an exhaustive review and listing of the cases which follow Larsen, see, Barry

Levenstam

&

Daryl

J.

Lapp, Plaintiff's Burden

A Clash Worthy ofAnalysis, 38 DePaul
544

Dyson

v.

Of Proving Enhanced Injury

In Crashworthiness Cases:

L. Rev. 55,61 note 33 (1988).

General Motors Corp., 298 F.Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Volkswagen of Am.,

Inc., v.

Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
545

Melia

v.

Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8*

Cir.

1976), applying Nebraska law, (Bright,

J.,

dissenting).

546 See, e.g.. General

N.E. 2d
547

1

Motors Corp.

v.

Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1 188 (Ala. 1985); Miller
Avco Corp., 478 N.W. 2d 70,75 (Iowa 1991).

139,1 143 (Ind. 1990); Hillrichs v.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Liability, P.F.D., § 16, cmt b,

at

291-292.

v.

Todd, 551
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which had been caused by the vehicle defect
then,

and severally

jointly

is

liable

the other part of the damage. ^^^^
injuries

As

(divisible injury).^''^

who

with the other party

to the provision

is

The manufacturer,

responsible for causing

of evidence for the apportionment of

and responsibility, courts must rely on expert testimony

(e.g.

engineers or

medical doctors) in order to obtain a result on this difficult issue.^^o

(II.)

Extent of manufacturer's liability

if

there

is

no proof for the

APPORTIONMENT OF HARM

A problem arises in cases in which the injuries are indivisible, when
proven which part of the damage occurred because of the

was caused by

initial collision

Between the courts

and which part

there

is

Common law approach
a

split

of authority with regard to

majority of courts^^i hold that in such a case the manufacturer
suffered

carmot be

the vehicle defect.

(a)

harm

it

by the

plaintiff

from both the defect as well as the

is

this issue.

The

liable for the entire

initial collision.

Thus,

the burden of proving the divisibility of the injury shifts from the plaintiff to the

defendant,

who

will be liable for all the

548 Larsen v.
General

harm unless he can show an apportiormient of

Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,503

Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10*

Cir. 1978);

(S"" Cir.

1968) (applying Minnesota law); Fox

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

v.

LIABILITY,

P.F.D.,§ 16(b).
549

Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8*^ Cir. 1982) (applying Michigan law); General
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 11 76 (Ala. 1985); McDowell v. Kawasaki Motor Corp. U.S.A., 799
S.W. 2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Mitchell

V.

550 Hillrichs v.

Avco

Corp.,

478 N.W. 2d 70 (Iowa 1991); Reed

v.

Chrysler Corp., 494

N.W. 2d 224

(Iowa 1992).
551

For the majority approach commonly referred

to as the "Fox-Mitchell-approach", see, e.g..

May

v.

Volkswagenwerk of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d
1283,1287-1288 (Okla. 1984); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1189 (Ala. 1985);
McDowell V. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 799 S.W. 2d 854,867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Czamecki v.
Volkswagen of Am., 837 P.2d 1143,1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Oakes v. General Motors Corp., 628
Portland Jeep, Inc., 509 P.2d 24,26-27 (Or. 1973); Lee

N.E. 2d 341,348

(111.

App.

Ct. 1993).

v.
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the damages. 552 in this situation the manufacturer will again be jointly and severally
liable

who

with the other party

caused the harm, however, the manufacturer will

generally be financially stronger than the other party (e.g. an individual) and can
therefore be considered as the "deepest pocket". Consequently, the plaintiff will be well

advised to try hard to

fulfill

every requirement necessary in order to succeed in his suit

against this defendant.

A

minority of courts,553 however, argue that the plaintiff must prove the extent

of the increased harm, which means that he has to show that the
injuries

can be distinguished fi"om the enhanced

initial collision-related

injuries, if this is

impossible he will not

be able to recover.

Restatement approach

(B)

The Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses
damages
two

in

enhanced injury cases

tortfeasors, the first is the

manufacturer

who

proof for

apportionment

this

is

in its §

433

B

one causing the

(2).

the issue of apportionment of

This section provides that

initial collision,

among

the second one

is

the

responsible for the vehicle defect, the one bearing the burden of
is

he

who

claims that the harm

motor vehicle manufacturer who seeks
defect by claiming that plaintiffs

A provision similar to

B

apportionable. Thus, the

to limit its liability to the

damage

§ 433

is

is

(2)

divisible

harm caused by

the

would bear the burden of proof.

of the Second Restatement can be found in §

16 (c)554 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. This section reflects the view of the

552 See, e.g.,
553
V.

Czamecki

v.

Volkswagen of Am., 837 P.2d

For the minority approach to which

is

1

143,1 148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).

often referred to as the "Huddell-approach", see, e.g., Huddell

Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying

P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Sumner

v.

New

Jersey law); Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688

General Motors Corp., 538 N.W. 2d 112 (Mich Ct. App.

1995).
554

§ 16 (b) and (c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts read:

(b) If

proof supports a determination of the harm

absence of the product defect, the product
solely to the product defect.

that

would have

seller's liability

is

resulted

from other causes

limited to the increased

harm

in the

attributable

125

common
harm

law majority

if his

(2)) §

harm

is

in that

it

holds the product seller liable for

not apportionable. Although, in contrast to

its

all

of the plaintiffs

predecessor, (§ 433

B

16 (c) does not explicitly shift the burden of proof for the apportionment of

damages

to the defendant, its effect is practically the

chance to escape
injuries. 555

liability for the entire

harm

is

to

same, because the defendant's only

prove the divisibility of the plaintiffs

Thus, both Restatements support the position taken by the

common law

majority.

(c)

The approaches taken by

the

Comment

common law

majority,

on the one hand, and the

minority of courts on the other hand, constitute two extreme positions. The "FoxMitchell approach" (majority view) goes entirely to the detriment of the manufacturer as

he

is

liable

for all of plaintiffs

damages, and the "Huddell-approach" (minority

position) takes the opposite point of

view

in not allowing the plaintiff to recover if

cannot prove the apportionment of damages. The question that arises

now

is

he

which of

two approaches should be approved.

the

In order to provide an answer to this question the following background has to

be

considered.

wrongdoers,

In

first,

motor vehicle crashworthiness cases we typically have two
the

one causing the

collision,

and second, the motor vehicle

manufacturer responsible for the defect in the vehicle. Before reaching the issue of

apportionment of damages, the plaintiff usually has already proven that the defect was a
substantial factor in increasing his harm. Thus,

cause in fact of the harm to the

(c) If
in the

plaintiff. In this situation

it

would be unjust

was a

to allow the

and other causes.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

300.

clear that the manufacturer

proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm that would have resulted
absence of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiffs harm attributable

to the defect
555

it is

Liability, P.F.D., § 16, Reporters' Note to cmt d, at

.
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who

has been proved to be a tortfeasor to escape Hability just because

was another

tortfeasor involved in the harmful event and the circumstances are

manufacturer
there

such that an apportionment of damages

is

impossible. ^^^ Accordingly, the "Huddell-

approach" has to be rejected, and the solution provided by the

common law

majority

("Fox-Mitchell-approach") to be approved.

B)

Comparison to German product liability law

Under German product

liability

solve the problem of apportionment of
cl.

law two solutions could be provided

damages

in

enhanced injury cases. § 830

2 BGB557 could be applied directly or by analogy. § 830

830

sec.

I, cl.

1

BGB

damage. In addition,
the extent of

sec.

it is

damage,

if

it

sec.

I,

ff.

is

sec. II

I, cl.

cl.l

refers to §

in the tortuous

not provable^^s. In both cases, the

BGB). However, § 830

BGB

and severally

liable (§§

designed for situations in which

is

several persons act deliberately together. This can be concluded

830 sec,

BOB

I,

recognized that this section also applies to situations in which

harm caused by each wrongdoer

421

2

sec.

cannot be discovered which party caused the

tortfeasors would, like in U.S. product liability law, be jointly

840

I, cl.

and provides that each of several parties involved

act is liable for the entire

in order to

from

its

wording, as §

speaks of a tortuous act that must have been committed "jointly", § 830

only applies to "instigators" or "accomplices" in the wrongful

act,

and § 830

sec.

2 finally speaks of "participants" (Beteiligte), a term that in this context describes

persons acting deliberately together. ^ 59 in crash worthiness cases, however, the person

556

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,

557

§ 830

BGB

§ 433

B

(2),

d.

[Accomplices and participants]

(1) If several persons through a jointly

responsible for the damage.

The same

committed

applies if

it

tortious act

have caused damage, each of them

and accomplices are

558

BGH NJW

559

Thomas, supra note

in the

same

position as joint actors.

1990,2882; THOMAS, supra note 66, § 830
66, §

830 BGB, Rn.

1

is

cannot be discovered which of several participants has

caused the damage through his action.
(2) Instigators

cmt

BGB,

Rn.

9.
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causing the
vehicle

initial

do not

defect

and the motor vehicle manufacturer responsible

collision

deliberately

act

together

independently acting wrongdoers. Thus, § 830 sec.
directly to these kind

must

similar state of interest

German

the second requirement,

of eliminating the
unclear,

if

it

exist.^^o

Because the issue

should be said that § 830 sec.

which person was the cause

let

cannot be applied

is

to this issue,

is fulfilled.

I, cl.

2

BGB

of the harm, or where

in fact

are fulfilled.

and second a

With regard

damage

it

is

liability.

clear that each

attributable to the

The same

automobile crashworthiness cases where the manufacturer caused

was

harm because

the vehicle

prerequisites

of an analogous application of § 830

I,

true in

at least part

cl.

BGB

2

would

it

is

defective. Thus, a similar state of interest exists,
sec.

either

it is

not provable. ^^i Here, like in U.S. product liability law,

one of the tortfeasors escape from

to

serves the purpose

has to face in situations where

participant caused the harm, and only the extent of the

be unjust to

as

in question is not explicitly

Civil Code, the first prerequisite

difficulties that the plaintiff

different tortfeasors

considered

two prerequisites

must be a gap of statutory regulation with regard

addressed by the

BGB

2

cl.

I,

be

to

of cases.

Nevertheless, this section could be applied
First, there

have

but

for the

of the

and both
are

met.

Accordingly, this section can be applied in analogy, which means that in enhanced
injury cases

where the extent of plaintiffs

vehicle manufacturer

German product

is

liability

liable for all

law

is in

injuries cannot be apportioned, the

of plaintiffs harm. Finally,

accord with the

Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre des Rechts

561

BGHZ

55,86;

BGH ZIP

1994,374;

liability law.

391 (6* ed. 1990).

THOMAS, supra

see that

common law majority view as

both Restatements' approaches under United States product

560

we can

note 66, § 830

BGB,

Rn.

7.

motor

well as
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2.

Preemption of state tort law by federal law and compliance
WITH federal safety STANDARDS

Closely related to the issue of crashworthiness are two other, very important

The

issues.

first is

the issue of preemption of state tort law

second focuses on the question of what effects

result

by federal law, and the

from compliance with federal

safety standards.

Preemption - background information

a)

Preemption finds

its

(Supremacy Clause)562 and

Supreme Court holding

roots in
is

art.

VI,

cl.

2 of the United States Constitution

defined as a"[d]octrine adopted by the United States

that certain matters are

of such national, as opposed to

local,

character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state laws."^^^ Thus, if there
is

preemption, neither state

the

common law

motor vehicle product

where the

fi-equently in situations

Standards (FMVSS), which
those standards

is

liability

FMVSS

it

is

context,

NHTSA

See U.S. Const.,

563

Black's

art.

VI,

the

issue

of preemption arises most

promulgates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

empowered

to

do under the

traffic

Safety Act.

One of

208^64 which requires manufacturers to install occupant

restraint systems^^^ j^ their automobiles.

562

nor statutory law can be applied to a case. In

The kind of

restraint

system that has to be

cl. 2.

Law Dictionary,

supra note 390, at 1 177; see also, Painter's Local Union No. 567 v. Tom
398 P.2d 245,246 (Nev. 1965) (stating that "Preemption rests upon the supremacy
clause of the federal constitution, and deprives a state of jurisdiction over matters embraced by a
congressional act regardless of whether the state law coincides with, is complementary to, or opposes the

Joyce Floors,

Inc.,

federal congressional expression.").
564

49 c.F.R. §571.208.

565

There are active and passive occupant

restraint systems.

rather than "active"

when

render

Encompassed within the

it

effective.

it

example, windshield, roof, head
that, active restraint

Higgs

v.

A

safety system

is

characterized as "passive"

does not require any independent action taken by the vehicle occupants to

restraints,

definition of passive occupant restraint systems are, for

energy absorbing steering columns, and airbags. In opposite to

systems comprise door locks and seat belts which have

to

be fastened manually, see,

General Motors Corp., 655 F.Supp. 22,24 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); Kurt B. Chadwell, Automobile

129

depends on the year

installed
that

in

which the vehicle was manufactured. For passenger

have peen manufactured on or

1996, for example,

option

it

September

1989, but before September

1,

allows manufacturers to choose from three options. The

The second option

is

first

a passive protection for frontal crashes, for example,

automatic shoulder belts or airbags, plus manual lap belts for
rollovers with a seat belt warning system, or as a third option, a

warning system.566 As a practical matter,

belts with a seat belt

the manufacturers will choose to install
the latter are

more expensive.

liability actions that the

rendered

1,

a complete passive restraint system, automatic seat belts with or without

is

airbags.

after

cars

and shoulder

likely that

most of

automatic seat belts rather than airbags since

manufacturer failed to

defenses in order to avoid

is

lap

In such a situation plaintiffs often allege in products

defective in design.^^s

it

^67

manual
it

crashes and

lateral

install

an airbag in the vehicle which

The manufacturer, on

liability. First,

the other hand, will bring

he will argue the inapplicability of

two

state tort

law, because the field of occupant restraint systems has already been addressed by
federal

law

(FMVSS

208.) Therefore, the manufacturer will argue that state law

preempted under the Supremacy Clause. Second, he will contend

FMVSS

208 since he chose

required under this standard.

to install

He

he should be immunized from

that

tort liability

Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone:

he complied with

one of the safety features (automatic seat

will further argue that, as a result

under

An end to

is

belts)

of such compliance,

state law.569

the Federal Preemption Defense,

46 Baylor

L. Rev.

141, note 24 (1994).
566

49 C.F.R.

§ 571.208, s 4.1.4; see also, Irving v.

567 Chadwell,

568 See, e.g.,

supra note 565,

Pokomy

v.

Mazda Motor

Corp., 136 F.3d 764 (1

Doyle

v.

Cir. 1998).

at 150.

Ford Motor Co., 714 F.Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Johnson

Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
569 See. e.g.,

1*^

Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 S.E.2d 518,520 (Ga. 1997).

v.

General Motors

.

130

Difference between the "preemption" and "compliance"

B)

ARGUMENT
Although the manufacturer's arguments related

seem

to

to

preemption and compliance

be similar, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the two.

(I.)

The key

factor to determine

Preemption

whether

state tort

law

is

preempted by federal law

the intent of Congress.^^^ In other words, the decisive factor

is

is

whether Congress, by

enacting a statute, intended to preempt state law or not. In order to

make

this

determination, courts must consider the language, history, structure, and purpose of the
statute.5^'

Thus, courts deciding on this issue have to

make

exclusively taking into consideration federal law.^''^ If the court
that

Congress intended

would escape
to decide

state

liability. If

on the

law

to

be superseded,

it is

these

comes

by

findings

to the conclusion

not applicable, and the defendant

the court reaches the opposite result, state courts will be able

further issues of the case.

(II.)

Compliance

The question of which consequences
standards arises only if the court

preempted. The answer to

comes

this question

provides with regard to this issue. 5"^^

result

to

from compliance with federal safety

the conclusion that state

law

is

depends on what the law of the specific

As we

not
state

will see in the further discussion, the

majority of jurisdictions today holds that compliance with federal safety regulations

570

White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,504 (1978); Cipollone
504,515 (1992); Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).
571

Malone

v.

Cipollone

v.

v.

Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.

Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,517 (1992); Medtronic, Inc. v. lohr,

2240,2250-2251 (1996).
572

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,

573

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

P.F.D., § 4,

is

cmt

Liability, P.F.D., § 4, cmt

e,

atl41.

e, at

141

116 S.Ct.

131

relevant and admissible, but not controlling, evidence of defendant's exercise of due

care and product defectiveness.

Consequently,

it

^'''*

can be concluded that the question of preemption

by the courts as a matter of

federal law,

is

determined

whereas the issue of compliance

is

to

be

decided as a matter of state law. Moreover, the two doctrines can be distinguished with
regard to their consequences. While preemption of state law immunizes the defendant

from

state tort liability, this is not necessarily the case

where he complied with federal

safety regulations.

c)

Recent development and changes in the preemption doctrine

(I.)

Three categories of preemption: Express-, conflict-, and
OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD PREEMPTION

Before analyzing the court decisions regarding the preemption doctrine in the
context of motor vehicles,

it

is

important to keep in mind that the United States

Supreme Court distinguishes between

three different categories of preemption. First,

preemption of state law can take place where Congress explicitly
statute's language.

preempted when

if there

is

no

explicit statutory language,

state

law

is

regulates a field that Congress intended to be occupied exclusively

it

by federal law, and
law.575 Since the

Second,

states this intent in the

third,

two

preemption takes place where

latter

state

law conflicts with federal

forms of preemption are not explicitly stated in a statute's

language, they are both forms of implied preemption.576

^'''^

"5

See

infra, at \52.

English

V.

General Elec. Co., 476 U.S. 72,78-79 (1990); Easterwood

1548,1552 (11*

Cir.

v.

CSX

Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d

1991), affd, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.

504,517(1992).

"6 Gade
Lake

v.

National Solid Waste

Aircraft, Inc.,

Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,98

992 F.2d 291,294

(1

1''

Cir. 1993).

(1992); Public Health Trust v.
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Express preemption occurs when Congress declares

law

in a particular area

through the use of explicit language. ^'^^ In this context,

be stressed that the Traffic safety Act contains in

which has been interpreted
occurs

when Congress

enactment of specific

intent to preclude state

its

differently

by the

its

§ 30103

in

has to

a preemption clause

(b)-''''^,

courts. Occupation-of-the-field

preemption

intends to entirely preclude state law in a particular field by

legislation. ^^^ Conflict

when

preemption, finally, exists

otherwise inconsistent, with applicable federal law^^o so that

conflicts, or is

law

state

is

it

impossible for a party to comply with both state and federal law.^^i

(II.)

The preemption doctrine in the context of motor vehicles preAND MEDTRONICt'^^

ClPOLLONE^^^, FREIGHTLINER^^-^,

From
state

mid 1980s

the

until the early

and federal courts claiming

1990s several lawsuits were

filed in

both

that the manufacturer's failure to install safety features

such as airbags rendered the vehicle defective. In most of these lawsuits the defendants
brought the preemption defense. At the federal

district level,

of the sixteen courts

addressing the issue of preemption of "no-airbag" claims^^s only a few586 found these

"7 Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 16,1 120 (3d Cir. 1990).
"8 Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745,943 (1994) (codified as amended
1 1

(1995)). This section corresponds to § 1392 (d) (1988) and
clause. §

30103

(b) reads:

is

42 U.S.C. § 30103

at

"When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter,
may prescribe or continue in effect a standard practicable to

of a State

political subdivision

(b)

frequently referred to as the preemption

aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only

if

the standard

is

a State or
the

same

identical to

the standard prescribed under this chapter."
^^^ Chadwell, supra note 565, at 152; see also Pacific

Conservation

& Dev.

580 See, e.g.. Sears,
58'

Comm'n, 461

Roebuck

&.

McCauley, supra note 396,

Co.

v. Stiffel Co.,

583 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,

585 See, e.g..

Cox

v.

1

&. Elec.

Co.

v.

State

376 U.S. 225,231 (1964).

504 (1992).

514 U.S. 280 (1995).

16 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).

Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover

F.Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Staggs

Ford Motor Co., 677

F.

Energy Resources

at 840.

582 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.

584 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,

Gas

U.S. 190,203-204 (1983).

v.

v.

Ford Motor Co., 632

Chryler Corp., 678 F.Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Hughes

Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1987);

Murphy

v.

v.

Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F.Supp. 922
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claims not to be preempted by federal law. At the federal appellate level, a number of
Circuit Courts have considered the issue and held that "no-airbag" claims were

preempted the Traffic Safety Act and federal safety standards. ^^^
have addressed the

state courts that

between courts arguing

issue, take the opposite position. ^^^

and against preemption

in favor

In contrast,

reflect a

The

most of the

differences

number of different

concerns and interpretations of the Traffic Safety Act.

(a)

Different interpretations of the Traffic Safety Act's

PREEMPTION CLAUSE

(§

30103

(b)):

PREEMPTION OF STATE COMMON LAW

LIABILITY ?
§ 30103 (b) of the traffic Safety Act states that
safety standard

is

"When

in effect..., a State or political subdivision

a [federal] motor vehicle

of a State

may

prescribe or

continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor
vehicle... only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed

A

controversy

effect

to

among

the courts focuses

of this section also applies to

under

this chapter."

on the question of whether the preemptive

common law

be dismissed, and judgment would have

to

actions. If yes, this action

would have

be issued in favor of the defendant

manufacturer. § 30103 (b) mentions that action taken by the "state" or "political
subdivision of a state" can be preempted. This does not include courts or juries, because

they

make

part of the independent judicial

(E.D.N. Y. 1987);

Wood

v.

remanded, 865 F.2d 395 (1"

branch and cannot be considered as

General Motors Corp., 673
Cir.

1988)

(Wood

II);

F.

Supp.

Richart v. Ford

1108 (D. Mass. 1987)

(Wood

I),

Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M.

v. For Motor Co., 714 F.Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Tammen v. General Motors Corp.,
788
(D. Kan. 1994) Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
857 F.Supp.

1988);

586

Pokomy

Wood

Motor

V.

General Motors Corp., 673

F.

Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987)

Corp., 650 F.Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Richart

v.

(Wood

I);

Murphy

v.

Nissan

Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M.

1988).
587

Wood

V.

General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (P' Cir. 1988)

Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10"^ Cir. 1989); Taylor

Pokomy v. Ford Motor
588 See. cases cited

Co., 902 F.2d

1 1

v.

(Wood

II);

Kitts v. General

General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816

16 (3d Cir. 1990).

by Chadwell, supra note 565, note 99.

(ll*^ Cir.

Motors
1989);
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some

political organs. ^^^ Nevertheless,

dependent

language of

this section,

it

can be applied to

courts have held that because of the

common law

actions as well as to state

regulatory bodies.^^^ These courts argue that § 30103 (b) does not explicitly state that a

by a regulatory body. They further hold

safety standard can only be effected

common

law decision, according

to

which an automobile

equipped with a specific safety feature,

when
of a

airbag)

(e.g.

but also a court or a jury

state,

based on a

FMVSS

common law

is

standard that

208 allows manufacturers

been installed

is

a

common law

is

choose from three different occupant

traffic safety

concluded that

standard which

this section

does not preempt

McCauley, supra note 396,

also,

holding that a jury
590 See. e.g.,

Cox

is

v.

liability

restraint

is

not identical to the federal standard.

common law is

expressly preempted

Act's preemption clause. ^92

Safety Act's savings clause, § 30103

59 J

not

a jury finding that an airbag should have

etc.),

However, other courts have interpreted § 30103

632

is

not identical to the federal standard. Given that

Thus, these courts came to the conclusion that state

See

it

a safety standard set by the state

precluded by § 30103 (b) from imposing

to

options (automatic seat-belts, airbag,

^^9

defective because

enforces the decision.^^i Accordingly, not only a state or a political subdivision

it

by the

is

is

that a

at

state tort

(e)^^^. 595

(b) differently. ^93

law claims

According

in light

They have

of the Traffic

to this rationale they fiirther

note 90: "There do not appear to be any court decisions

a political subdivision."

Bahimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,763 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover

v.

Ford Motor Co.,

Supp. 1095,1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986).

F.

Cox

V.

Bahimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,763 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover

v.

Ford Motor Co., 632

F.

Supp. 1095,1096-1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
592 jj_

;

however, among the courts fmding preemption, the majority found implied preemption instead of

express preemption, see
593 Garrett v.

infra.

Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987); Baird

v.

General Motors Corp., 654

F.Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
594 §

30103 (e) corresponds to § 1397 (k) (1988) and is referred to as the savings clause. It states that
"Compliance with any Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard issued under this title does not exempt any
person from liability under common law."
595 Garrett v.

Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407,41

F.Supp. 28,30 (N.D. Ohio 1986).

1

(D.

Md.

1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654
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held that the preemption clause only precludes states from implementing motor vehicle
safety regulations

common

which

differ

from

their federal counterparts but

common law

law.596 Hence, in preserving

between the

distinguished

claims in § 30103

of sanctions

imposition

do not address

by the

state,

Congress

(e),

a

or

political

subdivision, for non-compliance with a regulatory provision and awards of tort

damages

injuries. ^^^

compensating for

(b)

state

Different assessment of occupation-of-the-field preemption

Another source of conflict between the courts concerns the question of whether
Congress intended to occupy the entire
enactment of the Traffic Safety Act

field

v.

District

Court in Staggs

Chrysler

common law

actions that interfere with or

purposes of the legislative act as a whole "[wjhere Congress... has drawn a

comprehensive

with a particular subject."^oo j^ application of this

statute for dealing

rationale to the airbag cases, the court in Staggs found that

carefully

v.

Ouellette^^^ for the holding that general savings

clauses such as § 30103 (e) will not preserve
frustrate the

The

in 1966.

Corp. 598cited International Paper Co.

of motor vehicle safety through the

drafted

complex

regulatory

implementation of non-identical

scheme

for

where Congress enacted a

motor

state standards is precluded.

shared by the District Court in Doty

v.

Ford Motor Co.^^K

vehicle

safety,

the

This opinion has been

In this decision, the court

held that "Congress has legislated so comprehensively in the area of motor vehicle
safety through the Safety

596 Baird v. General

Act

that

it

has

m

598

678 F.Supp. 270,274 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

599

479 U.S. 481,493-494 (1987): The court held
statute, the inclusion

for the States to

supplement

600 Staggs V. Chrysler Corp.,

that

where Congress enacted a carefully written and

of a savings clause should not preclude a court from finding

Congress impliedly preempted a particular

601 Civ.

no room

Motors Corp., 654 F.Supp. 28,30-31 (N.D. Ohio 1986).

597

comprehensive

left

field

of law.

678 F.Supp. 270,274 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

A. No. 85-3591, 1987

WL 31 143

(D.D.C. Feb.4, 1987) = Prod. Liab. Rep.

(CCH) P

1

1,273.

that
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federal law."602 in contrast, the court in Garret

v.

Ford Motor

Co. ^^^held that two

aspects undermine the occupation-of-the-field argument favored in Staggs and Doty.
First, the court

did not consider the Traffic safety Act to be a comprehensive legislative

scheme.^^ Second, the court concluded
Safety Act,

most reasonable

it is

that,

according to the language of the

to interpret this statute as not preempting

traffic

common law

claims. 605

(c)

Still

decisions

Conflict preemption

another point of disagreement between courts

would

As mentioned

conflict with federal

earlier, conflict

with federal law, making

it

law

to

whether

is

state

an extent that would preempt the former.

preemption occurs when a

state

law directly conflicts

impossible for a party to comply with both state and federal

law. Courts arguing in favor of preemption contend that Congress intended

be a

minimum

for this

argument

to

the automobile

as well as a
is

was

manufacturers to

maximum

FMVSS

208

standard for automobile safety. The rationale

common law judgment

holding a manufacturer liable because

defectively designed due to the absence of an airbag

install this

common law would
208

that a

common law

would force

kind of safety feature into their vehicles.^^^ Since state

de facto eliminate the choices given to manufacturers by

to integrate different kinds

of passive safety

restraints,

it is

FMVSS

argued that such a result

stands in conflict with federal law.^^^

WL 31143, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb.4,

602

Doty

603

684 F.Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987).

V.

Ford Motor Co., 1987

1987).

604 /J. at 409.
605

Id at 412; see also, Perry v. Mercedes-Benz, 957 F.2d 1257,1264 (5*
no occupation-of-the-field preemption under the traffic safety Act).
606 Staggs V. Chrysler Corp.,

678 F.Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Schick

Cir.

v.

1992) (holding that there

is

Chrysler Corp., 675 F.Supp.

1183(D. S.D. 1987).
607 Baird v. General

865 F.2d 395,412

Motors Corp., 654 F.Supp. 28,32 (N.D. Ohio 1986);

(P Cir.

1988)

(Wood

II).

Wood

v.

General Motors Corp.,
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However, not

Ford Motor

courts have agreed with this argument.

all

The

court in Richart

Co.^^^, for example, rejects the proposition that a state tort

compels automobile manufacturers

FMVSS

choice authorized under

necessarily impose a legal duty

argued that such an award

is

v.

damage award

to install passive restraints, thereby foreclosing the

208. The court held that

on manufacturers

one part of the

risk

change

to

damage awards do not
their product design.

It

of doing business and putting products

on the market. Rather than eliminating an option given by federal law, a damage award
holds motor vehicle manufacturers liable for harm resulting from their negligence in

choosing among federally authorized options.^^^

(D)

A

Controversy about the importance of uniformity

final point

of divergence between the courts

setting safety standards is subordinated in the interest

the Traffic Safety Act.

was

Safety Act

According
state

would

to create uniformity with regard to

state's role in

of national uniformity created by

motor vehicle safety standards.^'^

concluded that Congress must have intended to preempt

law, because the adoption of
frustrate

whether the

courts have held that one significant purpose of the Traffic

to this premise, they

common

states

Some

is

Congress'

throughout the whole country.^''

On

goal

common law

of establishing

safety standards

by single

uniform

standards

safety

the other hand, the argument that uniformity

is

the

controlling purpose of the Traffic Safety Act has been rejected by several other

608 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.
609 Richart V. Ford

N.M.

Motor

Motors Corp., 673 F.Supp.
610

Cox

V.

1988).

Co., 681 F.Supp.
1

108,1

1

611

(Wood

(Wood

See, e.g.,

Wood

v.

v.

v.

General

v.

Ford Motor Co., 632

General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395,412 (T' Cir.

II).

Cox

Wood

I).

Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,763-764 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover

F.Supp. 1095,1096-1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986);

1988)

1462,1467 (D. N.M. 1988); see also.

13 (D. Mass. 1987)

Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,764 (D. Md. 1986).
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courts. ^'2

According to these authorities uniformity was only one of Congress'

The main purpose pursued by Congress

objectives.

to reduce traffic accidents, deaths,

and

injuries.^'^

in passing the traffic Safety

Given

this premise, states

Act was

must be

able to set identical or even higher safety standards than those set by the federal

government. Consequently, rather than conflicting with Congress'

damage awards, through which

liability for defective

design

is

intent,

state tort

imposed on automobile

manufacturers, are consistent with the Traffic Safety Act's purpose.^''*

(E)

We

Comment

have seen that from the mid-1980s

disagreement on whether

common law

state

Safety Act or federal safety standards.
the following discussion

is

that

An

among

until the early

liability

1990s courts were in

was preempted by

the Traffic

important point that should be emphasized for

the courts favoring preemption a majority found

implied preemption, occupation-of-the-field preemption or conflict preemption, while

only a few courts argued in favor of express preemption.

now

Supreme Court decisions and

discuss recent

their

It is

against this backdrop

I

impact on the preemption

doctrine.

(III.)

The change of the preemption doctrine brought by Cipollone,
Freightliner and Medtronic

A

dramatic change in federal preemption analysis came with the Supreme

Court's decisions in Cipollone

and Medtronic,

Inc.

v.

v.

Liggett Group, Inc.^^^, Freightliner Corp.

Myrick,^^^

Lohr.^^'^

^•2 See, e.g.. Garret v. Ford

681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.

v.

Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407,409 (D. Md. 1987); Richart v. Ford Motor Co.,
N.M. 1988); Perry v. Mercedes Benz, 957 F.2d 1257,1266 (5*^ Cir. 1992).

6'3 See, e.g., Richart v. Ford

Motor

Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462,1469 (D.

614 Id. at 1463.
615 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,

505 U.S. 504 (1992).

N.M.

1988).
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(a)

The Supreme Court's decision

preemption, there

is

Cipollone: If there

in

express

no need for an implied preemption analysis

Although Cipollone did not address the preemption issue
vehicles, but

is

rather dealt with a claim

of motor

in the context

against cigarette manufacturers,

it

is

still

important for our analysis, because in this case the Supreme Court shed a different light

on the preemption

issue. In Cipollone, the

son of a

woman who

developed cancer

after

she had been smoking regularly for more than 40 years brought an action against the

Among

cigarette manufacturers.

other things, he alleged that the cigarettes were

defective in design because of the manufacturer's failure to use safer alternatives, and
that they negligently failed to appropriately test
defect).^' ^

The manufacturers, on

the

and advertise

their products

(warnings

other hand, raised the preemption defense,

contending that the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965^'^ and the Public Health

Smoking Act of 1969^^0 protected them from

liability

under

state

common

law.

The

court had to consider whether these claims could survive the language of the Act's

preemption clauses, according

to

which

states

were barred from imposing other warning

requirements relating to the advertisement or promotion of cigarettes.^^i x^g issue in

Cipollone was whether the Act's preemption provisions precluded state
claims

-

the

same

issue has been raised in the airbag cases. In the

616 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
^•^ Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,

1

first

common law

part of

its

analysis

514 U.S. 280 (1995).

16 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).

618 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505. U.S. 504,508 (1992).

619 Pub. L. 89-92,79 Stat.

as

amended

at 15

620 Pub. L. 91-222,84 Stat. 87 (codified as

amended

15 U.S.C.

621

§

282 (codified

U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994).

4 of the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965 made

the United States unless the package bore a label

§§1331-1341 (1994).

it

stating:

unlawful to

sell

or distribute cigarettes in

"Caution: Cigarette

Smoking May Be

Hazardous to Your Health." § 5 of the Act contains the preemption provision:
"(a)

No

statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this

Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b)

No

statement relating to smoking and health shall be required

packages of which are labeled

in

in the

advertising of any cigarettes the

conformity with the provisions of this Act."

.
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some of

the court reviewed

These are the

the basic principles governing the preemption doctrine.

of the Supremacy Clause and the presumption that historic

inviolability

police powers of the states, such as tort law,622
it

^q

^ot superseded by federal law unless

the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.^^a

is

held that

"When Congress

Most

importantly, the court then

has considered the issue of preemption and has included in

the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and

when

that

provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority,... there is

no need

to infer congressional intent to

preempt

state

laws from the

substantive provisions of the legislation."624 since the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act

contained express preemption provisions, the Supreme Court determined that
task

was

to "[IJdentify the

domain expressly preempted by each of those

its

only

sections"625^

whereas there was no need to perform an implied preemption analysis. In applying the

above mentioned rule and the presumption against preemption, the court then
determined that a narrow reading of both Acts' preemption clauses was necessary.626
Finally, the court held that

none of plaintiffs claims were preempted by the Act of

1965, but, because of the broader language used in the Act of 1969,

some of his claims

were.^27

From

the preceding,

it

can be concluded that Cipollone dramatically changed

previous preemption analysis by holding that where Congress has explicitly addressed
the preemption issue in a statute, the preemptive scope of this statute

^22 See, e.g., Tebbetts v.

136 F.3d 764,767
traditionally

(ll*^

Group,

Inc.,

505 U.S. 504,516 (1992).

624 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,517 (1992).

625/^.
626

M

627 Id. at 5 1 8-5 1 9

limited to

its

Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345,346 (N.H. 1995); Irving v. Mazda Motor Co.,
Cir. 1998) (stating that "[tjhe provision of tort remedies. ..is one that has

been regarded as properly within the scope of the

623 Cipollone v. Liggett

is

and 530-53 1

states' rights.").
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express terms precluding a finding of implied preemption. Thus,

it

seems

that Cipollone

constitutes a case for the plaintiff rather than for the defendant.

However, the language used

in Cipollone qualifies this finding. In analyzing the

language of the 1969 Cigarette Act, the Court stated that the words "[no] requirement or
prohibition" suggest that there

common

is

no difference between positive enactments and

law.^^s j^ contrast, the Court found that this phrase "[ejasily

obligations that take the form of

enhanced by the statement
damages... which

is

common law

encompass [es]

rules."629 -p^js finding

that "[state] regulation... can

was

further

be exerted through an award of

designed to be a potent method of governing conduct and

controlling policy.''^^^ Accordingly, the Court held that state

be considered as a type of "regulation". This

is

common law

liability

can

the key factor to determine the scope of

application of a preemption clause, since courts arguing in favor and courts arguing
against preemption agree that a preemption clause

generally

encompasses

"state

regulations" or "state regulatory bodies. "^^i Thus, since state regulations comprise

common law
will

liability,

generally

a preemption clause similar to the one of the 1969 Cigarette Act

expressly

preempt

state

common

law.

Consequently,

Cipollone

constitutes a better case for defendants that raise the preemption defense than for
plaintiffs.

628

629

m
m

at 521.

630 yj.
631

See

infra, notes

590,596 (Some courts interpret the Traffic Safety Act's preemption clause to apply to
and common law. Other courts restrict its scope to "state regulations".).

"state regulatory bodies"
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The interpretation of Cipollone in Freightliner: Cjpollone o^l\

(B)

DEVELOPED AN INFERENCE BUT NOT A RULE
Freightliner Corp.

In

Myrick ^^Hhe Supreme Court altered

v.

its

position

regarding the issue of preemption previously taken in Cipollone. In Freightliner, one of

Ben Myrick, was

the plaintiffs,

which ended up jackknifmg

tractor-trail or,

braking.

The

the driver of an

traffic

hit

by a

when suddenly

was not equipped with

anti-lock brakes. Like in the airbag

install anti-lock

common law

it

FMVSS

121, gave manufacturers the choice of

brakes or not. Because of this, the manufacturers argued that

actions dealing with their failure to install this kind of safety feature

were impliedly preempted due
claim which

oncoming

was

manufactured by Freightliner, was

cases, the relevant safety standard,

state

into

that

plaintiff alleged that the tractor trailor,

defective in design because

whether to

oncoming vehicle

made

it

to a conflict

between the

FMVSS

and the plaintiffs

impossible to comply with both federal and state law. The

peculiarity in this case, however, resided in the fact that the applicable federal safety

standard

(FMVSS

121)

was not

in effect at the

time

at

which the

occurred. Prior to that time the Ninth Circuit Court had reviewed

harmfiil event

FMVSS

found that the standard was neither practicable nor reasonable, because the
failed to take into consideration the high failure rate

created a

more hazardous highway

operative.633 Therefore, the

The
and found

that

situation than existed before the standard

first

632

514 U.S. 280 (1995).

633

Id

at

285.

634

jd

at

289.

was no

FMVSS

became

121.

analyzed whether there was express preemption

because of the suspension of

preemption.^3'* Since there

NHTSA had

of anti-lock brake devices and

Ninth Circuit Court suspended

court in Freightliner

121 and

FMVSS

121 there could be no express

federal safety standard in effect at the time, the court
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rejected the manufacturer's

argument

that the plaintiffs claims

implied conflict preemption. The court held that

comply with both
with. "635

comply

federal

and

state

of law

was not impossible

for

them

''[t]o

law because there simply was no federal standard

Most importantly, however,

that Cipollone only established

it

were precluded by

to

the court reconsidered Cipollone and held

an inference, but not a

rule, that

where a

particular field

expressly preempted in a statute by Congress, matters outside this field are not

is

preempted. 636 Thus, the court in Freightliner read Cipollone in a

way

that the existence

of an express preemption clause merely creates a presumption that Congress did not
intend to preempt matters not explicitly contained in the provision. However, an implied

preemption analysis

is

preemptive scope of a

thereby not excluded but can

The Supreme Court's opinion in Medtronic

third decision in

preemption

is

be used in order to extend the

statute.637

(c)

A

still

Medtronic,

which the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
Inc.

Lohr.^^^

v.

manufactured by Medtronic, failed

in

The

plaintiffs

cardiac

pacemaker,

1990, leading to a complete heart block and

The

plaintiff alleged that the

pacemaker was

defective in manufacture and design, and that the defendant had failed to

warn her or her

requiring her to undergo several surgeries.

physicians of the product's tendency to
failures.

fail

despite

knowledge of previous product

Medtronic argued that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by § 360 k

(a)639

635 Id. at 288.

636 Id. at

288 ("At

best,

implied preemption;
637

it

Cipollone supports an inference that an express preemption clause forecloses

does not establish a

rule.").

m

638 116 S.Ct.

2240 (1996).

639 21 U.S.C.
§

360 k

"Except as provided

(a) (1996); this section reads:
in

subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State

establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
(1)

and

which

is

different from, or in addition to,

human

may

use any requirement

any requirement applicable under

this chapter to the device,
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of the Medical Device law. As

in Cipollone, the court in

Medtronic reviewed the basic

principles governing the preemption doctrine and stated that there

power and

against preemption of state police

a presumption

is

that Congress' intent is the "ultimate

touchstone" in preemption cases. ^^ In addition, the court confirmed Cipollone in
holding that there

is

no need

to "[g]o

beyond § 360 k

(a)'s

preemptive language to

determine whether Congress intended... to preempt... state law..."^' and that the court's
only task

is

to determine the

domain

that is expressly

preempted by

this section. ^^ j^ j^s

analysis the court concluded that according to the language used in §
legislative history, state

federal

law^^ and

which

(2)

that

common law may

relates to the safety or effectiveness

Medtronic, Inc.

641

Mat 2243.

642

m

643

Mat 2244 and 2255.

Lohr,

v.

its

higher safety standards than prescribed by

none of the plaintiffs claims were preempted^^. ^^

requirement applicable to the device under

^0

set

360 k and

1

of the device or to any other matter included

in

a

this chapter."

16 S.Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).

644 Id. at 2259.
645

In

This

its
is

analysis of the preemption issue the Court in Medtronic had to deal with a

one reason

why

this

preemption analysis. The Medical Device Amendments
three categories. Pacemakers are Class
illness or injury or

new

Class

III

complex

fact pattern.

decision cannot be considered as a comprehensive framework for a

III

(MDA)

from 1976

classified

medical devices

in

devices which either present a potential unreasonable risk of

which are of substantial importance to prevent impairment of human health. Before a
may be introduced on the market the manufacturer must provide the Food and Drug

device

Administration

(FDA) with "reasonable assurance"

establish this assurance the device

is

that the device

is

safe

and

subject to a rigorous premarket approval

effective. In order to

(PMA)

process under

which the manufacturer has to submit detailed information regarding safety and efficacy of their devices,
which the FDA then reviews, spending an average of 1,200 hours on a single submission. However, a
"grandfather" clause of the medical device law foresees an important exception to this

This provision (also

known

as "§

510

(k) process") permits

going through the premarket approval process.

FDA

of the intent to market

at least

New

devices

most Class

may

III

PMA

process.

devices to be sold without

be marketed simply by notifying the

90 days prior to marketing, and by demonstrating the new product's

when

"substantial equivalence" to a "predicate device" (a device that

was already on

medical device laws were passed

received a "substantial equivalence"

this

1976 or that has

itself

the market

the

Class

III

devices today, also the plaintiffs pacemaker reached the market

quicker procedure

(it

is

determination).

through

in

As most

completed by the

FDA

in

an average of 20 hours). Medtronic

claimed that Lohr's negligent design claim was preempted by the § 510 (k) process because defendants
fiilfiUed the federal "substantial equivalence requirement" Plaintiff Lohr contended that the § 510 (k)

premarket notification process imposes no "requirement" on the design of defendant's pacemaker. The
Supreme Court held that the § 510 (k) process did not "require" Medtronic's pacemaker to take a
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Thus,

it

can be concluded that the court in Medtronic returned to adopt the

limited scope of application of the implied preemption doctrine established under

Cipollone.

(IV.)

The Aftermath: Application of Cipollone, Freightl/ner, and

Medtronic 10 the motor vehicle product liability context by

U.S.

Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts
Although one might think

that after Cipollone, elucidated

by Freightliner, and

Medtronic, the preemption discussion must be more clear, uniform, and consistent than
before, a review of recent U.S. Courts of Appeals cases

and State Supreme Court

decisions reveals a different picture.

At

Courts have dealt with this issue in the context of motor

least four Circuit

vehicle product liability after 1995.

manufacturer's

preempted

by

liability

the

based on

state

Safety

Traffic

They have held unanimously

common law

Act

and

Standards. ^^ In addition, at least eight State

particular design but

it

the

is

that the

automobile

either expressly or impliedly

relevant

Motor Vehicle

Supreme Courts have addressed

simply allowed the product to be marketed without the rigorous

Safety

the

PMA

same

process.

Accordingly, the court found that the "substantial equivalence" provision did not preempt plaintiffs
design claim.

^6 Montag

V. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414,1417 (10* Cir. 1996): Plaintiff's wife, Diane Montag, was
when her 1988 Honda Prelude collided with a freight train. Although she was wearing a seat belt,
she was ejected from her car and received serious brain injuries from which she dies 2 months later. The
Plaintiff alleges that the car's seat beh was defectively designed and that Honda failed to install an airbag

killed

1

as an alternative restraint system.

The defendant argued

that federal

motor vehicle safety regulations

barred plaintiffs claim. The court held that plaintiffs claim was impliedly preempted.; Harris

Mortor Co., 110 F.3d 1410,1416

(9'*'

Cir. 1997):

While driving a rented 1992 Mercury Topaz,

v.

Ford

plaintiff,

smashed into a tree and sustained serious
was defectively designed and that Ford was
negligent in failing to install a driver side airbag. Ford raised the preemption defense. The court held that
plaintiffs action was expressly preempted by the Traffic Safety Act; Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.
1997): While driving as a passenger in a 1986 Volvo truck, plaintiff, Gracia, was
1 12 F.3d 291 (7* Cir.
catapulted through the windshield opening on the pavement when the truck rear-ended another vehicle.
She sustained a spinal injury. Plaintiff alleged that the truck was defective under Illinois common law for
the windshield retention system was unreasonably dangerous and inadequate to prevent the windshield
from ejecting during impacts. Volvo argued that Gracia's claim is preempted by the traffic safety Act.
sixteen year old Jennifer Harris, lost control of the vehicle,
injuries.

The

She alleged, among other

court held that §

30103

things, that the car

(b) expressly

preempted plaintiffs claim; Irving

v.

Mazda Motor

Corp., 136

146
issue in this period of time.
split

However,

of authority among the

FMVSS

preempt

state

state courts as to

common

Hampshire, Indiana, Arizona,
nor

impliedly

in contrast to the four federal courts, there is a

law actions. According

New
In

preempted.^'*''

whether the Traffic Safety Act and the
to the

New

Supreme Courts of

York, and Ohio, these actions are neither expressly
contrast,

the

Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania,

Mississippi, and Idaho have concluded that such state tort claims are preempted.^'*^

The

differences between the courts finding preemption and those finding no preemption
reflect basically the

same considerations

prior to Cipollone, Freightliner,

(iC

F.3d 764,769

Cir.l

have already been discussed by courts

that

and Medtronic.^^ Therefore, these arguments do not

1998): Plaintiffs daughter, Bonita Irving,

was

killed in a single-car accident

Mazda MX-6. Plaintiff, Juliette Irving, alleged that the car's seat belts were
defectively designed and that Mazda failed to warn adequately of the risks of not utilizing the manual lap
belt. Mazda replied that the claim was both expressly and impliedly preempted. The court found that

while driving a 1990

FMVSS
^^

208 impliedly preempted plaintiffs

Tebbetts

Tebbetts,

v.

was

action.

Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345,346-347 (N.H. 1995): Plaintiffs daughter, Rebecca

fatally injured

while driving a 1988 Ford Escort.

Plaintiff, Jo-

Ann

Tebbetts alleged that the

was defectively designed for that it did not contain a driver-side airbag. Ford argued that plaintiffs
claim was preempted by the Traffic Safety Act and FMVSS 208; Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E. 2d
327,330,339 (Ind. 1995): The estate of automobile driver who died in automobile accident brought
car

negligence action against the vehicle manufacturer based on the manufacturer's failure to
airbag;

Munroe

install

an

General Motors Corp., 938 P.2d 1114,1120 (Ariz. 1997): While driving a 1990

v.

Chevrolet Corsica,

Kenneth Munroe, collided with another vehicle and was rendered

plaintiff,

quadriplegic. Plaintiff contended that General Motors

was

failed to equip the car with a supplemental

driver side airbag. General Motors raised the preemption defense; Drattel v. Toyota

N.Y.S.2d 535,537-538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997):

A

motorist

who was

Motor Corp., 662

injured in an automobile accident

sued the manufacturer, alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed

in that it was not equipped with
(Ohio
Inc.,
684
N.E.
2d
648,662
v.
Honda
of
Am.,
1997): Executor of estate
Minton
a driver side airbag;
collision
brought
a
products
liability
action against the
head-on
of motorist who was killed in a
vehicle
was
defectively
designed
that
the
because it did not
manufacturer (Honda). The plaintiff alleged

contain an airbag.

^^ Zimmermann

v.

Volkswagen of Am.,

Inc.

920 P.2d 67,72 (Idaho 1996) (Failure

to include lap belt

General Motors Corp., 702 So. 2d 428,433-444 (Miss. 1997) (Failure to
claim); Celucci v. General Motors Corp., 706 A.2d 806,811-812 (Pa. 1998) (Failure to

claim);

Cooper

v.

install

airbag

install

airbag

claim).

^9

See supra,

at pp.

132; see.

e.g.,

Harris v. Ford Mortor Co.,

1

10 F.3d 1410,1412 and note 3

(9*^ Cir.

1997) (focusing on the uniformity argument); id. at 1413 (stating that the language of § 30103 (b)
preempts state common law claims); Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V. 112 F.3d 291,298 (7* Cir.
1997) (holding that uniformity was Congress' an essential goal that would be frustrated if state common

law claims were not preempted;
state

common

law

liability).

id. at

297 (arguing

that §

30103

(b) has to be interpreted as to

encompass
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we now

need to be repeated. Instead,

Supreme Court

focus on

how

the courts applied the leading U.S.

cases.

Controversy about the similarities of the preemption clauses in

(a)

CiPOLLONE AND MEDTRONIC TO § 30103

One

(B)

OF THE TRAFFIC SAFETY ACT

important argument of courts finding preemption

is

that the

preemption

clause of the Traffic Safety Act (§ 30103 (b)) uses language similar to the one used in
the preemption clause of the Public Health Cigarette
at issue

in

preempted,

is

argued that the Traffic Safety Act must have the same

1969 Act provided

in its

be imposed under

agencies but also state
enforce duties that

Co.

^54

preemption clause
law...".65i

state

preemptive scope of the

The

1

1969 Act some of plaintiffs claims were

Cipollone. Since under the
it

Smoking Act of 969, which was

£ire

"[N]o requirement or prohibition.

Supreme Court held

j^ Cipollone, the

this clause not

common

that

effect.^^o

.

y^e

.shall

that the

only encompasses enactments by legislatures or

law, because the "[ejssence of the

common law

[is]

to

either affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions."652

court in Gracia

v.

Volvo Europa Truck, N.

V.

^^^and Harris

v.

argued that the term "safety standard" used in § 30103 (b) of the

Ford Motor
traffic safety

Act's preemption clause carmot be distinguished from the terms "requirement or
prohibition" in the 1969 Cigarette Act. Therefore, the courts concluded that § 30103 (b)

common

also preempts state

law.^^s

Jq

reinforce this argument, the court in Harris

pointed to the dissenting opinion in Medtronic where

650 Gracia v.

Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.
(9*^ Cir.

1997).

v. Liggett

Group,

F.3d 1410,1414
651

Cipollone

Inc.,

1

it

was held

12 F.3d 291,297 (7* Cir. 1997); Harris

that

"[cjommon law

v.

Ford Mortor Co.,

1

10

v.

Ford Mortor Co.,

1

10

505 U.S. 504,504 (1992).

652 Id. at 522.

653

112F.3d291

654

llOF.Sd 1410

655 Gracia v.

(7"^ Cir.

1997).

(9"^ Cir.

1997).

Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.

F.3d 1410,1414

(9"^ Cir.

1997).

1

12 F.3d 291,297 (7* Cir. 1997); Harris
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damage

actions do impose requirements."^^^ This argument

finding that the

Supreme Court

is

consistent with the earlier

in Cipollone considered state

common law

as safety

"regulation".657

(B)

Finding preemption on the ground that Freightliner rejected

Cipollone
Another argument which courts finding preemption often provide
reluctant attitude of the

that the

in Cipollone

was

Supreme Court held

that

Supreme Court towards implied preemption

rejected three years later in Freightliner. In Freightliner, the

is

the court in Cipollone did not establish a rule but at best an inference that an express

preemption clause forecloses implied preemption.^^^ Therefore, the U.S. Court of

Appeals

in

Montag

Honda Motor

v.

Co.^^^ and in Irving

v.

Mazda Motor

Corp.^^^, did

not consider themselves to be bound by Cipollone and found implied preemption. The
Circuit Court in Gracia even cited Freightliner in order to support

its

finding of express

preemption.^^i However, the courts in Gracia and Irving, although citing Medtronic,

seem

to

have ignored that Medtronic confirmed the position taken by the United States

Supreme Court

in Cipollone. Accordingly, the decisions issued

by these Circuit Courts

should be disagreed with.

(V.)

Eventually,

even

it

can be concluded that the discussion of the preemption issue

after Cipollone, Freightliner,

656 Medtronic, Inc. v. lohr,
657

See supra,

Comment

1

and Medtronic,

still

highly controversial.

16 S.Ct. 2240,2262 (1996).

at 142.

658 Freightliner v. Myrick,

514 U.S. 280,288-290 (1995).

659 75 F.3d 1414,1417 (10* Cir. 1996).
660 136 F.3d 764,768 (1
661 Gracia v.

1*"

Cir. 1998).

Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.,

1

12 F.3d 291,294-295 (7* Cir. 1997).

To

is,

a
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certain extent this

is

due

to the fact that in these decisions the United States

how

Court failed to establish a clear standard on
the reason

why

was not able

the Court

preemption analysis

is

to handle this issue.

to provide a

However, part of

comprehensible framework for a

and Medtronic dealt with peculiar and complex

that Freightliner

which limited the establishment of clear guidelines. Congress, on the other

fact patterns

make an end

hand, could

to this controversy

by

However, Congress has not attempted

legislation.

Supreme

clearly

stating

its

intent

to resolve this issue. Instead,

in

the

it

has

enacted statutes containing "preemption clauses" that tend to reflect an intent to preempt

and "savings clauses" that tend

to reflect

One reason

for this congressional

That

was probably

is,

it

preemption issue than
as such a clarification

ambivalence

easier to pass

is

may be found

in the political

domain.

the issue been clearly resolved.

missing, the controversy on

how

As long

to interpret federal statutes

among

containing preemption and savings clauses will continue

(VI.)

liability.

legislation without directly resolving the

would have been had

it

common law

an intent to preserve

federal

and

state courts.

Comparison to German product liability law: Non-existence of
A PREEMPTION ISSUE

In

German law

72, 74 sec.

I,

Nr.

the fact that there

1

the area of private law that includes tort law

GG,

is

solely regulated

3.

in the

according to Art.

by the federal government. This

only one nationwide applicable

preemption does not exist

is,

tort law.

German law of product

is

reflected in

Consequently, the issue of

liability.

The effects of compliance and noncompliance with federal
safety standards

As we have

seen, the issue of

what

effects the

compliance with federal safety standards has regarding

law

arises only if state tort

law

is

motor vehicle manufacturer's

its liability

not preempted by federal law.

under

state

common
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a)

The
first

time

in

issue in question

1

892

in

Compliance: The old common law
was addressed by

Grand Truck Railroad

Co.

the United States
v.

Supreme Court

for the

Ives^^^. In this case, safety regulations

prescribing the nature and placement of precautionary measures, such as crossing
signals and flagmen,

were imposed upon a railroad company. The issue was whether,

company could be held

case of an injury, the

although

liable

in

under a negligence standard,

complied with the safety regulations. The Supreme Court held that

it

regardless of such compliance,

common law

dictates that

"everyone must so conduct

himself. ..as that... he will not injure another, in any way."^^^ Thus, compliance with
safety standards did not

mean

that the defendant automatically

which would immunize him from

met

the duty of care

under a negligence standard. The Supreme

liability

Court's approach in Ives has been adopted by the majority of American courts,^^

mostly arguing that the defendant's standard of due care has to be established by the
characteristics of the particular case

and not by compliance with safety standards. ^^^

In contrast, a minority view^^^ considered statutory compliance to

defendant from

liability.

However, the court

neither cited to sources for

its

Shramek

v.

Hujp^'^ supporting this view,

holding nor provided sufficient reasoning for

and therefore the minority view must be

662 144 U.S.

in

immunize the

its

opinion,

rejected.

408 (1892).

663 /J. at 421.

664 Mitchell V. Hotel Berry Co., 171 N.E. 39 (Ohio Ct.

2d 850

(Pa. 1945); Southern Pac. R.R. Co.

v. Mitchell,

App. 1929); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.
292 P.2d 827 (Ariz. 1956).

665 Mitchell v. Hotel Berry Co., 171 N.E. 39,41 (Ohio Ct.

666

Shramek

v.

Huff, 280

N.W. 450,452 (Neb.

Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 Harv.
667

280 N.W. 450 (Neb. 1938).

App. 1929).

1938); see further, Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of
J.

on Legis. 175,186 note 53 (1989).
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Compliance: Today's common law rule: Evidence of compliance

B)

IS

admissible but not controlling

Today, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions^^^ holds that compliance with
product safety statutes and regulations

is

relevant and admissible, but not controlling,

evidence of a defendant's exercise of due care and product defectiveness.^^^ The
rationale for this rule

only as a

minimum

is

and regulations are considered

that statutes, ordinances,

floor of satisfactory behavior.^^^ Consequently, the judicial system

has to serve as an additional check, which allows
existence of which
dictated

even recognize

668 Sours V. General

FMVSS

may justify

it

to consider specific facts, the

the imposition of a higher standard of care than the one

by the regulation. However, a few courts give regulatory compliance

weight^'^^, or

to act

it

as conclusive evidence for non-negligence or non-

Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511,1517 (6*

216. ..was properly

Corp., 750 F.2d 418,421

left

substantial

Cir.

1983) ("GM's alleged compliance with

for the jurors to factor into the calculus..."); Shipp v. General

(5"^ Cir.

1985); Jackson

v.

Motors

Spagnola, 503 A.2d 944,949 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986)

("The introduction of [the federal automobile safety standard] into evidence was proper, although
compliance by Volkswagen with the standards is 'only a piece of the evidentiary puzzle' and does not
grant immunity from state liability."); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54,63 (N.M. 1995)

("Evidence of compliance with applicable regulations

Doyle

negligent...");

669

The same

v.

is relevant to whether the manufacturer was
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 S.E.2d 518,521 (Ga. 1997).

position has been taken in §

Restatement (Second) Of Torts,

30103

(e)

§ 4 (b) of the

Liability, and the majority of legal scholars, see,

e.g.,

of the Traffic Safety Act, § 288

C

of the

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Christopher Scott D'Angelo, Effect of Compliance

or Noncompliance with Applicable Governmental Product Safety Regulations on a Determination of
Product Defect, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 453,454 (1995); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and

Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance between the Two, 30 U. Mich.

Nader

&

Page, supra note 395, at 459; Ashley

Standards: Is

it

enough

to

W. Warren, Compliance

immunize a Defendant from Tort

Liability ?,

J.

L.

Ref 431,460

(1997);

with Governmental Regulatory

49 Baylor L. Rev. 763,766, 772

and 816 (1997).
670 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Mitchell,

292 P.2d, 827,832-833

814 F.2d 1481,1487 (10* Cir. 1987); Plenger

Feldman

v.

ALZA

(Ariz. 1956);

Smith

v. Atlantic

Richfield Co.,

Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 811,819 note 7 (1992);

Lederie Laboratories, 625 A.2d 1066,1070 (1993); see also,

Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., §
671 Miller v.

v.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

4, cmt. e, at 141.

Lee Apparel Co., Inc., 881 P.2d 576 (Kan. App. 1994); Sims
932 S.W.2d 559,565 (Tex. App. 1995).

v.

Washex Machinery

Corp.,
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defectiveness.^''^

^

similar point of

view has been taken by a minority of

states that

have enacted statutes establishing a rebuttable presumption that the product
defective or in an unreasonably dangerous condition.

c)

is

^'^^

Compliance: Arguments against common law liability when

THERE

IS

COMPLIANCE

Although the majority of courts and secondary authority (Restatements,
scholars) reject compliance as a complete defense to tort liability, the

manufacturer as defendant in a products

liability suit

To

court of the opposite in order not to be held liable.
six

arguments which will subsequently be analyzed:

might

still

try to

(1) that statutory

development and marketing of new

With the

first

argument,

reduce the costs arising out of

it

would

from engaging

is

not needed, (4)

products.^'''*

it is

alleged that a statutory compliance defense

tort litigation,

in undesired behavior.

would be spent on

lawsuits.^'^^

6^2 Jones V. Hitle Services, Inc.
(5*^ Cir.

compliance as a

create incentives for the

would

because such a defense would create an

incentive for manufacturers to adhere to regulations deterring

costs

convince the

of jurors the agency's experts should regulate industry conduct, (5) that

a need for uniformity and, finally (6) that

is

motor vehicle

prevents the tort

it

system from "getting out of control", (3) that an extra judicial check

there

legal

reach this goal he could present

defense leads to a reduction of costs spent on lawsuits, (2) that

that instead

not

Thus, fewer

trials

them

at the

would take

place,

same time
and fewer

Against this argument one can object that a plaintiff

549 P.2d 1383,1390 (Kan. 1976); Lorenz v. Celotex Corp., 896 F.2d 148
(5"^ Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. 863 P.2d 167,176

1990), reh'g denied, 901 F.2d 1110

(Cal. 1993).
^^^ Kansas,

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304

(a), (c)

(1994) (presumption that compliance with regulatory

standards illustrates non-defectiveness of product); Tennessee, TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 29-28-104 (1980

&

Supp. 1995) (Rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness of product and of defendant's exercise of due
care); Colorado,

COLO. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403

674 Warren, supra note 669, at 798-806.
675 Id. at 798.

(1) (b)

(1989

& Supp.

1996) (same).
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will only

be dissuaded from

complied with

filing suit if

because he only gets to

know

Furthermore, even

trials

as a defense,

it

if

may

fewer

these facts

may

in

A

the discovery

trial

phase

would have an economic incentive

to screen cases

not be filed in the

litigation costs.

many phases

On

Thus,

first place.

it

is

the other hand,

make

it

more

it

may

difficult

working on a contingent fee

for plaintiffs to ultimately prevail. Plaintiffs attorneys

would reduce

suit.^'^

high amount of judicial resources are spent in pretrial

not be neglected that recognizing the compliance defense would

won will

phase of the

only one of

is

matters, hearings, motions, including the discovery period.^''"'

likely to be

defendant

take place if regulatory compliance were adopted

not be neglected that the

through which a lawsuit passes.

that, that the

Generally, the plaintiff lacks this knowledge,

safety standards.

all

he knows prior to

more

carefully.

Cases that are not

A decrease in the amount of litigation

true that a recognition of compliance as a

defense will save judicial expenses.^"^*

The second argument

that a statutory

system from "getting out of control"

is

compliance defense prevents the

based on the allegation that awards in

have reached astronomical amounts which sometimes lead
results that could

more important

676

tort liability

sources, such as an increased

awards find

number of

tort suits

to unjust compensation^''^,

be avoided by adopting such a defense. However,

overlooks the fact that increases in

tort

this

argument

their origin in several other,

injured persons and injuries,

m

677/^.
678

However, the question remains whether a reduction of claims pursuing a decrease in litigation costs is
desirable. On the one hand, one could argue that this would relieve courts from being overwhelmed by a
large amount of actions. Efficiency and care for the single case would increase. On the other hand,
potential

would, as a practical matter, be deprived

plaintiffs

in

their

right

to

file

suit

against

make as much profit as they would were the
However, whether the number of claims should be reduced should

manufacturers. Furthermore, plaintiff attorneys would not

compliance defense not recognized.

primarily be a matter of procedural or "formal" law

minimum amounts
679 Michael

J.

And Why Not

Saks,

?,

(e.g.

introduction of statutes of limitation or

to file an action) rather than of substantial law.

Do We

Really

140 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1

Know

Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System

147,1241 (1992).

-

.
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more expensive

costs. ^^^

and higher medical

losses,

Moreover,

it

must be stressed

that a

decrease of jury awards to plaintiffs could be achieved more efficiently by other means,

such as inventing

maximum

caps on damages for pain and suffering^^' and on punitive

damages,^^^ rather than introducing statutory compliance as a defense. Because of
the second argument

With regard

this,

not compelling.

is

an extra judicial check

to the statement that

is

superfluous

when

a

manufacturer has already complied with regulatory safety standards, the following
aspects have to be taken into consideration. Safety standards in the motor vehicle area

by a governmental agency, the

are issued

NHTSA.

This kind of agency, however,

may

be influenced by interest groups, such as an automobile lobby group, or be subject to
political

independence from any
fairness,

to

avoid that the law

fourth argument goes in the

that lay jurors

system,

judicial

whose

political or industrial pressure, is

and public safety and

The

a

Therefore,

pressure.^83

same

is

characteristic

needed

made by

is

to ensure justice,

interest groups.

direction as the third one

^^'^

by contending

do not have the capability of assessing complex technical information

short period of time, while the regulatory agency's experts

its

in a

do have the necessary

^80 Warren, supra note 669, at 801
^^^

The appropriateness and

Taylor Machine Works,

legality

179

111.

of introducing

2d 367

noneconomic damages (compensation

(111.

for pain

this

kind of caps

is

controversial, see, e.g., Best v.

1997) (holding that legislatively imposed caps on

and suffering) are unconstitutional under

constitution because they confer exclusive privilege

Illinois's

on a specific group of people (business, doctors).

^^2 Also the introduction of caps

on punitive damages is subject to controversy, see, e.g., Henderson v.
878
627
2d
(Ala. 1993) (holding that a statute imposing a flat cap of $ 250,000
So.
Alabama Power Co.,
on punitive damages was unconstitutional because it violated plaintiffs right to a jury trial); Robert L.
Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 1,30 (1997) ("[c]aps are debatable").
^*3

The following example demonstrates

In

1971, representatives of the automobile industry secretly met with President Richard

wanting him

to stop the efforts

the seriousness of this statement:

made by

the

NHTSA

M. Nixon

to oblige manufacturers to install airbags in their

James S. Kunen, Reckless Disregard: Corporate Greed, Government Indifference, and the
Kentucky School Bus Crash 150-154 (1994) for a reprint of the National Archives official transcript, Part
of a Conversation Among President Nixon, Lido Anthony lacocca, Henry Ford II, and John D.
Ehrlichmann in the Oval Office, Arp. 27, 1971, The Nixon Project, National Archives, Washington D.C.;
vehicles; see,

see also, Nader &. Page, supra note 395, at 435.
^^'^

Warren, supra note 669,

at

804.
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scientific

education.

appropriate should be

Therefore,
left to

of whether a safety

assessment

the

them.^^^ In objection to this argument,

in cases involving technical questions,

evidence

it

standard

must be said

presented by expert witnesses

is

is

that

who

provide scientific explanations so that the ordinary person can understand the facts of
the case. Accordingly, the jurors as well as the judges,

laymen

who

are generally regarded as

the scientific field, will get the necessary information.

in

However,

it

is

questionable whether jurors will be able to understand evidence presented by expert
witnesses. In comparison to experts working for administrative agencies

most jurors

will not

have the educational background to grasp in every

{e.g.

NHTSA)

detail scientific

issues that require ftindamental technological knowledge, skills, or experience (e.g.

aviation or automobile product liability cases). Consequently, a jury will not be able to

assess

complex

experts of governmental agencies

whereas a jury

may

agency experts.

scientific fact patterns as well as

may be

is politically neutral^^^.

On

the other hand,

influenced by political or industrial groups^*^,

Accordingly, governmental safety regulations

not reflect the optimal level of safety. Therefore, the assessment of whether such a

regulation

is

appropriate should ultimately be

With the
contribute to

fifth

argument

it is

more uniformity and

common law does sometimes

left to

the jury and the judge.

alleged that a regulatory compliance defense

would

of the law.^^s Admittedly,

under

clarity

lead to inconsistent outcomes,

liability

which could be avoided by

introducing the compliance defense on a federal or at least a state level. However, the
price for this increase in consistency

685

jd

at

would have

to

be paid for by society, as public

804-805.

David A. Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 50 Food & Drug L.J.
that "Over the past two years six FDA field staff have been offered bribes for
special treatment. The products involved ranged from spices and seafood to surgical instruments and
foodstuffs. There were six attempted bribes,... one attempt on the West Coast, and five an the East

686 5gg

gg

327,327 (1995) (stating

Cost.").

687 Warren, supra note 669, at 805.
688 jj_
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health and safety

would be jeopardized^^^ because

plaintiffs

would no longer be able

to

successfully challenge the appropriateness of regulatory safety standards, a price which
is

much

too high. Consequently, this leads to a rejection of the fifth argument.

The

argument centers on the allegation

final

confident in creating them if they

has

not

liability. ^^^

been

manufacturers

recognized

still

compliance defense

and marketing new products, because manufacturers will be more

will help developing

immunized from

that a statutory

know that when meeting

However,
by

the

until this day, the regulatory

majority

of jurisdictions

continue to develop and market

achieving higher profits

incentive

is

safety standards they will be

enough

new

compliance defense
and,

nevertheless,

products, because the goal of

for them.^^i Thus, this

argument also

is

not

compelling.

D)

The

presentation of the foregoing arguments leads this author to the conclusion

that the current

safety

Act

Compliance: Comment

(§

common

30103

(Third) of Torts,

is

law majority opinion, which

(e)),

the better view. That

establish higher standards

minimum

m

690 Id. at 806.
691 Id.

NHTSA

and the Restatement

compliance with federal regulatory

should be admissible but not conclusive

the basis for this conclusion

requirements.

Thus,

it

is

up

is that

those

to the state courts to

by taking into consideration the particular

under a reasonable person standard.

689

that

is,

The main argument which provides

safety standards are only

also reflected in the Traffic

the Restatement (Second) of Torts,

motor vehicle standards issued by the
evidence.

is

facts

of each case
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E)

After having

we now

standards,

discussed

the

A^ONCOMPLIANCE
of compliance with federal

effects

regulatory

turn to the consequences resulting out of noncompliance with those

requirements. In the leading case dealing with noncompliance with such standards,

Martin

v.

Herzog,^^^ Judge Cardozo concluded that the unexcused violation of statutory

safety standards

is

more than mere evidence of negligence,

"negligence per se".^^^ Today, the majority of

courts^^"* still

it

negligence in

is

itself,

or

holds that such a violation

constitutes negligence per se or causes products to be defective as a matter of

law

in

cases involving design or failure to warn defects. Other courts consider noncompliance
as evidence of negligence or product defectiveness^^^ or give

However,

like in

constitute proof

Martin

presumptive

effect^^^.

Herzog, most courts recognize that noncompliance does not

of negligence when the violation of the safety standard

The same

justified.^9''

v.

it

is

excused or

position has been taken in §§ 288 A^^^ and 288 B^^^ of the

692

126N.E. 814(N.Y. 1920).

693

M

814-815.

at

694

Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,431 (1958); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler,
276 F.2d 455,461 (4*^ Cir. 1960); Wells v. City of Vancouver, 467 P.2d 292,295 (Wash. 1970); Hamed v.
Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 12-13 (Alaska 1983).
695 Fidelity

&

Valdastri, Ltd.,

Cas. Co. of N.Y.

v. J.A.

Jones Constr. Co., 325 F.2d 605,612 (8* Cir. 1963); Michel

575 P.2d 1299,1301 (Haw. 1978); Fox

v.

Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774,784

v.

(lO"" Cir.

1978).
696 Stonehocker v. General

Ramirez

v.

Plough,

697 See, e.g.,
Inc.,

698

§

Inc.,

Bamum

v.

Motors Corp., 578 F.2d 151 (4*

A

1978) (applying South Carolina law);

Williams, 504 P.2d 122,126 (Or. 1972); Klauseck

393 N.W. 2d 356,360 (Mich. 1986); Witham

288

Cir.

863 P.2d 167,172 (Cal. 1993).

v.

Norfolk

& W.Ry., 561

reads:

Excused Violations
(2)... violation is

excused when

(a) the violation is

(b)

reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;

he neither knows or should

know of the

occasion for compliance;

(c)

he

is

unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;

(d)

he

is

confronted with an emergency not due to his

(e)

compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.

699 §

288

B

reads:

own

v.

Anderson Sales

&

Serv.,

N.E. 2d 484,485 (Ind. 1990).

misconduct;
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Restatement (Second) of Torts. In contrast, § 4
standard

that

is

sHghtly

from the

different

(a)

of the Third Restatement appHes a

common

Restatement. Under this section, noncompliance with safety standards
render the product defective, but an excuse for this wrongful behavior

Because of this,

§

4

(a)

has been subject to criticism. "^0°

new Restatement

the "excused violation," the

by
4

common

(a)

law.'^^i

However,

this

It is

argument has to be

sees that a product does not
ability to

postpone the sale

noncompliance of the

until

at

and the

The

liability.

least

rule set forth in §

peculiarity in

should know, about

marketing of his products. Therefore,

to the

meet the

not recognized.

argued that in eliminating

rejected,

manufacturer usually knows, or

mandatory safety requirements prior

is

considered to

is

ignores the limits set to negligence per se

should be considered appropriate in the area of product

this field is that the

Second

law rule and the

statutory or regulatory standards, he

compliance

is

still

if

he

has the

achieved.'^^ Consequently, an excuse for

sort that exists in negligence actions generally is not appropriate

in product liability actions. Therefore, §

4

(a)

of the

approved and should be adopted by the courts

new Restatement

has to be entirely

in cases involving safety standards

governing product designs or instructions or warnings.

Effect of Violation
(1)

The unexcused

by the court
^00

violation of the legislative enactment or an administrative regulation

as defining the standrad of conduct of a reasonable

D'Angelo, supra note 669,

at

man,

is

neglignece

which

is

adopted

in itself

471-474.

701 Id. at 472.
"^02

test

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 4, cmt. d, at 140. Example: In the
phase prior to marketing the new "Model T' manufactured by X does not meet mandatory crash test

standards for side impact collisions. Nevertheless

divergence between the mandatory crash

test

is

the sale of the cars authorized by

standards and the actual achieved results

is

X

because the

"marginal".

X

comply with mandatory safety standards prior to sale. He could have postponed the
delivery of the cars until full compliance was achieved. His failure to do so constitutes negligence and
renders the vehicle defective. He is not excused because the divergence was only "marginal".

knew

that he did not
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E.

Warning and instruction defects

1.

Definition

Besides the possibility of being held liable for manufacturing or design defects,
the

motor vehicle manufacturer may also be subject

provide adequate instructions or warnings to

its

to liability because

consumer about the

failed to

vehicles at the time of sale J^'^ Although

closely related, instructions and warnings are not the same.
the

it

Whereas

instructions inform

safe use of the product,'''^ warnings call attention to the

existence and nature of risks involved in the use of a product so that consumers are able
to avoid

harm

either

Accordingly, even

by behaving appropriately or by choosing not

if the

motor vehicle functions perfectly and

defects in manufacture or design,

it

may

still

be considered to be

to use the product.^^^

is

completely free of

defective.''^^ In these

cases, the defect is the manufacturer's failure to provide the necessary information^^^

^^^ Today, the automobile manufacturer's duty to instruct

and warn is widely recognized, see, e.g.,
424
(Two
people were killed and two others were
Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Co.,
N.E. 2d 568 (1981)
injured in the rollover of a Jeep CJ-7 while they were driving an off-road recreational area. The court
held that the manufacturer could be liable for failing to warn that the Jeep does not provide occupant

Motor Co., 322 N.W. 2d 898
(Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (Plaintiffs decedent sustained fatal injuries when he was stuck between a 1975
Ford pickup truck and a building. The plaintiff contended that the truck's transmission had shifted from
safety in the event of a forward pitch-over accident.); LaCoste v. Ford

park to reverse after the decedent got off the truck with the engine running. The plaintiff prevailed

because the transmission design was defective and the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the truck's

known tendency
"^^

to

behave

in this way.).

Hiigel V. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975) (stating that instructions refer to the

proper use of the vehicle);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

LIABILITY, P.F.D., § 2, cmt

i,

at

31.
^^5 Hiigel V. General

Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975) (holding that the manufacturer must not
only provide instructions regarding the proper use of the vehicle but must also alert the user to the
dangers involved

in its use);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

at31.
706

MILLER, supra note 412, § 7.05 [5],

at

148-149.

LIABILITY, P.F.D., § 2, cmt

i,

160

The manufacturer's duty

to

warn of dangers

at the time the vehicle

be distinguished from his post-sale duty to wam'^o^. Whereas the

when

the time of manufacture and sale, the latter duty arises

aware of a dangerous condition of its vehicles subsequent

2.

sold has to

duty arises only

the manufacturer

to the time at

placed on the market.''09 Furthermore, a difference must be

duty to warn and the manufacturer's duty to recall

first

is

at

becomes

which they were

made between

the post-sale

^'^its vehicles.

Extent of duty to instruct and / or warn at time of sale

The automobile manufacturer's duty

instruct

to

or

warn extends

to

the

purchasers of its vehicles as well as to other foreseeable users7" However, the scope of

duty to warn

its

not unlimited since the majority of jurisdictions takes the position

is

that a manufacturer's duty to

have been known

warn encompasses only

to

dangers associated with the intended use of the product but

also to misuses if the manufacturer
misuse'^i^. In order to

is

aware of a tendency towards

on

'^^^

See

^09

Miller, supra note 412, § 7.05[5],

"^^^

See

711

Miller,

harm

arising out of the accident, the

infra, at 163.

at 155.

infra, at 165.

5w/?ra note 412, § 7.05[5], at 148-149.

712 Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d

271,279 (Ariz.

Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991); Olson

(The court refuses

LaCoste
(111.

v.

to

v.

App. 1978); Anderson v. Owens-Coming
Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284,289 (Iowa 1994)
warn of unknowable dangers).

Ct.

Prosoco,

impose a duty upon manufacturers

to

Ford Motor Co., supra note 703; Mazikoske

v.

Firestone Tire

&

Rubber Co., 500 N.E.2d

1986) (Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to mount a 16-inch tire on a 16.5-inch wheel.
exploded and the plaintiff contended that the defendants were negligent in failing to warn of the

dangers involved

when

of

several factors such as the likelihood that an

accident will occur, the type and severity of

tire

this type

determine which type and extent of warning must be provided in

particular circumstances depends

622
The

were known or should

to a reasonable person.'''^ Nevertheless, the manufacturer's duty to

warn not only extends

713

risks that

in

such a mismatch. The court held that the defendants had the alleged duty to warn

the existence of a

mismatch would not be obvious

to users.).
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manufacturer's burden to provide a warning, and the nature of the product

When

applying these factors to motor vehicles,

by

vehicles,

reach the following result: motor

their very nature, provide a high potential

make them completely
involved in

we

of danger.

It is

not possible to

safe for their occupants nor for other road-users that

traffic accidents (e.g.,

itself."''

might be

pedestrians). Moreover, there is always a certain

likelihood that an accident might occur due to several circumstances (driver's failure,

other road-user's failure; defect in vehicle, bad road conditions,
accident, property

damage, bodily injury or even death are

etc.).

In case of an

likely to occur.

On

the other

hand, the manufacturer can, at the time of sale of its vehicles, easily provide information

necessary for the consumer in order to avoid some of the risks
sticker that a passenger-side airbag should be disengaged

series

in

which they provide

this

transporting

little

kind of information. Although a whole product

of hundreds of thousands of vehicles has to be equipped with such precautionary

features, they are available at relatively

the burden of
is

when

provision of a

Indeed, automobile manufacturers regularly equip their cars with driver

children).

manuals

(e.g.,

low costs and bring a high

motor vehicle manufacturers

benefit. Therefore,

to provide adequate instructions or

warnings

relatively low.

3.

Burden of proof and causation

In order to successfully sue a manufacturer, the plaintiff must

show

that the

defendant provided an inadequate warning which rendered the vehicle defective. Like in
design defect cases, the plaintiff has to provide evidence that a reasonable alternative

warning was available which would have reduced the risk of harm.'^^ Furthermore, he

'i'*

Hiigel V. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Cover

v.

Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y.

1984).
^15 Jugle V.

Volkswagen of Am.,

OF Torts: Products Liability,

Inc.,

975 F.Supp. 576,582 (D. Vermont 1997); RESTATEMENT (Third)

P.F.D., § 2 (c); in contrast to a claim based on design defectiveness, the

provision of evidence for a reasonable alternative warning (or instruction)

is

generally easy since

no

162

must show by a preponderance of the evidence

that the manufacturer's failure to provide

such a warning was the proximate cause of the injury.^'^ Accordingly, the manufacturer
cannot be held liable
generally

known

to

when

the danger involved in the use of the vehicle

the user7'^ Furthermore, the plaintiff

manufacturer had given an adequate warning,
like

in

German

law,^!^

plaintiffs

is

must prove

obvious or
that

if the

would have been followed.^ '^ However,

it

burden of proof

is

eased with regard to this

requirement since the courts have established a presumption that

adequate warnings

if

had been given they would have been foilowed.^^o Consequently, the burden of proof
defendant

shifts to the

who now

an appropriate warning had

it

has to prove that the plaintiff would not have followed

been given.

technical issues are involved {e.g., the plaintiff can simply allege that a sticker warning of the danger of

transporting children on the airbag-equipped passenger seat should have contained a "read warning sign"
instead of words); accordingly, plaintiffs will be able to financially afford bringing a failure to

claim; thus, the argument

made

in

warn

context with design defects that financially small actions will be

eliminated does not apply here.
716 See,

Conti

e.g.,

v.

Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d

applying Permsylvania law (Plaintiffs husband

Cir. 1984), cert, denied,

who had been

470 U.S. 1028 (1985),

driving standard transmission automobiles

more than 25 years started turned the ignition key of a 1980 Ford Mustang while the car was in gear.
The car lurched backwards and plaintiff, who wanted to enter the car, lost her balance and fell. The
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer was liable for failing to provide an adequate warning of the danger
of starting a standard transmission car while in gear. The court held that there was no evidence that the
driver would have paid greater attention when starting the car even if supplementary warnings were
contained in the operator's manual or on a sticker located in the interior of the car.); Jugle v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 576,582 (D. Vermont 1997).
for

^'^ Claytor v. General

Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982) (stating that it is common knowledge among
mechanics that the application of excessive force can cause serious injuries); Baughmann v. General
Motors Corp., 627

F.

Supp. 871 (D. S.C. 1985), affd 780 F.2d 1131

(4'" Cir.

1985), applying South

warn of the danger of explosive separation
Carolina law
was
experienced
an
tire repairman who was familiar with
of multi-piece truck rims when the plaintiff
relevant safety procedures for mounting wheel and rim assemblies); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735
S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that there is not duty to warn of the risk of driving intoxicated
(holding that a truck manufacturer has

because there

is

a general awareness of this risk);

no duty

Crow

v.

to

Manitex,

Inc.,

550 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa

Ct.

App.

Mazda Motor
duty to warn... when

1996); Payne v. Quality Nozzle Co., 643 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Brand v.
Corp., 978 F.Supp. 1382,1389 (D. Kansas 1997) ("Kansas law does not recognize a
the user
^'8

akeady knows of the danger.").

Miller, supra note 412, § 7.05[5],

^^^ See, Chapter

720

Menard

v.

I,

at 154.

supra, at 62.

Newhall, 373 A.2d 505,507 (1977); Wolfe

v.

Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass.

1982); Jugle v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 576,582 (D.

Vermont

1997).
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4.

Post-sale duty to warn

The foregoing explanations

with the manufacturer's duty to provide

dealt

adequate instructions and warnings at the time of sale of his products. However, once
vehicles have been put on the market, they might develop dangers which were not

discoverable at the time of their manufacture

or airbags might explode without impact

anti-lock braking systems might

{e.g.

etc.).

fail

In this situation the question arises

whether the manufacturer also has a duty to warn of dangers

in the vehicle

subsequent

to its putting in the stream

of commerce, for a violation of which he could be held

(post-sale duty to warn).

The

liable

The

courts provide different answers to this question.

majority of jurisdictions'^^! holds that the manufacturer has a continuing post-sale duty

warn under

to

particular circumstances. Other courts,^^^ however, reject the imposition

of such a duty when the product was not defective
courts''23

is

sale.

Still

other

argue in favor of the existence of a post-sale duty to warn but outline that there

no duty

risk

time of

at the

inform about safety advancements in the product which would reduce the

to

of danger. The jurisdictions recognizing a post-sale duty to warn make clear that a

decision on this issue has to be taken on a case-by-case

basis.'^24

xhey

limit the

^^' See, e.g.

Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959) (The plaintiff was struck
by a 1953 Buick Roadmaster equipped with power brakes. He introduced evidence that demonstrated that
shortly after the introduction of the 1953 Buick model difficuhies occurred with the power brake system,
resulting in sudden brake failures.
kits.

However,

it

The defendant manufacturer furnished

imposed a duty on the manufacturer

to take all reasonable

means

warnings directly to the

to issue

purchasers of 1953 Buicks as soon as the defect was discovered.); Hamilton
Cir. 1985),

Buick dealers with repair

all

never issued a warning to the Buick owners. The court held that the facts of the case
Smith, 773 F.2d 461 (2d

v.

applying Connecticut law (the court held that the manufacturer of a press brake has a duty to

a degree of care, both during and after the sale, that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have taken under similar circumstances); Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826,832
(Minn. 1988); Crowston v. Goodyear Tire &. Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,406-410 (N.D. 1994).

employ

^22 Arkwright Boston- Mfrs. Mut. ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,

844 F.2d

11 74, 11

85 (5*

Cir.

Cir. 1987); Romero
1988) (applying Texas law); Black v. Henry Pratt Co., 778 F.2d 1278
International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444 (10"^ Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law).
(7"^

^23

See, e.g., Williams v.

Monarch Machine Tool

Co., Inc.,

26 F.3d 228,232 (1"

Cir.

Massachusetts law).
'24

Crowston

v.

Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co., 521

N.W.2d 401,406-410 (N.D.

1994).

v.

1994) (applying
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imposition of such a duty to situations in where the likelihood of occurrence of injuries

outweighs the

difficulties a

manufacturer has to face in issuing post-sale warnings. "^-^ In

particular, they consider different factors

such as the extent of the risk of harm and the

communicating a warning

possibility of effectively

to the actual user

and ask whether a

reasonable manufacturer in a similar situation would have issued a warning. "^^^ Thus,

they apply a negligence standard which finds

its

basis in a risk-utility analysis applied to

a reasonable-person standard.

On

the other hand, the jurisdictions rejecting such a duty focus

arguments:

impose

first,

liability

since the product

was not

exist.^^?

Second, after the sale of the

vehicle the manufacturer does not any longer exercise control over
liable. ^^8 Finally,

is

it

different

defective at the time of sale, a rationale to

on the manufacturer does not

can no longer be held

on three

its

product so that he

argued that imposing such a duty would

place an unreasonable burden upon the manufacturers, since they would be required to
trace the

ownership of each product which

-

As mentioned

may

already have been sold years ago.''29

Comment

above, accidents involving motor vehicles are likely to occur and

frequently cause serious injuries. Accordingly, courts following the majority view will

hold that a motor vehicle manufacturer has a duty to warn consumers of dangers
discovered after the time of

"725

sale.

This result

is

achieved by

fairly

balancing the interests

Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826,832 (Minn. 1988); Crowston
& Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,406-410 (N.D. 1994).

v.

Goodyear

Tire
726

Cover

V.

Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864,872 (N.Y. 1984); Patton v. Hutchinson WilRich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,409 (N.D.

1299,1314-1315 (Kan. 1993); Crowston
1994); see also.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts: PRODUCTS

727 Carrozales v.

Rheem Mfg.

Co., 589 N.E.2d 569,579

(111.

Liability, P.F.D., § 10.

App.

Ct. 1991).

728 Arkwright Boston- Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,

1988) (applying Texas law).
729 Black V.

Henry

Pratt Co.,

778 F.2d 1278,1284 (7*

Cir. 1987);

844 F.2d

1

174,1 185 (5* Cir.
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of the consumers not to be exposed

of harm against the interests of the

to a high risk

manufacturer not to be subject to an unreasonable burden. Therefore, the majority view
has to be supported.
In contrast, the arguments of the minority opinion are not convincing. This view

overlooks that a vehicle does not need to be defective

time of sale in order to

at the

establish a post-sale duty to warn, but the imposition of such a duty

is

based on a

negligence standard taking into consideration what a reasonably prudent manufacturer

would have done. Therefore, the argument
control over the product
tracing the

is

owners of vehicles

in a

dangerous condition

which automobile model was

single owner,
is

and therefore a

risk

5.

is

of repair, replacement, or

its

over-exaggerated.

is

dealerships should

when doing

Knowing

document data when and

sold. True, they will not

of being held potentially

the price a manufacturer has to pay

A product recall

manufacturer does no longer have

not compelling. Finally, the manufacturer's difficulty in

of this difficulty the manufacturer and

whom

that the

to

be able to find every

liable remains.

However,

this

business.

Post-sale duty to recall

defined as "[njotification of a defect combined with an offer

refund.'''^^^

Thus,

it

differs

from a post-sale warning

in that the

manufacturer not only informs the consumer of the defect but also takes additional

measures

which

to repair or replace

it.

Whether a manufacturer has the duty

are in a dangerous condition after they have been sold

^^^ Jeffrey A.

Lamken, Note,

Efficient Accident Prevention

Recall Defective Products, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 103,104 (1989).

is

to recall vehicles

controversial.

As A Continuing Obligation: The Duty To
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Duty to recall under common law

a)

While some

jo not recognize a duty

courts'^^i

governmental regulation specifically establishes

to recall

unless a statute or

this duty, other jurisdictions''32 take the

opposite point of view in holding a manufacturer liable under a negligence standard for

breaching his duty to

recall.

Some of the arguments

provided by those courts refusing to recognize a duty to

we have

recall are similar to the

ones

duty to warn.

argued that a duty to recall would place an unreasonable burden

First,

it

is

heard in context with the rejection of a post-sale

upon manufacturers of tracking down each purchaser
recall. ^33

Second,

it

is

product.''^'*

manufacturer failed to

newly developed

^31

of a

being held that the manufacturer's responsibility to eliminate

dangers arising out of the product ends

owner of the

in order to give notice

Furthermore,

retrofit its

after the

when

time of

if

it

left its

liability

control and shifts towards the

was

established,

even

if

the

products with technological features that have been
sale, this

would discourage

the development of

new

&

Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129,134-135 (8* Cir. 1985) (holding that a duty to
recall is no logical extension of a duty to warn); Baker v. Firestone Tire &. Rubber Co., 793 F.2d
1196,1200 (11"^ Cir. 1986); Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln Plaza Associates, 548 A.2d 1276,1281 (Pa.
Super Ct. 1988); Romero v. International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444,1449-1450 (10* Cir. 1992)
(declining to impose a duty to recall or retrofit a product that was not negligently designed at time of
manufacture); Eschenburg v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 829 F.Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (declining
to extend a duty to warn to a duty to recall); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299
(Kan. 1993) (holding that there is no duty to recall or retrofit absent legislation); Gregory v. Cincinnatti,
Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995).
Smith

V.

Firestone Tire

^^^ Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 41

engine was aware that that

its

a crash leading to the lawsuit. The court held

manufacturer
condition

until after sale, the

came

1

F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969) (Manufacturer of airplane

engines were subject to failure due to defective design eight months prior

to the attention

that,

manufacturer had a duty to remedy the engines once their dangerous

of the manufacturer); Bell Helicopter Co.

(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (the court held that a duty to recall

Lunghi

V.

product was

defective);

Hernandez

v.

liability for

Lynch

734

M

retrofit

Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519
the manufacturer

campaign was independent of a finding

Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34

(stating that liability for failure to

733

v.

was appropriate where

Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a finding of negligence

based on a failure to conduct an appropriate

1994)

t

although the defect was not discovered by the

perform an adequate

retrofit

2d 732 (Cal.

defective design).

v.

McStome

& Lincohi Plaza Associates, 548 A.2d

that the

App.
campaign was independent of

Cal. Rptr.

1276,1281 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988).

Ct.
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technology 7^5 jn addition, courts argue that the resources of the judicial system are

NHTSA,

limited and that administrative agencies, such as the

are in a

much

better

position to weigh costs and benefits associated with recall and retrofitting programs.''^^

On

the other hand,

some of the

dangerous products focus on the severity of the harm

failure to appropriately recall

resulting
recall

from such a

defective

jurisdictions holding a manufacturer liable for a

failure (e.g. deaths

airplane

and severe

engine). "^^^

however,

Others,

manufacturer voluntarily conducts a recall campaign he
to

perform

it

intervening.^38

because

appropriately,

However,

this

kind of

he

was aware or could have been aware of the

is

reason

that

where

would-be

rescuers

Section

1 1

the

from

only imposed where the manufacturer

post-sale product danger.

"^^^

Duty to recall under the Restatement (Third) of Torts,

B)

failed to

subject to liability if he fails

other

deters

liability is

when manufacturer

injuries

§ 11

of the Third Restatement reflects the position taken by courts

generally rejecting a manufacturer's duty to recall.
to recall exists only in

two

governmental regulation, or

^'^ Id. (holding that there

is

cases: either

if the

no duty

when

It

such

states that

duty

this

liability for failure

required by statute or

is

manufacturer voluntarily conducts a recall campaign

to retrofit or inform users

Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn:

of ne safety improvements); see

Two Unfortunate Forks

in the

Road

to

also,

a Reasonable

Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 892,900-901 (1983).
736 Patton V. Hutchinson Wil-Rich

Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 12991316 (Kan. 1993).

737 Braniff Airways, Inc., v. Curtiss- Wright Corp., 41
738 Bell Helicopter Co., v.

"Once

the duty [to recall

1

F.2d 451,453 (2d Cir. 1969).

Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519,532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (The court stated that
and repair] was assumed. Bell had an obligation to complete the remedy by

using reasonable means available to

it...".);

Blossman Gas Co.

v.

Williams, 375 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. App.

1988) (The court held that because the defendant volunteered he was obliged to use reasonable care

in

the performance of the recall).
739 Lanclos v.

Rockwell

Int'I

Corp.,

470 So.2d 924,930

(La. Ct.

App. 1985) (Experts

manufacturer had knowledge that incorporation of available safety devices for

testified that the

wood

shapers

was

necessary); Braniff Airways, Inc., v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451,453 (2d Cir. 1969) (Airplane

engine manufacturer was aware of engine defect eight months prior to plane crash but did not take any
action. This fact

was

essential for the court to find negligence).
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and

in both cases fails to act as a reasonable

by a significant number of courts

rejects the position taken

failure to recall, also in the

c)

recall.

It

thereby

that establishs liability for

absence of a statutory requirement, since

unjustifiable burden {e.g. incalculable costs)

A

person in conducting the

this

would place an

on the manufacturer. '''*o

Comment

product recall due to a defective design of a particular automobile model

affects the

whole product

series, thus,

hundred thousands of cars. In addition

to the costs

of contacting the consumer the manufacturer will suffer financial loss in recovering and
repairing or replacing defective vehicle parts. '^'*' Consequently,

compared

warning campaign, the financial burden placed upon a manufacturer
higher

when conducting

Ghmshaw

v.

is

even much

a recall campaign. The costs in recalling a vehicle series

even be higher than the estimated costs
recall. In

to a post-sale

Ford Motor

may

for being held legally liable for a failure to

Co.,"^^^ for

example,

it

has been stated that the costs

of fixing defective fuel systems in Ford Pinto automobiles would have been $ 137
million. Ford estimated that

its liability

for 180

and 2,100 destroyed vehicles resulting from the

bum

deaths, 180 serious

bum

failure to recall the Pintos

injuries

would have

cost the entity only $ 49.5 million. Ford chose not to perform a recall campaign.
In

order to determine whether liability against a manufacturer should be

established, his burden to perform a post-sale warning or recall

weighed against the

Where

'''*o

risks

and probable

the manufacturer's burden

is

loss to

relatively

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

which potential

low

(e.g.

campiagn must be

plaintiffs are exposed.

$ 5,000) to save the

Liability, P.F.D., §11, cmt.

a, at

life

of a

244.

^^^

see, Balido v.

"^^^

174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981) (the court held that the decision to expose consumers to such a
harm was an unethical "cost-benefit analysis" balancing human lives against corporate

The manufacturer will generally execute repairs free of charge for the consumer,
Improved Machinery, Inc,. 105 Cal. Rptr. 890,901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).

serious risk of
profit.

Id

at

384.
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consumer,

compared

to

plaintiffs

Although the rescue of

favorable,

should be obvious that

action on the manufacturer's part.

between

liability

he

fails to

probable

established.

it

if

warn about the post-sale dangers or

However, where the manufacturer's burden

to recall the product.
billion)

be established

liability will

at

life

loss

(e.g.

life),

too high

liability

(e.g.

should

$

not

as the highest object of legal protection

some

point the cost

would be too high

The question which remains

is

this question,

where

A

and accpetance of manufacturer conduct.

formula cannot be applied to answer

is

because

to

strict

1

be
is

to justify

draw

the line

mathematical

could not take into

it

consideration every single aspect of an individual case. Instead, the assessment of

whether a manfacturer

on a case-by-case
manufacturer,
the

is liable

basis.

Given

for a violation

of his post-sale duties has

that a duty to recall

liability for failure to

(e.g.

be decided

imposes the highest burden on the

do so should only be established

consumer cannot be achieved by imposing

to

if the

protection of

other, less severe post-sale obligations

post-sale duty to warn). Thus, the duty to recall should be

imposed by courts only

as "ultima ratio".

However, as some courts correctly hold, motor vehicle manufacturers should not
be subject to

liability for failing to recall their vehicles in situations

where new safety

features have been developed after they have already been put in the stream of

commerce.

This

would place the

risk

new

of developing

technologies

on the

manufacturers and would indeed deter them from improving the safety of their vehicles,
a development which would go to the detriment of the consumer.

On

the other hand,

product recalls should not solely be the task of administrative agencies. With regard to

motor vehicles, the

NHTSA

is

empowered

to order manufacturers to recall

dangerous

vehicles. This serves the purpose of preventing the occurrence of harmftil events.

However, since the

NHTSA

influence, or, due to

have courts

its

that decide

is

a governmental agency

internal structure,

slow

it

might be subject

to react. Therefore,

on the manufacturer's duty

to recall

it

is

to political

necessary to

and the consequences of a

170
failure to exercise this duty.

Although, the judicial system will not be able to prevent the

occurrence of harmful events,

it

is still

able to provide compensation for the victims.

Thus, a combination of administrative prevention and judicial compensation

is

the best

solution to improve traffic safety.

This evaluation leads to the conclusion that the position taken by some
jurisdictions as reflected in §

common law duty to

recall

6.

1 1

of the third Restatement has to be rejected, and that a

should be imposed with the limitations set forth above.

Comparison to German product liability law

Both U.S. law and German law distinguish between the manufacturer's pre-sale
duty to instruct and warn and
liability for failing to

provide adequate information

law

significant that the

at the

in both countries applies the

warning would have been heeded by the consumer
majority

warn or

post-sale duty to

its

of jurisdictions

in

the

if

it

time of

National

Motor
recall

it

Highway

had been issued.

not exist

is

it

particularly

''•^^

Also, like the

standard.'''*^

Regarding the

can be noticed that administrative agencies in both countries (the
traffic Safety

Administration in the United States and the Federal
in

Germany) have

campaigns. However, in contrast to United States

whether a duty to

sale,

to the

United States, German law has established the

Agency (Karftfahrtbundesamt)

Traffic

With regard

presumption that an adequate

manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn under a negligence
issue of recalls,

recall.

recall

the

common

power

to initiate

law, a controversy

should be recognized in the absence of statutory regulation does

among German

courts. Nevertheless, the

same

factors that a

number of United

States courts take into consideration in their evaluation of recall duties are also being

"^^^

"^^

With regard
See, Chapter

to
I,

German
supra

law, see, Chapter

at pp. 54.

I,

supra

at 62.

1
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considered by

German

courts. '''^ Thus,

it

can be concluded that both laws are very

similar and only vary in details.

F.

Defenses

Besides the preemption and compliance

defenses,'''*^

raise several other defenses in order to escape liability.

limitation, statutes

manufacturers will try to

Among

those are statutes of

of repose, contributory negligence and comparative

fault,

product

misuse, and product alteration.

1.

Most

have adopted

states

Statutes of limitation

statutes

of limitation under which the plaintiff must

bring a products liability suit within a certain period of time, usually two or three years,
in order not to

be barred from bringing the claim. "7"*^ For the running of this time period

the majority of states has, either by statute or

common

law, established a discovery rule

under which the time limitation begins to run from the time
should have discovered either the product

^^^

See Chapter

'^^^

See supra, dX^^. 128.

''*''

See. e.g., ARIZ.

I,

supra

at

which the

plaintiff has or

defect'"*^ or the injury'''*^.

at pp. 58.

REV. STAT.

ANN

§ 12-542 (1991

Cum. Pocket

Part):

An

action for personal injury,

property damage, or wrongful death must be brought within twO years after the cause of action accrues;

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-106
property

damage have

to

(1) (1986): All actions for products liability for personal injury, death, or

be brought within two years

after the claim for relief arises;

(3):

A

^'^^

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (the limitation period generally runs

FLA. STAT. § 95.1

must be brought within four years or it is barred; Ga. CODE ANN. § 9-3-30,
9-3-31, 9-33-33: Negligence and strict liability actions must be brought within two years of the date of
accrual for bodily injury and within four years for property damage.
product

liability action

from the time the defect

is

discovered or should have been discovered);
^'^^

Murphy

v.

Spelts-Schultz

Lumber

Co., 481

N.W.2d 422 (Neb. 1992)

(the time limitation begins

when

the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered the existence of the injury or damage);

Miss.

Code Ann.

§ 15-1-49(2) (Supp. 1993) (the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has

discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury).
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2.

Based on the concept

Statutes of repose

that after a certain period

of time the defendant should no

longer be held responsible for harm resulting from the defective product, a number of
jurisdictions have enacted statutes of repose

product

liability action

which

act as

an absolute defense. '^^o jf ^

has not been brought within the time limit set forth in such a

statute, the plaintiff is barred

from

state to state,

some

jurisdictions the injury

from recovery. The terms of the different

and the period of repose ranges from five

must occur within the

statutes vary

to fifteen years.

While

in

statutory time limit, other states

require the filing of the lawsuit within that time. Thus, in contrast to statutes of
limitation, the discovery

3.

of the defect or injury by plaintiff is irrelevant.

Contributory negligence and comparative fault

Contributory negligence
is

defined as conduct on the part of the plaintiff, which

is

own

a contributing cause to his

Under

injuries.'^^i

was an absolute bar

plaintiffs contributory negligence

traditional

common

to recovery, since

it

law, a

was deemed

impermissible to permit recovery in cases where his misconduct partly caused the
injuries.'^^^

Even where

the plaintiff only slightly failed to exercise reasonable care,

As

recovery was not allowed.

a reaction to the harsh consequences resulting from this

almost every

"all-or nothing

approach,"''^^

^^^ See, e.g., ARIZ.

REV. STAT. § 12-551 (1956)

the date of fu-st sale);

the date of

Ga. Code

first sale); ILL.

filde within ten years

§ 51-1-1

REV. STAT.

of the date of

ch.

first

1

1

state

(the cause

has

now

of action must accrue within twelve years of

(b) (2) (1982) (the lawsuit
10, §

adopted some form of

must be

filed) within ten years

13-213 (b) (1984) (the products

sale to a

liability action

consumer, or within twelve years of the

non-consumer); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50 (1983) (the lawsuit must be

filed within six years

first

of

must be
sale to a

of the date of

first sale).
"751

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

752 Butterfield V. Forrester, 103

THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER §
75^

Prosser, supra note 415,

at

Liability, § 463.

Eng Rep 926 (KB

9.05, at

1809);

PAUL SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR

256 (1981, Supp. 1997).

568, note

1.
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comparative negligence. '5"* Under

products

own

each person involved

only in proportion to his or her share of

is liable

his

this concept,

liability action will

negligence

{e.g.

now

Some

states.

states

is,

it is

among

fault is treated differently

less than

which

fault concept,

is

can recover no matter

how

great his degree of fault

100 %. The amount of damages the plaintiff can recover

%

30 %, then he can recover 70

comparative fault a plaintiff is only able to recover
threshold percentage. In
if his fault is

some jurisdictions'^^?

i\^q

if his fault is greater

forms of modified comparative

if his share

of fault

plaintiff will

is

below a

is

than that of the defendant. These two

where both the

50 %. Under the former concept, "not as great as-

greater than approach," he will recover 50

Today, 46

certain

others,''58 xhe plaintiffs

approach," the plaintiff will be barred from recovery, whereas under the

S.2d 431,436

the

if

be barred from recovery

fault reach different results in cases

plaintiffs and the defendant's fault

is

of the damages. Under modified

equal or greater than the fault of the defendant. In

claim will only be barred

^^''

the

exists in about a

then reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to him; for example,
plaintiffs fault

in a

apply a pure comparative fault scheme, others chose to adopt a

jurisdictions,''^^ the plaintiff

provided

Consequently, the plaintiff

driving intoxicated, failure to wear seat belt) contributed to his

modified approach. '^^ Under a pure comparative

dozen

harmful event

generally be able to recover despite the fact that that

However, the concept of comparative

injury.

fault.

in a

"not

% of the damages.

states

have adopted the concept of comparative

(Fla.

1973); Li v. Yellow

Cab

latter,

Co., 532 P.2d

fault, see, e.g.,

Hoffmann

v.

Jones,

280

1226 (1975). The only exceptions are

Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia, see, e.g., Williams v. Delta
International Mach. Corp., 619 So.2d 1330 (Ala. 1993); see also. O. Stephen Montagnet, Assumption of
Risk in Mississippi: Eliminating the Confusion While Retaining the Defense - Independent of
Comparative Negligence Principles, 64 Miss.

L.J.

753,755 and note 14 (1995).

"^55

Prosser, supra note 415,

at

579, note 5; MILLER, supra note 412, § 32.01, at

756

Prosser, supra note 415,

at

579, note

''^''

See, e.g., Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska,

579 note
"^5*

Most

Illinois,

5.

3.

5.

and Tennessee,

see,

PROSSER, supra note 415,

at

B.

jurisdictions apply this kind of modified comparative fault concept, see, e.g., Connecticut,

Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, see, PROSSER, supra note 415,

at

579 note

5.
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Whether

negligence but also to

comparative
"fault"

strict liability is controversial.

fault to strict liability. "^^^

on the one hand, and

if

that the

jurisdictions chose to apply

semantic difference between

on the other hand,

however, focuses on the

courts,

were not applied

worse position than

They argue

Most

"strict liability or no-fault"

The main argument of these
fault principles

on

the comparative fauh system not only applies to actions based

fact that if

to strict liability, the plaintiff

he had sued in negligence, although

is

irrelevant.

comparative

would be placed

strict liability

in a

was imposed

to

protect the consumer. In negligence, plaintiffs fault only diminishes, but does not

completely bar his claim, whereas

when he

sues in

strict liability, his

assumption of risk

completely forecloses recovery. Since in some jurisdictions assumption of risk

merged

into comparative fault, this

would lead

to the result that

assumption of risk

is

in a

negligence action would not defeat the plaintiffs recovery, while the same conduct in a
strict liability

fault

case would bar his claim.

should also apply to

To void

On

strict liability.'^^o

would be unfair towards manufacturers

to

because this would relieve consumers from

all

4.

In

some jurisdictions

this "bizarre

the other hand,

disregard the

known

must establish three elements

759 See. e.g..

Daly

v.

also argued that

it

consumer's misconduct,

Assumption of the risk

the defendant

risk."''^^

it is

responsibility for safe product use.''^'

is

allowed to bring assumption of risk on the

part of the plaintiff as a separate defense. This term

exposure to a

anomaly," comparative

is

defined as "[pjlaintiff s voluntary

^g can be concluded from

this definition, the

defendant

in order to successfully plead this defense: the plaintiffs

General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d

1

162 (Cal. 1978); Armstrong

v.

Clone, 738 P.2d 79

(Haw. 1987).
''^O

Daly

V.

General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d

"761

1

162, 11 67-1 169.

Daly V. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 11 62, 11 72
S.W.2d 414,425 (Tex. 1984); Smith v. Goodyear Tire
1985).

"^^2

Montagnet, supra note 754,

at

754.

Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
Rubber Co., 600 F.Supp. 1561,1568 (D. Vt.

(Cal. 1978);

&
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knowledge of the danger,

its

appreciation by the plaintiff, and his deliberate and

voluntary exposure to that danger^^^ For example, these prerequisites would be fulfilled

where the driver of a car knows about steering problems but continues

Some

during his vacation. ''^'^

states take the position that

to use

it

for a trip

assumption of risk completely

bars plaintiffs claim^^^ Since assumption of risk as a complete defense

would lead

to

inconsistent results in connection with the application of comparative fault principles,

most jurisdictions have abolished assumption of risk as a separate defense and recognize
it

only as a factor in determining comparative

5.

When

Product misuse, alteration and modification

the plaintiff uses a vehicle in an abnormal

intended by the manufacturer,''^^ or
it,

fault.^^^

one must consider

how

this

when he

conduct

is

maimer or

negligently repairs

it

in a fashion not

or adds accessories to

relevant for his recovery. In

some

states

misues and alteration are statutory defenses.^^^ As for conmion law, most courts take the
position that the plaintiffs

763

Elias V.

New Laurel

^64

Palmer

v.

damages should be diminished according

Radio Station,

Inc.,

(10*^ Cir. 1974),

applying Kansas law (the driver of a 1968

an accident allegedly due to a steering defect. The court held that the driver's

in

knowledge of steering problems and the continued use of the truck could
Tafoya v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 (10*
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (1991).
^65

766

Daly

v.

General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d

728 (Wash. 1981); Sanford
^67

of

146 So.2d 558,561-562 (Miss. 1962).

Ford Motor Co., 498 F.2d 952

Ford truck was killed

to the principles

v.

Chevrolet Div.

1

Cir.

constitute assumption of risk).

1989) (applying Colorado law); CONN.

162,1 172 (Cal. 1978); South v. A.B.

Of General

Chance Co., 635 P.2d

Motors, 642 P.2d 624,628 (Or. 1982).

Ford Motor Co., 581 F.Supp. 728 (D.N.M. 1984): In an attempt to commit
became locked into a trunk of a 1973 Ford for nine days. Plaintiff claimed that the car's
trunk lock design was defective for lack of an internal release mechanism. The plaintiff could not recover
for breach of implied warranty when the use of the trunk in this fashion was not intended.
See, e.g., Daniell v.

suicide, plaintiff

''^^

See, e.g.. IND.

CODE

§ 33-1-1.5-4(3);

N.D. CENT.

CODE

§ 28-01.1-04.
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comparative

fault.'^^

However,

kind of conduct was unforeseeable for the

if this

defendant manufacturer, the plaintiffs claim

6.

As we saw
defenses. This

nmning from

is

is

completely

barred.''''^

Comparison to German product liability law
German law

earlier,

true for the statute

the time at

which the

explicitly recognizes

most of the discussed

of limitation defense (§ 852

plaintiff

knew of the

tortuous act and the tortfeasor;

§ 12 ProdHaftG: three years from the time in which the plaintiff

known of the

BGB:'^''' three years

tortuous act), the statute-of-repose defense (§ 13 sec.

knew
I

or could have

ProdHaftG:

'^''^

ten

years running from the time at which the product has been put on the market), and the
contributory negligence defense (§ 254
plaintiffs conduct, for

BGB). Under

example assumption of the

driving while intoxicated,

is

the latter, every aspect of the

risk or negligent

conduct such as

taken into consideration in the decision on whether and to

what extent he should recover. Furthermore, German law applies
§ 287

ZPO

some

jurisdictions in the United States.

in its §

an approach similar to the pure comparative fault concept, which

comparative fault system

is

unknown

in

G.

However, a concept similar

German

BGB

254

is

to the

and

used by

modified

law.

Damages

If the plaintiff has successfully brought a product liability action against the

automobile manufacturer, he

Damages can be

769

West

197,204
'^''O

Schuh

''• See,

V.

1983); States v.

entitled to recover

damages

for the

harm he

suffered.

two groups, compensatory damages and punitive damages.

336 So.2d 80,90 (Fla. 1976); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus.,
R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427,430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).

V. Caterpillar Tractor,

(111.

complete

classified in

is

Inc.,

454 N.E.2d

Fox-River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1974) (unforeseeable misuse or alteration

bar).

Chapter

I,

supra

at 65.

^^2 See, Chapter

I,

supra

at 89.

is

a
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Compensatory damages can

further be divided in

economic damages and non-economic

damages.''''^

Compensatory damages

1.

Compensatory damages
and

to restore

happened.^'"*

him

The

are

awarded

to the position

to

compensate the

he would have been

plaintiff can recover for

plaintiff for his injuries

in if the injury

never had

compensatory economic damages

if

he

suffered monetary loss. Monetary loss includes financial expenditures for medical
treatment, burial and memorial expenses, loss of income, past and future impairment of

earning capacity, expenses occurred for substitute domestic services, loss of use of
property

(e.g. vehicle),

and expenses

for repair

of damaged property ^'^^ Compensatory

non-economic damages, on the other hand, can be defined as subjective, non-monetary
losses. '^''6

They

care, comfort,

7"
^^^

See, e.g.,

include, for example, recovery for pain and mental suffering, loss of

companionship and

Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560

society,

and

consortium.'^''''

(2) (a), (b), (3) (1997).

Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46
L. Rev. 1573,1578, note 20 (1997).

Am. U.
''''5

Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560

defective product itself

most jurisdictions

is

is -

(2) (a) (1997).

like in

German law

However,
-

it

has to be emphasized that recovery for the

considered as pure economic loss for which recovery

not allowed because the provision of this kind of remedy

is

in

regulated under the

Uniform Commercial Code, see, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145,147-148 (Cal. 1965); National Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Pratt and Whimey, Can., 815 P.2d 601,604 (Nev. 1991): The court held that
damages resulting from a defective airplane engine leading to the destruction of the whole plane was
mere economic loss not recoverable under tort law. One important rationale for this rule is that otherwise
contractual statutes of limitation could be undermined, see, e.g.. Spring Motors Distribution v. Ford
Motor Co., 489 A. 2d 660,663 (N.J. 1985). On the other hand, recovery is - again like in German law allowed where a defective component part {e.g. a gas pedal) led to the damage of the entire product (e.g.
vehicle) if component part and the rest of the product are not deemed to be an integrated whole, see. e.g.,
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,867 (1986) (holding that the
turbines of a ship and the ship itself are an integrated whole. The damage of the ship by defective
turbines is no damage to other property so that recovery was precluded).

U.S. 858 (1986); Seely

'76

OR. Rev. Stat. § 18.560

(2) (b) (1997).

777

Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560

(2) (b) (1997).
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2.

Punitive damages

Punitive damages, on the other hand, are monetary

intended

compensate the

to

manufacturer for
indifference
retribution

and

they

are

that

awarded

to

intentional, malicious, reckless or willful

its

human

to

Rather,

plaintiff.'^''^

damages

safety.

not

are

punish

conduct showing

The objective of punitive damages

to

is

a
its

provide

to deter the actual defendant, as well as other potential defendants,

from

similar conduct in the future (individual and general deterrent).''''^ Unlike compensatory

damages, punitive damages are a "[pjublic remedy for a public wrong. ""^^^
automobile case in which punitive damages were awarded, and that
in

cormection with the

in this field

Grimshaw

v.

Ford Motor CoJ^^.

of comparison, German and U.S. product

common. Like U.S.

great deal in

discussed

Comparison to German product liability law

3.

Also

is

we have

significant

of punitive damages in Germany and the

introduction

manufacturer's recall duties,

A

compensatory damages

law,

German law recognizes

liability

laws have a

the classification of

economic and non-economic damages. ^^^ of

in

particular

interest is the fact that the rules regarding recovery for the defective product itself are
identical. In

is

both countries, compensation under

A common

limitation in contract

See. e.g.. Enstan

rationale for this rule

law vary from the ones

Group,

Inc. v. Grassgreen,

damage award because of

(Second) Of Torts, § 908, cmt.

would otherwise be

based on the fact that the statutes of

in tort law. Nevertheless,

an exception to

its

934 F.2d 1377,1383-1384 (5* Cir. 1991) (upholding
deterrent effect on the manufacturer); RESTATEMENT

a.;

Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46
L. Rev. 1573,1579 (1997).

Am. U.
781

is

itself

812 F.Supp. 1562,1583 note 14 (M.D. Ala. 1993).

779 See. e.g.. Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.,

the size of a punitive

7*0

law for the defective product

generally precluded by the law governing contracts, which

undermined.

'''8

tort

174 Cal. Rptr. 348

782 See, Chapter

I,

(Ct.

supra

App. 1981).

at pp. 66.
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this general rule is

made under both laws

a product and the product itself are not

However,
counterpart.

in cases

deemed

to

where the defective component

Unlike American law, German

tort

American

its

law does not recognize punitive

damages. As for the rationales and the proposal of introducing punitive damages

German law

can be referred to the discussion on punitive damages

it

of

be an integrated whole. "^^^

an important matter German law differs from

in

part

in the

in

first

Chapter.784

Another point of divergence between the law
matter of

fact,

damage awards

Germany. Damages

this

DM

exceed

rarely

amount by

An

than

on the amount of damages

to

may be

that in

Germany

the court

be awarded, whereas under U.S. law

fact finder (jury)-

Moreover, U.S. attorneys might be

juries (e.g. exposure to emotions suffered

by

plaintiff)

may

be

(unemployment insurance, health insurance, pension insurance fund)

United States

is

not as good as in Germany, that medical expenses are higher, and

that attorneys

work on contingent

^^^ See,

Chapter

I,

See, Chapter

I,

"^^^

higher than in

attorneys can on judges. Other aspects explaining this divergence

that social security
in the

of the

more influence on

German

much

and suffering awarded by German courts, for example,

explanation for this difference

this generally is the task

able to exert

United States are generally

100,000 while U.S. awards for the same kind of damage often exceed

far.

(judge(s)) decides

for pain

in the

in both countries is that, as a

supra

at 65,

note 292.

supra, at pp. 66.

fees.
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H. Conclusion

1.

Analysis of products liability law

Regarding the theories of
that the plaintiff

liability (strict liability

can base his claim on

strict liability

Although some courts may use the

defects.

label

in

the United States

and negligence), we have seen

only in the area of manufacturing

of

strict

liability

warning defect claims, the majority of jurisdictions apply,

in

for design

and

a kind of

reality,

negligence standard to these two kinds of defects. Within this standard a risk-utility test
focusing on the availability on a reasonable alternative design or warning
in

which consumer expectations

However,

in

are appropriately considered as

is

performed

one of several

factors.

order to ease the plaintiffs burden of proof, the introduction of a

presumption that an alternative design was available should be adopted by

state

common law.
With

regard

to

the

manufacturer's

unanimously recognize a post

recommendation

is

sale duty to

post-sale

warn and

duties,

the

should

courts

recall defective vehicles. This

based on the ground that the responsibility of the manufacturer does

not end with the placing of

its

vehicles on the market, because he created a potential

source of danger which constantly has to be monitored, controlled, and eventually
eliminated. In this area the National

Highway

Safety Administration and state

law should function as a double control mechanism

common

in order to increase traffic safety

by

preventing the occurrence of harmful events through post-sale warnings or recalls.
In addition to the already mentioned controversial aspects of Unites States

product

liability law, the

preemption of

state

most

difficult

common law by

Vehicle Safety Standards. This issue

is

and practically relevant issue

the Traffic Safety

Act and

/

is

the one of

or Federal

Motor

rooted in the federal system of the United States

181
(see

Supremacy Clause)'^^ and requires a balance of power between

government and the individual

states.

common law

is

is

preempted or not

The answer

intent. Currently, neither

ftiture,

wide room

for various interpretations

preemption takes place in the motor vehicle
is

Congress.

doctrine by cleary stating

do so because

it

its

of its holdings. In the
if

and to what extent

More blameworthy than

the

Supreme

could avoid the discussion surrounding the preemption

It

intent in its legislation. Until today,

was probably

issue. Potential defendants

area.

Congress nor

Supreme Court did not

however, the Supreme Court should determine precisely

Court, however,

state

to determine the issue. In its

recent analysis in Cipollone, Freightliner, and Medtronic, the
left

of whether

to the question

Supreme Court provided adequate guidelines on how

take a clear position and

federal

decisive for every aspect of the plaintiffs action and

has to be determined by focusing on Congress'
the

the

Congress has failed to

easier to pass legislation v^dthout directly resolving the

have to be advised in two ways.

First, in

every design or

warning defect case involving Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, they should
raise the

preemption defense. Since the majority of United States Courts of Appeals and

numerous
the case

state courts

argue in favor of preemption,

it is

very likely that they will win

on summary judgment. Second, since some courts take the opposite opinion,

manufacturers should not only comply with applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, but rather they should comply in the

way

that they

choose

of several safety options provided by those standards. Although

on the

part of the manufacturer,

which

will at the

to

adopt the safest

this will increase costs

end be reflected

in the product price

and, thus, be borne by the consumer, this contributes to increase traffic safety and

minimizes the manufacturer's

785

U.S. Const., art VI,

cl. 2.

risk

of facing economic loss through damage awards.
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2.

Final aspects

in

the comparison between United States and

German product liability law

a) Similarities

The most important finding
motor vehicle area

the

in

both countries

aspects even identical. This
liability (strict liability

in the

is

comparison between product Habiiity law
that both laws are very similar,

in

some

two theories of

particularly true for the recognition of

is

and

in

and negligence), the existence of three kinds of product defects

(manufacturing, design, and instruction or warning defect)

the standards applied to

,

determine product defectiveness,''^^ the distribution of burden of proof, the defenses,

and most of the damages.
Significantly, the extent to

Germany enacted

which both laws are similar has increased since

among

the Product Safety Act in 1997, empowering,

the Federal Office for

Motor

other agencies,

Traffic to take preventive measures (warning, recall) in

order to increase traffic safety. Since the American counterpart, the National
Traffic Safety Administration,
late

1

empowered with

similar authority,

was

Highway

established in the

960s,^^^ today both countries use a combination of administrative preventive check

and judicial compensatory check

to pursue the

common goal

of traffic

German

In addition, even the conceptual difference between

United States

Common Law

is

minimized

in the area

safety.

of product

Civil

liability,

Law

and

because not

only in the United States but also in Germany the rule making and development of this

786

The

starting point in

elements of a

It

seems

into

liability

law

Under
consideration consumer

risk-utility balancing.

supplemented by taking
7^7

German product

is

a consumer expectations test supplemented with

United States law, the starting point

German product

empowered

Motor Vehicle Administration with

its

liability

law.

This

is

is

-

at least in

not only reflected

been abolished

Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)) whereas

Germany

51,91

ff.).

in

some

areas

the fact that

-

the

Germany

authority only about 30 years later but also in the fact

that the privity requirement in the United States has already

BGHZ

a risk-utility analysis

expectations.

to be the trend that United States product liability law

forerunner of

is

in

this

in

1916

(in

MacPherson

only happened

in

1968

v.

(in

183
field

of law

in

The most important explanation

the existing statutes

on product

general provisions in §§ 823 ff

its

either

the task of the courts.

Germany

that in

with

is

do not address product

an incomplete or

BGB

way

is

Code from 1900

liability (the Civil

and the Product Liability Act from 1990)

liability issues explicitly (Civil

inefficient

for this finding

Code) or do address them

(Product Liability Act).

Eventually, an explanation for the remarkably significant similarities in product
liability

law

in

both countries

Both countries are highly

is

a similar economic, social, and political development.

industrialized, technologically developed,

strong. In particular, industries in both countries are characterized

manufacturing companies

(e.g.

Chrysler, General Motors, Ford;

and economically

by a large number of

BMW,

Mercedes Benz,

Audi, Porsche, Volkswagen) involved in worldwide trade. Although a few cultural
differences exist, people in both coimtries join similar education under a democratic

system and have basically the same world view. These people constitute society. Law,

on the other hand, does not

find an end in itself but pursues,

among

other things, to set

standards which are economically, socially, and politically acceptable.

seeks to find the right balance of interests.

As

Most

often,

a result, one might say both that law

mirror of society and that the nature of society

is

is

law
the

to a certain extent reflected in the

governing law.

B)

On

the other hand, three aspects in

should be outlined. The
countries

is

first

which both laws

significant difference

is

to

composed of

As

German

differ fi-om

that although the

very similar in terms of substantive legal doctrine,

practical matters.

unknown

Differences

it is

each other

law

different in terms

of

law but

is

for procedural aspects, pre trial dicovery exists in U.S.

law.

The

fact finding process

six or twelve jurors, while in

Germany

in both

under U.S. law

is left

to a jury

the judge(s) decide(s) exclusively

184

on

this issue.

Another important aspect concerns the remuneration of attorneys. In the

''88

United States most attorneys work on a contingent fee basis, some on an hourly basis. In

Germany, however, contingent
regulated

the

in

fees

do not

Attorney

Federal

The

exist.

fees

attorneys receive are

(Bundesgebuehrenordnung

Act

Fees

German

flier

Rechtsanwaelte, BRAGO).^^^

The second
federalist

structure,

difference

significant
tort

law

in

Germany

is

that

is

although both countries have a

exclusively regulated by the federal

of law

government, while in the United States

this area

law. Thus, in the United States there

not a single applicable tort law, but there are 50

tort

is

is

traditionally a matter

of

state

laws addressing and solving issues sometimes similarly, sometimes differently.

On

the one hand, this has the advantage that a variety of solutions can be provided by the
states,

which can experiment

in this area

disadvantage that United States law

is

of law.

On

not as clear as

the other hand, this has the

German

raised the question whether United States tort law should be

position taken to this

complex and

law.

The

more

latter fact

federalized.

difficult question is that the federal

has

The

government

should only slightly interfere, for example by providing optional proposals concerning
product

liability issues.

The

rationale for this position

belongs to the police powers of the states and

Moreover,

if

one pleads

for the nationalization

is

of

is

that tort

law traditionally

an important part of sovereignty.

tort law,

one must also plead for a

nationalization of other matters left to state competence (e.g. criminal law, family law)

be consistent. This, however, would violate fiindamental principles of the

in order to

United States federal system.

^88 jn

commercial

affairs,

legal

professional

however, one professional judge and two honorary jugdes (persons without

background, usually businessmen or merchants) decide the case, see,

Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG),

1077) (Landgericht,
^89

BGBl.

I

S.

907.

in

der Fassung der Bekanntmachung

Kammer flier Handelssachen).

vom

9.

§

Mai 1975, BGBl.

105
I

S.
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Third, the most important point of divergence concerns the recognition of

punitive damages. While this kind of damage
as

means of

retribution

and deterrence,

because of these two objectives and

is

is

it

recognized

unknown

to

in

U.S. product

German

tort law.

in order to create incentives for

manufacturers to produce safer products,

damages should be adopted by the German

it

is

recommended

legislature.

liability

that

law

However,

motor vehicle

capped punitive

Appendix

Examples of recall campaigns carried out by NHTSA'^^o

Company

Model

Number

Year Reason

Chrysler Corp.

Dodge Ram

960,000

1997

Transmission

Ford Motor Co.

Crown

125,000

1997

Structure,

General Motors

Cad. Delville

156,910

1997

Brakes, antiskid

BMW

3 181, IS,

410,000

1997

Throttle linkage

Mercedes Benz, N.A. S-Class

27,000

1997

Brakes, hydraulic

VW of N.A.

Audi 90

39,300

1997

Airbag

Volvo of N.A.

Model 855

12,530

1996

Fuel, throttle linkage

Toyota Motor Co.

Camry

18,746

1997

Brakes, power

Nissan Motors Corp. Altima

36,000

1996

Active Restraint Syst

Hyundai Motor Am.

Tiburon

74,965

1997

Visual systems

F355, F456

346

1997

Brakes, hydraulic

Vict.

IC

,

Ferrari

N.A.

hood

assist.

Rolls-Royce Motors

Silver

Dawn

1,621

1997

Brakes, hydraulic

Suzuki Motor Co.

TLIOOOSV

2,935

1997

Steering (motorcy.)

Harley Dav. Mot.

XL, FX, FL

176,515

1996

Fuel injection

^^0 <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/recalls/recmniy5.cfm>.
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